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Abstract
The implementations of network protocols, such as DNS, DHCP and Zeroconf, are prone to flaws,
security vulnerabilities and interoperability issues caused by ambiguous requirements in protocol
specifications. Detecting such problems is not easy because (i) many bugs manifest themselves
only after prolonged operation; (ii) the state space of complex protocol implementations is large;
and (iii) problems often require additional information about correct behaviour from specifications.
This thesis presents a novel approach to detect various types of flaws in network protocol im-
plementations by combining symbolic execution and rule-based packet matching. The core idea
behind our approach is to generate automatically high-coverage test input packets for a network
protocol implementation. For this, the protocol implementation is run using a symbolic execution
engine to obtain test input packets. These packets are then used to detect potential violations of
rules that constrain permitted input and output packets and were derived from the protocol specifi-
cation. We propose a technique that repeatedly performs symbolic execution on selected test input
packets to achieve broad and deep exploration of the implementation state space. In addition, we
use the generated test packets to check interoperability between different implementations of the
same network protocol.
We present a system based on these techniques, SYMBEXNET, and show that it can automatically
generate test input packets that achieve high source code coverage and discover various bugs. We
evaluate SYMBEXNET on multiple implementations of two network protocols: Zeroconf, a service
discovery protocol, and DHCP, a network configuration protocol. SYMBEXNET is able to discover
non-trivial bugs as well as interoperability problems, most of which have been confirmed by the
developers.
i
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CHAPTER1
Introduction
IMPLEMENTATIONS of network protocols commonly used today, such as DNS [Pau87a], Ze-roconf [SC05] and DHCP [Dro97] are often prone to implementation errors [ME04, SMCP11].
The complexity of these network protocols makes errors difficult to detect. Ambiguities in pro-
tocol specifications can cause different interpretations by developers, leading to bugs and interop-
erability errors in the corresponding implementations of network services, even for well-studied
and mature protocols. Such flaws are often hard to detect because they may only be triggered
by complex sequences of events that occur only after long execution as part of a production net-
work [LGW+08]. For example, DNS server implementations that are vulnerable to DNS cache
poisoning attacks [Dan08] are difficult to detect because the vulnerability only exhibits itself in
specific scenarios. Unlike other software errors that can be detected before deployment, the im-
pact of the vulnerabilities can be severe and the cost of fixing them is high. Although a large
body of work has focused on techniques for finding software errors, these techniques have sig-
nificant weaknesses because (i) many bugs manifest themselves only after prolonged operation;
(ii) the state space of complex protocol implementations is large; and (iii) detection often requires
additional information from protocol specifications about correct behaviour.
1.1 Motivation
In order to understand the problems of network protocol implementations and motivate research to-
ward new techniques for detecting implementation errors, it is necessary to consider real examples
that show how ambiguities in protocol specifications can cause various flaws and interoperability
problems. In the following, we introduce two examples that provide a justification for our research
throughout the rest of the thesis.
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Figure 1.1: Typical network service development, from protocol specification to implementation
1.1.1 Where do protocol implementation errors come from?
Network protocols are typically described in specifications that contain the information required
to produce a protocol implementation. Protocol specifications are usually written in informal lan-
guages, and therefore may be vague, incomplete or fail to address important properties of the
protocol implementation. These specifications are referred to by multiple manufacturers and lead
to different protocol implementations. A misinterpretation of a specification by one of manufac-
turer can cause implementation errors. Many errors are not detected until the service is in real use.
Therefore, there is a strong need for developing a method to minimise the gap between protocol
specifications and their implementations.
Figure 1.1 shows the typical development process of a network service in which protocol specifica-
tions are referenced by manufacturers to provide a network protocol implementation to end users.
Let us consider Zeroconf [CK10] network, a service discovery protocol. The protocol is described
in several standardised documents such as the “Multicast DNS” [CK10] and “DNS-Based Service
Discovery” [Stu10] specifications. Then specifications are used by multiple vendors to create dif-
ferent implementations such as Bonjour [App] by Apple and Avahi [Ava] by the Avahi Project.
Different interpretations of requirements in the specifications can cause errors, which may interfere
with the proper communications between Zeroconf implementations.
1.1.2 What effect can protocol implementation errors have?
In order to avoid the complex task of configuring all parameters of a network service, most network-
capable devices and services available on the market today support features that allow them to
configure their parameters automatically. For example, devices and services follow procedures to
select a unique service name and an Internet Protocol (IP) address in the network so that conflicts
do not occur [CK10].
Figure 1.2 shows a common office environment with networked devices that can automatically con-
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Figure 1.2: An example of network implementation errors occurring in a modern office environment
figure their network parameters using Zeroconf. According to the Zeroconf specification [CK10],
any network device that selects a conflict name must immediately reset its name with a new name
and restart its registration process. Here, let us assume that a new printer, which does not fully
comply with the required procedure for resolving a conflict of devices having the same name, is
installed in the office with the name of “printer 2”. The new printer tries to resolve the conflict but
fails. It may incorrectly select the same name or not manage to register itself on the network.
1.2 Current Techniques for Checking Protocol Implementations
Testing and verification can both be used to enhance the correctness of network protocol imple-
mentations [Ray82, Smi96]. Testing, which is a commonly used technique, involves generating
test cases, which are used to check the protocol implementation. The two most common testing
methods of network protocol implementations are conformance testing and interoperability test-
ing [APRS93]: conformance testing determines whether an implementation behaves as described
in the protocol specification, while interoperability testing is concerned with whether two imple-
mentations can interoperate as intended. A common way of doing these tests is to generate test
input packets either manually or via random testing [MRW03]. Unfortunately, as the complexity
of network services continues to increase, these methods become less effective; for example, ran-
domly generated test packets often cannot explore source code efficiently and thus miss rare errors
that are hard to detect.
Unlike testing, verification can be used to show that the implementation complies with its protocol
specifications. Model checking [CGL94] is an automatic formal verification technique for the anal-
ysis of systems. It can be used to detect certain properties such as deadlock in concurrent systems,
invariants and user defined assertions in the code. Model checking exhaustively checks programs,
3
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but it is limited by the size of the state space that it can handle [SMP10]. Static analysis [WD01]
is another popular technique that can be used to detect flaws in network protocol implementations.
While static analysis benefits from high code coverage [WD01, ULF08], it is often too impre-
cise to guarantee properties that depend on accurate information about execution state. Although
there has been much research on formal verification of network protocols [RA00, ISK06], such
approaches cannot guarantee the correctness of the actual implementation because they check an
abstract model of the protocol rather than its implementation.
Symbolic execution [Kin76] is a popular technique for generating high-coverage test cases through
exhaustively exploring all execution paths of a system. It combines the strengths of both testing
and verification. The core idea behind symbolic execution is to use symbolic variables, which
are initially allowed to have any value instead of using concrete data. Program variables are rep-
resented as symbolic expressions. Symbolic execution explores a large number of potential ex-
ecution paths and generates test data for all traversed paths. Thus, it provides developers with
high quality test cases generated after exhaustive exploration. Symbolic execution has been suc-
cessfully used to find bugs in a broad range of applications ranging from libraries to operating
systems [CDE08, CGP+06, GKS05, GLM08a]. Symbolic execution has been used to check net-
work protocol implementations [CGP+06, SMCP11], but prior work (1) considered only single
input packets and (2) focused on generic errors, ignoring protocol semantics.
Consider the following concrete example. In a dhcpd daemon, each connection from a client
has internally an associated state machine that handles input packets from the client and generates
required responses. Symbolic execution on an input packet from the client can generate the possible
input packets necessary to explore various states of that machine. Therefore, the generated input
packets can be used to check whether the daemon is correctly implemented to process the input
packets that it can receive. After receiving an input packet, the daemon expects to exchange more
packets in an exact order to provide specific functionality. For example, the dhcpd daemon may
assign an IP address to the client only after it has sent a packet offering an available IP address
followed by having received a packet that requested the offered IP address. A single generated input
packet using symbolic execution cannot effectively check whether multiple packets are correctly
handled as specified in the specification.
1.3 Research Statement
The focus of this thesis is to check the correctness of network protocol implementations. It pro-
poses a novel effective technique designed to check complex network protocol implementations
against their specifications and to discover various types of implementation flaws. As a result,
the technique enables developers to reduce the gap between specifications and implementations of
network protocols.
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To achieve this, we overcome three challenges: (1) due to the size of complex network protocol
implementations, symbolic execution must explore a potentially exponential number of paths in the
source code — an effect called path explosion [CDE08]. The total amount of state and the number
of constraints grow during symbolic execution, and this limits the size of programs that can be
executed symbolically; (2) by default, symbolic execution can only detect low-level programming
errors such as null pointer references. In order to detect deviations from protocol specification,
we need a mechanism that can detect violations in observed input and output packets; and (3) per-
forming symbolic execution on a single input packet generates test packets that are inadequate for
exploring the deep paths reached only after handling exchanged multiple packets.
In this thesis, we introduce a technique that automatically checks a network protocol implementa-
tion against its specification and discovers various types of errors that are hard to detect manually.
As input, our technique takes the C source code of a network implementation and a set of rules de-
rived manually from the protocol specifications, which define correctness and security violations.
Developers specify a set of rules in a high-level packet description language that states invalid pat-
terns in the sequence of packets exchanged between a client and a server. It then uses an expressive
automata-based approach for the detection of rule violations.
Using symbolic execution, our technique generates an exhaustive set of input packets that achieve
broad and deep exploration of the program state space. We execute the implementation on these
test packets and check whether the implementation correctly handles them according to the packet
rules. If an implementation is supposed to exchange multiple packets with a client in order to reach
a certain program state, our technique repeatedly performs symbolic execution with additional
packets. The output packets in response to input packets show externally visible behaviour of the
implementation. Considering the observed behaviour according to the given set of rules enables us
to check the network protocol implementation.
Furthermore, our technique uses the generated test input packets to test interoperability between
different implementations of the same network protocol specification. Once a set of test input pack-
ets are generated from a network implementation using these test packets, they are executed against
all available implementations. Analysing the observed output packets from these implementations
explores the interoperability between these implementations. Since they implement the same pro-
tocol specification and are tested under the same conditions with the same test input packets, they
are meant to behave in the same way, i.e. the response packets must be consistent.
We developed a system based on this technique, SYMBEXNET, that checks network protocol im-
plementations, and empirically evaluated it with multiple network protocol implementations. We
are able to generate high-coverage test input packets avoiding the path explosion problem and con-
struct concrete input packets that can detect low-level errors leading to crashes. We also find hard
to detect errors that lead to incorrect protocol behaviour, such as generating unintended response
packets for test inputs, by using the rules derived from the protocol specifications of the target
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implementations. Our experiments reveal that multiple implementations of the same protocol can
behave differently resulting in interoperability problems.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. A novel checking technique that uses symbolic execution combined with rule-based packet
analysis to generate automatically high-coverage test packets from the source code of net-
work protocol implementations in order to detect various errors in these implementations.
2. Two enhancements to symbolic execution so that it can explore efficiently various network
protocol implementations avoiding the path explosion problem. The enhancements provide
both broad and deep exploration of the state space resulting in high source code coverage of
the network protocol implementations.
3. A new interoperability testing technique that generates test packets to check interoperabil-
ity between multiple implementations of the same protocol using symbolic execution. The
behaviour of these implementations for each test packet is compared to verify that they are
interoperable with each other.
4. Our experience implementing this approach in a system, SYMBEXNET, together with an
evaluation that shows various real-world flaws in multiple implementations of two protocols:
Zeroconf and DHCP.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 provides some preliminary definitions that are used throughout the thesis and the back-
ground that is required to understand our work. In order to have a better understanding of the ben-
efits and limitations of formal network verification, it also includes a case study applying model
checking to a network protocol managing configuration parameters.
Chapter 3 describes an overview of the proposed SYMBEXNET architecture. It also provides a
description of how SYMBEXNET explores the state space of a given network protocol implemen-
tation and generates high quality test input packets using symbolic execution. It introduces two
methods of performing symbolic execution, which can generate test input packets achieving broad
and deep exploration of the program state space. For checking network protocol implementations,
deciding which parts of input packets to mark as symbolic is an important consideration in order to
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generate effective test packets. The chapter proposes a way to avoid path explosion by introducing
a symbolic marking strategy, which marks individual packet fields as symbolic instead of an entire
input packet.
Chapter 4 describes verifiable specification that can be derived from network protocol specifi-
cations. A packet rule description language that allows the verification of the externally visible
behaviour is also introduced.
Chapter 5 presents a method for checking the interoperability of multiple network implementations
of the same protocol specification. It shows how test packets generated using symbolic execution
can be used for interoperability testing. The chapter also describes a method for the detection of
interoperability problems through an extension of our rule description language.
Chapter 6 evaluates the SYMBEXNET approach. After describing the implementations details of
SYMBEXNET and the experimental set-up for testing, it discusses the application of SYMBEXNET
to two standard network protocols, Zeroconf and DHCP. It reports the results from checking mul-
tiple available implementations of these two protocols.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides discussion of future work and concludes.
7

CHAPTER2
Background
THE purpose of this chapter is to provide definitions and the necessary background to under-stand the concepts that are used in this thesis. Formal verification and testing are widely used
techniques to improve the dependability of network protocol implementations. Although they can
help detect various network bugs, they suffer from their own limitations. Symbolic execution can
be seen as a technique that takes advantages of formal verification and testing in order to generate
high quality test cases that can effectively check software implementations.
This chapter is structured as follows: first, the definitions of network protocol, specification and
implementation are provided followed by examples of network protocols in Section 2.1. After that,
various techniques used to verify network protocols are described in Section 2.2. A case study
applying model checking to a network protocol managing configuration parameters is showed in
Section 2.3, discussing the benefits and limitations of using formal verification techniques to verify
network protocols. The chapter finishes with Section 2.4 that discusses different kinds of testing
techniques for checking network protocols. In particular, Section 2.4.2 describes the details of
symbolic execution in terms of test case generation.
2.1 Network Protocols
A network can be defined as a collection of entities interconnected by communication technologies
that enable the exchange of information [Tan02]. The communicating entities require an agreement
to exchange information and such agreements are called network protocols. Therefore, throughout
this thesis, we will use the following definition for the term “network protocol”:
Definition 2.1 (Network protocol). A network protocol is an agreement between two or more net-
work entities to communicate by exchanging information over a network.
A network protocol consists of a set of network entities that play a specific role in the protocol
and defines a set of rules which govern the exchange of messages through interactions of the par-
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ticipants over the interface between them [For03]. Network entities use well-defined formats for
exchanging messages, and each message contains information that leads to a defined response of
the receiver.
Usually, a message is divided into small pieces, called packets. Although in the literature there has
been several different definitions of a packet, here the term can be defined as follows [For03]:
Definition 2.2 (Packet). A packet is a sequence of binary octets of data exchanged over a connec-
tion between network entities.
A packet comprises of two main parts: the header and the payload. The header usually contains
network layer protocol data carried by the packet; for instance, in the case of an IP packet, the
header includes the length of the packet, a sequence number, a protocol type and the source and
destination IP addresses. The payload, which is also called the body, carries the actual user data or
data from upper layer protocols that the packet is delivering to the destination. For example, in a
DNS packet, the header information includes the source and destination IP address and the payload
contains DNS messages, such as QNAME and QTYPE. Different network protocols use different
packet formats.
Network protocols can be roughly categorised into two groups [Ste93]: stateless and stateful pro-
tocols. In stateless protocols, an implementation simply handles a request independently from any
previous request so that the communication occurs in independent pairs of requests and responses.
On the other hand, in stateful protocols, the implementation maintains the connection with com-
municating network entities and exchanges a series of packets until the entire transaction is over,
meaning that the implementation is aware of previous requests.
For example, in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.0) [BLFF96], a web server generates
a response for a request from a client and does not maintain state about the client. Whereas, in
the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [Kle01], a mail server handles a sequence of messages
from the client. In this type of protocol, a server expects a specific packet sequence and executes
certain functions only when it receives an expected packet from the client.
Consider two network entities at one layer, A and B, that are connected by a channel. In order
to complete a certain task, such as finding a printer, A and B must exchange packets through the
established channel based on rules provided by the network protocol between them. Each packet
delivers specific information, and the task is completed after exchanging a sequence of packets in
an exact order. The series of exchanged packets between these two instances is called a packet
stream, and it can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Packet Stream). A packet stream (or a sequence of packets) on a connection be-
tween network entities communicating with each other is a series of consecutive packets on that
connection.
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Figure 2.1: The relationship between protocol, specification and implementation
When a network protocol is designed, all the information regarding methods, behaviour and packet
formats are described in documents, which form the protocol specification, to be referenced by
developers of a protocol implementation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between protocol,
specification and implementation. When the requirements of a protocol P are specified, they are
described in a protocol specification S and the specification is implemented in I . For example, the
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is a network configuration protocol for devices on
TCP/IP networks and described in several protocol specifications [Dro97, AD97]. The specifica-
tions are implemented in several products such as isc-dhcp [Int] and udhcp [DR02].
In the domain of network communication protocols, a protocol specification is a description of the
intended and required behaviour of its participants [BS80,For03]. The nature of the network com-
munication, i.e. the exchange of actual data and the intended behaviors, are usually defined by a
standard specification such as Request For Comments (RFC). The goal of protocol specifications is
to furnish a set of logical rules for exchanging information between network entities communicat-
ing with each other [Yua88]. A protocol specification is defined by several pieces of information,
such as a general description of the services that it provides, a list of the types and formats of mes-
sages exchanged between the entities and rules governing the reaction of each entity to messages
from other entities.
Protocol specifications are usually implemented into a software program by protocol participants,
which communicate with one another [BS80]. In general, a protocol specification is assumed
a complete and self-contained document, thus the specification must be implemented exactly as
expected and intended. As individual vendors implement the same specification, there typically
exist multiple implementations providing the same functions to users. For the purpose of this
thesis, we will use the following definition of protocol implementation.
Definition 2.4 (Protocol implementation). A protocol implementation is a network enabled soft-
ware developed based on requirements specified in a standard protocol specification.
In Unix and other operating systems, there are special system applications that execute in the
background, which are called “network daemons”. Network daemons are often started at system
boot time and await network requests for the functions that they provide. Many network daemons
are implemented based on standard protocol specifications.
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We describe two examples of network protocols; Zeroconf and DHCP. Both are widely used and
implemented by many different vendors. They are used throughout the thesis to demonstrate the
various problems posed and addressed by our approach.
Example 1 — Zeroconf protocol. Zeroconf [CK10] is a network discovery protocol that enables
devices on an IP network to configure themselves and their services automatically and be discov-
ered without manual intervention. Zeroconf is a serverless implementation of the DNS naming
function built on top of standard DNS and uses the same format of a DNS packet.
Figure 2.2 shows the message format for DNS. The format describes different types of DNS mes-
sages, which are processed based on the information of each field. The format has a 12-byte
fixed-length header in addition to a variable data part reserved for question, answer, authority and
additional DNS information. In DNS packets, the fields deliver several key control flags. For ex-
ample, a 16-bit identification field in a query packet is copied to the response packet by the daemon.
It is then used by a device that sends the query to identify the corresponding response packet.
The Zeroconf protocol is defined as part of two RFC specifications: multicast
DNS (MDNS) [CK10] and DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [Stu10]. The MDNS RFC
covers basic behaviour such as probing, announcements and responses of Zeroconf; the DNS-SD
RFC describes the structure of resource records and service discovery mechanisms.
Zeroconf supports service discovery to allow applications to find a particular service name or all
instances of a given service type. When the Zeroconf daemon receives a DNS query packet for
a given type or name, it responds with any services matching the query. Figure 2.3 illustrates
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Figure 2.3: Simplified state transition diagram for Zeroconf
the finite state machine that specifies how Zeroconf handles service registration and discovery. In
Zeroconf, a new network service, such as a file server or printer, is added as follows. In order
to register a new network service, a device selects a service instance name. It then sends a DNS
packet registering a new service to its local Zeroconf daemon. This causes the Zeroconf daemon
to send out a broadcasting DNS packet three times to the network in order to probe if the service
name already exists. If there is no response, the daemon starts to send a broadcast DNS packet
announcing the new service at least two times. After the successful announcement, the daemon
waits for request packets and replies if it receives a query packet requesting a service running on
the daemon.
Example 2 — DHCP. In this thesis, we also use DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Proto-
col) [Dro97], a standard mechanism to obtain configuration parameters. Network devices that are
connected to IP networks must be configured before they can communicate with other hosts. DHCP
allows a server to assign network configuration parameters dynamically, especially the IP address,
to clients. DHCP has eight types of packets, such as DHCPDISCOVERY and DHCPOFFER. They
share the same format but can be distinguished based the values of certain fields in the packets.
DHCP is standardised in the RFC 2131 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol [Dro97]. The
DHCP-RFC describes the behaviour of a dynamic configuration service framework that passes
configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network. The RFC includes the description of
client-server interaction for allocating a network address and the structure of message types used
in the protocol. Since the protocol is based on the Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) [CG85], it also
describes methods maintaining the compatibility between DHCP and BOOTP.
Figure 2.4 shows the format of a DHCP packet. The first 12-bytes of the DHCP packet are used
to deliver basic information about messages and client types, such as hardware type and address
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length. After that, the format has various fields for IP addresses that are needed to provide an
available IP address to clients. For example, the address to be assigned to a client is stored in
the assigned IP address field (yiaddr). Options contains a variable list of data records passing
configuration information to clients.
Figure 2.5 illustrates a simplified state transition diagram of a DHCP server handling an IP ad-
dress allocation request from a client. When a DHCP-enabled client is connected to the network,
the client sends a broadcast query packet (DISCOVERY) requesting an IP address from a DHCP
server. Any DHCP server that receives the query may send a packet (OFFER) offering an available
IP address. The client responds to the packet by sending a broadcast response packet (REQUEST)
init
Waiting
Request
Select Release
DISCOVERY
OFFER
REQUEST DHCPACK
RELEASE
Figure 2.5: Simplified state transition diagram for DHCP
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accepting the offered IP address. The server responds to the request packet with an acknowledge-
ment packet (DHCPACK), thus completing the assignment process. Before leaving the network, the
client terminates the leased IP address by sending a packet that requests to release the address to
the DHCP server (RELEASE). The server then returns the client’s IP address to the available address
pool.
2.2 Network Verification
As explained in the previous section, in order to provide the intended functions, network entities
communicating with each other must exchange a series of packets as described in the protocol
specification. Usually system verification is understood as the process of checking that an object,
i.e. design or implementation, meets its specification. In the same way, network protocols can be
verified through checking a protocol design or implementation against its specification.
Software programs implementing network protocols have their specific characteristics that are dif-
ferent from other types of software and these characteristics make it difficult to apply verification
techniques. For example, since a network protocol defines rules for communication between net-
work entities, interactions with other entities needs to be modeled and verified. Constructing a
protocol model within an environment often results in a model having complex states, thereby
making it difficult and expensive to explore.
Although the verification of a protocol design can detect errors at an early stage, the implemen-
tation may still contain errors because of human mistakes, incorrect implementations and wrong
interpretations of a specification. Therefore, verifying a protocol implementation is important to
guarantee that the protocol provides the desired behaviour specified in its protocol specification.
Prior verification research work [SMP10, Zav08, ISK06] has focused on the design rather than the
implementation. We focus on implementation verification to examine the correctness of imple-
mentations, i.e. whether they behave as specified in their protocol specification without errors.
The purpose of this section is to provide a general overview of verification methods and related
research. After presenting the main goals of network verification in the next section, we discuss
various verification approaches in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Goals of Network Verification
In this section, we describe the goals of network verification that have been used in verifying
network protocols. Liveness and safety are the main properties that need to be verified in order to
guarantee the correctness of a given implementation. Liveness is a property that a correct function
is provided during execution, i.e. a program eventually enters a desired state, while safety is a
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property that some unintended function is not provided during execution, i.e. a program never
enters an undesired state.
Since we try to verify protocol implementations that are able to send and receive network packets,
we define the verification goal for these two properties as follows:
Definition 2.5 (Liveness property). A network protocol implementation that receives a packet even-
tually enters a desirable state such as correct handling of input packets.
Definition 2.6 (Safety property). A network protocol implementation that receives a packet never
enters an undesired state such as unexpected termination.
2.2.2 Verification Approaches
The idea of using a method verifying the correctness of programs via a formal proof on an ab-
stract model, called formal verification, is well explored. Examples include the processing of input
packets in a protocol implementation [SGE00], the correct control of information flow in a routing
protocol [Fea04, FB05, ISK06, AW01, WBLS09], the reliable data transfer in a transport proto-
col [DKNP06, DKN+10], the selecting of parameters in a configuration protocol [Fea04] and the
handling of incorrect packets [Sch81, BOG02]. Researchers have explored various approaches for
the verification of network protocols. Formal verification techniques provide a proof that an im-
plementation satisfies its verification goals. In the following, we show when network verification
techniques can be used in the development of network protocols.
Figure 2.6 shows how various formal verification techniques are used as part of the protocol de-
velopment, ranging from specification to maintenance. Automated Theorem Proving considers the
relationship between a specification and its implementation as a theorem in logic. It is therefore
applied during the design and implementation phases. In Model Checking, the specification is de-
scribed in the form of a logic formula, and the truth is determined with regard to an abstract model
provided by an implementation. Therefore, it can also be applied during the design and implemen-
tation phases. In the case of Static Analysis, the runtime behaviour of a protocol implementation
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is predicted based on a direct analysis of the source code. Therefore, it usually occurs during the
implementation phase. Research on network verification aims to increase the ability of formal
verification techniques to be applied earlier (Formal specification), to cover the entire protocol de-
velopment cycle (Formal foundation), or to verify dynamically the behaviour of a target system at
runtime (Runtime verification). Next we provide explanations of each technique in detail.
Automated Theorem Proving
Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) [Sla74, CW96] deals with the development of programs that
show that some statement is a logical consequence of a set of statements. In other words, ATP
proves that an implementation satisfies a specification by mathematical reasoning. The relationship
between a specification and its implementation is considered as a theorem in logic. The proof can
use axioms and assumptions provided by the implementation. The increase in the number and
types of theorem provers is evidence for the growing interest in theorem proving.
There are theorem provers that can be used to verify network protocols. Isabelle [Pau93] is a
generic theorem prover, designed for interactive reasoning in a variety of formal theories. The
main proof method of Isabelle is a higher-order version of resolution, based on higher-order uni-
fication. Isabelle has been used to formalise numerous theorems from mathematics and computer
science and to prove the correctness of security protocols. Simplify [DNS05] is an automatic the-
orem prover and combines decision procedures for several important theories, and also employs
a matcher to reason about quantifiers. It uses two techniques, error context reporting and error
localisation, for helping the user to determine the reason that a conjecture is false. However, Sim-
plify lacks support for important programming language constructs such as pointers, structures
and unions. Prototype Verification System (PVS) [ORS92] is a comprehensive interactive tool for
specification and verification, combining an expressive specification language with an integrated
suite of tools for theorem proving and model checking. The specification language of PVS is a
typed higher-order logic with a richly expressive type system with predicate subtypes and depen-
dent types. It has been applied to a wide range of verification tasks, such as security algorithms,
real-time and hybrid systems and distributed algorithms.
To verify network protocols, high order logic is used to reason about possible protocol executions.
Due to certain limitations, such as a lack of automation (there is still a need for human interven-
tion), theorem proving techniques are mainly used to describe protocols with formal languages or
semantics, thus making the designed protocol specification verifiable [WBLS09,GS05]. In contrast
to ATP, our technique provides an automated method to check the implementation.
Model Checking
Model Checking [CGL94, CW96] is a technique that explores all possible states of a target system
in a systematic manner. Figure 2.7 shows an overview of system verification using model checking.
In order to apply model checking to a protocol, two inputs are required: a verification model and
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Figure 2.7: Conceptual view of system verification using model checking
a logical property. The verification model represents an abstraction of the given protocol and the
property prescribes what the protocol should do and what it should not do. A model checker, the
software tool that performs the model checking, examines all possible states to check whether they
satisfy the given property. If a state violates the property, the model checker reports an error and
provides a counterexample that indicates how the model could reach the undesired state.
For network protocol verification, the protocol specification is described in the form of a logic for-
mula, and the truth is determined with regard to an abstract model provided by an implementation.
An implementation is typically modeled as a finite-state machine that consists of nodes and edges
representing states of a system and possible transitions, respectively. Model checking then explores
all possible states and checks the logical correctness of the implementation.
Although model checking has been successfully applied to many network protocols [ISK06],
it also has several weaknesses. For example, it suffers from the state-space explosion prob-
lem [SMP10]. Although several extensions have tried to address this issue by using partial order
reduction [FG05], program slicing model reduction [DHH+06], decomposition into components
and/or sub-layers [AL03], an assume-guarantee approach [FQ03], it still remains a difficult issue
that needs to be tackled. In addition, protocol specifications need to be formalised and protocol
models need to be written manually.
Static Analysis
Static Analysis [WD01, AHM+08] has been used for decades to improve software quality and to
detect bugs. Static analysis techniques work on the program source code and take the specification
of the property to be checked as input. This specification is written in a given specification lan-
guage. Since static analysis is carried out on the source code, it is possible to check correctness
immediately after the code was written. Static analysis also systematically explores all possible
execution paths in a program at compile time and thus achieves good source code coverage.
In the domain of network verification, static analysis is used to predict (detect) errors from
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an implementation of network protocols without execution [Fea04, XZM+05]. Depending
on the technique employed, static analysis can detect various flaws from possible program-
ming errors [BPS00, EGHT94] to user-defined properties such as the reachability between end
hosts [Hol02, XZM+05]. Once an implementation is analysed, the technique reports that the im-
plementation is safe, i.e. the implementation satisfies the specified property or gives an error trace
that violates that property. However, static analysis also has several drawbacks, for instance, a
trade-off between scalability and precision, high false positive rates, etc. In comparison, our ap-
proach is more precise than static analysis because it does not abstract the implementation under
test and thus does not suffer from the inherent imprecision of static analysis.
Formal Foundation
Another approach is to apply formal verification techniques during all the development phases of
a system and provide a formal foundation of network protocols. In this approach, architectures or
protocols are specified with formal languages or semantics, making the designed system correct by
verification.
Karsten et al. [KKPB07] focus on formalising communication behaviour from a set of basic ax-
ioms to verify functional correctness of a protocol. Their framework can be used to analyse network
protocols formally based on structural properties, and also to derive working prototype implemen-
tations of these protocols. They axiomatically specify basic interworking concepts such as the
deliverability of messages and show that their approach can assist in the proofs of correctness of
communication protocols, such as TCP over NAT, DNS and Hierachical Mobile IP.
The work on metarouting [GS05] addresses the issue that there is a shortage of routing protocols
that meet the needs of network engineers. The work defines routing protocols using a high-level
and declarative language and enforces a clean separation of protocol mechanisms from routing
policy. The proposed solution allows for the construction of routing algebras and has correctness
conditions that can be derived automatically for a new routing algebra.
Anduo et al. [WBLS09] propose the design and implementation of a declarative network veri-
fier (DNV). In their work, network protocol specifications are expressed using a declarative logic-
based query language, which can be mapped automatically to logical axioms. These axioms are
then directly used in theorem provers to validate protocol correctness. Since their specification can
be executed as an implementation, the approach bridges specification, verification and implemen-
tation. However, the method can only be applied to the implementations of declarative networking
protocols.
Melange proposed by Madhavapeddy et al. [MHD+07] introduces a framework that comprises a
domain specific language, which is called the Meta Packet Language (MPL), a compiler and a
suite of libraries. MPL is used to describe the format of network protocols. The specification
of a protocol in MPL are then used by the compiler to generate code and required interfaces for
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the protocol. Their approach, since based on type-safe language, helps eliminate many errors
and provides additional benefits, such as automatic garbage collection. However, their framework
cannot detect implementation flaws caused by misunderstood requirements.
Although formal foundation provides a unified framework, it is not yet fully mature and only
applicable to specific network domains such as declarative networking.
Runtime verification
This is a verification technique that adopts mathematical language to formalise requirement spec-
ifications, such as temporal behaviour, events or actions. According to these formal properties, a
verifier that continually performs monitoring and analysis rigorously checks them against target
implementations at runtime. If any violation is found, the verifier identifies the error.
For example, monitoring-oriented programming (MOP) [CR05] is a runtime formal model check-
ing framework for software systems. The MOP framework automatically generates observers mon-
itoring the system for given formal properties. The monitoring observers can discover if the speci-
fied properties are violated, which is hard to discover by ordinary testing. Based on automatic code
generation and program instrumentation, MOP provides support for applying runtime monitoring
and recovery mechanisms in software development to improve reliability. CrystalBall [YKKK09]
is a runtime model checker that can predict and prevent inconsistencies in deployed distributed sys-
tems. CrystalBall can periodically collect snapshots of neighbouring hosts and construct a global
state of a distributed system. If bugs or inconsistent states are found, it steers the execution away
from them.
Continuous runtime verification can improve overall robustness of a system and find bugs that can
only be detected after prolonged operation. However, overall performance overheads are difficult
to avoid in these approaches [SSRL07, SLS05, YKKK09].
2.3 An Example of Model Checking
As described, formal verification techniques based on model-checking have been successfully used
for the verification of hardware designs, communication protocols and safety-critical systems. Such
approaches explore the entire state space of a system to ensure that there are no violations of cor-
rectness properties. For network operators, formal verification can provide correctness assurances
for autonomous networks throughout the design and operation. Therefore, we describe a case
study that applies model checking to a network management protocol in order to understand the
advantages and disadvantages of formal verification for network protocol implementations.
In this section, we performs model checking on a specific management protocol, namely the self-
configuration protocol of cellular base stations. We show how it can benefit from model checking
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and describe the problems that make it difficult to apply formal verification techniques to real-world
network protocol implementations [SMP10].
2.3.1 Self-Configuration of Base Stations
As a case study, we describe a protocol to configure network parameters automatically in a net-
work. We show how formal verification techniques can be adopted to analyse the protocol. A
self-organising network (SON) is an autonomous network specified by the 3GPP that configures,
optimises, heals and protects itself to help operators reduce operational expenses [3GP08]. In a
SON, evolved Node B (eNBs) and Home Node B (HNBs)—also called Femtocells or home base
stations—are cellular base stations that cover macro and small (home-range) areas, respectively. A
cell is the basic geographic unit covered by a base station. A cell has a unique physical-layer cell
identifier (PCI) as a basic configuration parameter that identifies the cell.
PCI assignment protocol. In a SON, the PCI is an essential configuration parameter for a cell
and corresponds to a unique combination of one orthogonal and one pseudo-random sequence for
data encoding. Only 504 unique PCIs are supported because of compatibility with legacy base
stations [3GP08]. When a new base station is deployed, a PCI needs to be selected.
New Cell
Cell B
PCI = 1
Cell A
PCI = 1
Collision
Cell B
PCI = 3
Cell A
PCI = 1
New Cell
Cell D
PCI = 1
Cell C
PCI = 6
Confusion
Figure 2.8: Examples of collision and confusion in PCI assignment
Figure 2.8 illustrates the problems of PCI collision and confusion. If the PCI of Cell B is equal to
1, there is a collision between Cells A and B because the PCI of Cell A is also 1. If the PCI of
a new Cell D is chosen to be 1, it leads to confusion of Cells B and C with A. This would cause
hand-over procedures from B to the new Cell D to fail. To achieve collision- and confusion-free
assignments, the 3GPP proposed a PCI selection protocol with several optional extensions.
According to the SON specifications [3GP08], an automated PCI selection algorithm should fulfil
the following two requirements regardless of deployment strategies:
• collision-free: a PCI should be unique in the area that the cell covers;
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• confusion-free: a cell should not have neighbouring cells with identical PCIs.
To achieve collision- and confusion-free assignments, the 3GPP proposed a PCI selection algorithm
that is divided into four main steps: (1) a base station tries to get a valid range of PCIs; (2) it
performs neighbour discovery; (3) it exchanges a neighbour relation table that contains information
about neighbours of neighbours with its neighbours; and (4) it selects a random PCI from the list
of candidate PCIs.
Modelling and evaluation. To assess the satisfaction of the collision- and confusion-free prop-
erties, we adopt model-checking as a rigorous method to evaluate a PCI selection algorithm. We
use the SPIN model-checker [Hol97] because it supports the verification of asynchronous and
distributed process system. It uses the PROcess Meta LAnguage (PROMELA) to describe the
algorithm and its assignment policies. PROMELA can be translated into a C program for effi-
cient verification using SPIN. It supports the specification of safety properties in linear temporal
logic (LTL). The semantics of LTL provides temporal modal operators that can make statements
about properties that are globally true or eventually true. This is sufficient to describe collision-
and confusion-free PCI assignments.
We consider an abstract model of the PCI assignment problem. We only model the configuration
procedure and do not consider failure of processes for simplicity. We adopt this simple model to
illustrate the problem and investigate the feasibility of formal verification. We use SPIN to exhaus-
tively search the state space for collision or confusion violations of the PCI selection algorithm
described previously. Overall, both our verification and simulation results provide evidence that
collisions and confusions cannot be avoided in the concurrent PCI selection, which is not addressed
by the 3GPP specification. However, the scalability of model-checking becomes limited even in
this simple scenario. Our detailed evaluation results are described in Appendix A.
2.3.2 Discussion
Our evaluation of verification and simulation has yielded several insights. Both verification and
simulation are useful for detecting hidden design flaws and finding correctness violations. Simu-
lation is easier to understand and perform. It scales better because it avoids the problem of state
space explosion. However, simulation has lower state space coverage and only tests scenarios un-
der predefined conditions, thus may not discover infrequently occurring problems. On the other
hand, formal verification techniques are more rigorous when assessing required properties. How-
ever, modelling and verification of a complex network is challenging and requires a certain level of
abstraction. The problem of state space explosion is the main obstacle when applying formal veri-
fication using model-checking. Even our simple deployment model with simplifying assumptions
has only limited scalability.
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Our comparison of simulation and verification using model-checking reveals their respective
strengths. Verification is more rigorous when discovering incorrect behaviour but its limited scal-
ability precludes its use in non-trivial deployment scenarios. Therefore, many developers use pro-
tocol testing as a mainstream method for checking network protocols. We discuss the details of
testing techniques for network protocols in the rest section.
2.4 Network Testing
In the domain of network protocols, implementations are tested to ensure that they will work cor-
rectly as described in their specifications and are properly interworking with other entities as in-
tended without any errors. Therefore, research on communication protocol testing has mainly
focused on finding these errors. Since the generation of high quality test inputs is an important
factor in finding bugs, many researchers on network testing have been trying to develop test case
generation techniques. In this section, we will describe various techniques that are used to generate
test inputs and check protocol implementations to find errors.
2.4.1 Testing Techniques
The goal of network testing is to achieve high code coverage, which means achieving as much
statement and branch coverage of the target protocol implementation as possible. Test inputs with
high code coverage improve the dependability of the target implementation.
Conformance and interoperability testing. Conformance testing is to check the conformance
of the implementation of a protocol to its specifications. Since conformance testing is considered
a necessary step before operation, it has been studied and formalised [DSU90, Tre99, BFN+05].
Different from conformance testing, in which the focus is to check an implementation against its
protocol specification, interoperability testing checks if two or more implementations correctly im-
plement a protocol specification necessary to ensure successful interaction before network services.
In general, interoperability testing is the process of testing implementations from multiple vendors
by interacting in such a manner as to exercise the network protocol under test.
Although both testing techniques aim to check different aspects of network protocol implemen-
tations, they both aim to check whether the implementation is fully conformant with a specifica-
tion. Therefore, many testing techniques use protocol specifications as a main source of gener-
ating high quality test inputs. Typically, the specification is translated into a formal model, such
as a finite state machine or use cases, and an algorithm is used to generate test cases from that
model [FJJV97, NFLTJ06]. However, the problem with test cases generated from the specification
23
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
is that they often do not cover all possible execution paths of the implementation. In addition,
expert knowledge of a specific protocol specification is required when the model is derived.
Random testing. Random testing [BM83] or fuzz testing [MFS90, FM00] is a simple testing
technique, which uses randomly generated test cases to check whether a target program works as
intended. It is one of the most commonly used techniques for network testing. The main advan-
tages of this technique are its ease of implementation and the low overhead in choosing inputs.
However, it is also well-known that random testing is not effective for detecting bugs that only
occur when a given program receives specific inputs and they provide low code coverage [FM00].
Some fuzz testing techniques provide grammars to enable the testers to add protocol specific knowl-
edge [God07]. Although fuzz testing techniques support effective bug finding methods, they also
suffer from the limitations of random testing.
Grammar-based testing. Fuzz testing is limited to test programs dealing highly-structured in-
puts such as compilers and interpreters. Since these programs have multiple stages for handling
complex inputs, such as lexing and parsing, fuzz testing struggles to explore a program beyond
these early stages. Research on grammar-based testing has been practically used for such programs
since the 1970s [Han70,SB99]. More recently, attention has turned towards applying the testing to
network protocols [HK07, HWC+10]. Methods used to generate test inputs can be roughly clas-
sified into two categories: random [BM83, Ait02, FM00] and exhaustive [GLM08b, LS06] genera-
tion. The first uses randomly modifying well-formed input packets, while the second exhaustively
generates all possible test inputs from a formal model. However, since test inputs are generated
from simplified (or abstracted) formal specifications, not many new test inputs can be generated.
In addition, by checking a program with the test inputs generated from an abstracted specification,
it is easy to miss errors.
2.4.2 Symbolic Execution
To address the limitations of random testing techniques, several researchers have proposed auto-
mated test case generation techniques that improve code coverage. Test case generation is consid-
ered as a production of sets of specific input values that can be used for testing a program. The
goal is to produce test cases that achieve high source coverage.
Symbolic execution is a popular technique for generating high-coverage test cases and finding
implementation flaws. The core idea behind symbolic execution [Kin76] is to use symbolic values
as input values, instead of actual data, and to represent values of program variables as symbolic
expressions. Consequently, the output values computed by a program are a function of the symbolic
input values, resulting in the creation of a symbolic execution tree. The tree is a representation of a
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1 int handle_input (packet p) {
3 ... parsing input packet p ...
5 if (flags == 0x01)
6 return QUERY; /*query*/
8 if (flags == 0xf0)
9 abort(); /*error*/
11 return RESPONSE; /*response*/
12 }
Figure 2.9: Source code that handles a received input packet.
program, which identifies the decision points and the assignments associated with each conditional
branch.
Symbolic execution maintains symbolic state. Two pieces of information are associated with each
state: a symbolic map (SM) and a path condition (PC). The SM associates symbolic values with
program variables, and the PC is a first order quantifier free boolean formula involving relations
between input variables, which expresses the conditions necessary for reaching that state. During
execution, a list of constraints on the inputs is accumulated to PCs by the set of symbolic repre-
sentations of each condition predicate along the path. In order to explain the main concepts used
in symbolic execution, we provide an example below.
Let us consider the code fragment in Figure 2.9, which processes a received input packet based
on its flags value. It contains a statement abort() when the value of flags is equal to 0xf0.
The function returns QUERY when the flags value is 0x01 and, otherwise, returns RESPONSE.
Symbolic execution starts from the first line of the source code and proceeds, branch by branch, to
the end of the program.
Initially, the PC is true and flags has symbolic value X. At every conditional statement, the PC
is updated with assumptions about the inputs to select between alternative paths. For example,
after the execution of the first conditional statement in line 5, PC’ is created, initialised to PC ∧ X
6= 0x01 and PC is updated to PC ∧ X = 0x01 (“if” branch). If the path condition becomes false,
symbolic execution does not continue for that path and terminates. At the end of the symbolic
execution of a path, the current PC is solved and the output variables are represented as the test
inputs.
Figure 2.10 shows the corresponding symbolic execution tree. Initially, flags has a symbolic field
value x that can be any value. At each branch point that is related to flags, the value for flags is
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flags==0x01
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Figure 2.10: The corresponding symbolic execution tree to Figure 2.9
updated with assumptions about the symbolic field. For example, after the execution of the second
if statement (line 7), both alternatives of the if statement update the flags value accordingly
and one of them leads to the abort() error.
The idea has provided a broad and useful spectrum of tools to programmers for verifying the
correctness of programs. In the beginning, symbolic execution was used to verify simple sequen-
tial programs [Kin76, BEL75, How77]. However, there were a number of challenges that had to
be solved [Dil90]. Recently, symbolic execution has received renewed attention with increased
computational power and new advanced algorithmic developments. For example, some propos-
als [ZC10, HBBR10] use symbolic execution in conjunction with static analysis to automatically
synthesize executions to reproduce bugs that occurred in the field, without incurring the overhead
of execution tracing. Symbolic execution is also used to compute a behavioural characterisation
of program changes and check for logical differences and similarities between two versions of a
program [PDEP08, CFF+06,PYRK11]. More recently, symbolic execution has evolved to provide
the basis for energy-aware programming through platform-specific energy profiles [HEKSP11].
To date, symbolic execution has already been applied to check network protocol implementations.
The input packets from the network can be used as symbolic values. Symbolically executing
the implementation with these inputs generate test packets that result in a high degree of cover-
age [CGP+06, SMCP11]. However, prior work (1) typically considered a single packet, starting
exploration from the initial program state, and (2) looked only at generic errors.
We use KLEE [CDE08], a symbolic execution tool for C programs capable of automatically gen-
erating high-coverage test cases to find low-level bugs. KLEE, at its core, is an interpreter for
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Figure 2.11: Overview of symbolic execution and the structure of KLEE.
an intermediate language (i.e. bytecode). Thus, as shown in Figure 2.11, KLEE requires the
source code to be compiled into a bytecode (instead of a native executable) using the LLVM com-
piler [LA04]. KLEE then interprets the bytecode and functions as a hybrid between an operating
system and an interpreter by providing environment models and redirecting system calls to these
models. KLEE understands the semantics of POSIX runtime APIs such as open, read and write.
There are several challenges associated with the use of symbolic execution. First, it suffers from the
exponential number of paths in the code—an effect called path explosion. The total amount of state
and number of constraints grow during symbolic execution, and this limits the size of the programs
that can be executed symbolically. Recently, several techniques, such as interleaving symbolic exe-
cution with random testing [MS07] and guiding path exploration heuristically [CGP+06,GLM08a],
have tried to address this challenge.
Second, the number of iterations of a loop is difficult to decide. Especially, when the number of it-
erations depends on symbolic variables, loops cause an explosion in the number of execution paths
to be explored. In order to solve this problem, various techniques have been introduced, such as
the use of simple rules to automatically guess an input constraint defining the number of iterations
of input-dependent loops [GL11], introducing new symbolic variables that represent the number
of times each loop in a program executes [SPMS09], and the use of simple abstraction heuris-
tics [CTS08]. Since most network protocol implementations process multiple incoming network
packets using loops, this challenge need to be addressed in order to apply symbolic execution to
network protocol implementations.
The third problem concerns interactions with the environment, such as data reads from the file
system. In order to execute a program, the program needs to symbolically invoke all libraries and
drivers symbolically. However, such symbolic invocations require extensive amounts of memory
and computation power. The latest generation of tools tackle this problem by providing custom
models and libraries that help explore all possible legal interactions with the target program’s en-
vironment [CDE08, BHK+07]. Since network protocol implementations usually interact with the
environment and also need to interact with other network entities, this is an important requirement
for a technique checking network protocol implementations.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter has outlined research relevant to the design and implementation of a network verifi-
cation system. We began with the definition of several terms, such as network protocol, network
specification and network verification, which are required to understand a technique checking net-
work protocol implementations. We then provided an overview of various formal verification tech-
niques, which can be used to check implementations. The survey showed the benefits of formal
verification for network protocols. However, some of the limitations of formal verification tech-
niques, such as the state space explosion problem, motivate the need for a new approach that can
effectively check network protocol implementations while avoiding such limitations. In particular,
we mentioned the limitations through our case study applying model checking to a network man-
agement protocol. Since we believe symbolic execution is a technique that is most suitable, we
provided a detailed overview of symbolic execution, especially focusing on test case generation
and its limitations.
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Checking Network Protocol
Implementations
IN this chapter, we propose a new approach for checking network protocol implementations viasymbolic execution and rule-based packet analysis. Since network protocol implementations are
fundamentally different from other software programs (e.g. they typically need complex packet
exchanges), we devise two exploration methods for performing symbolic execution on protocol
implementations. To provide broad and deep exploration of the state space of a target implemen-
tation, we generate test input packets that achieve high source code coverage. We then replay a
set of generated input packets and observe potential violations of rules derived from the protocol
specification, which will be introduced in Chapter 4. We implement this approach as part of a
practical network protocol checking system called SYMBEXNET. It first symbolically executes a
protocol implementation to generate high coverage input packets and then automatically checks a
set of rules constraining permitted input and output packets.
We demonstrate how our approach generates effectively test input packets for protocol implemen-
tations using symbolic execution. Before describing the architecture of SYMBEXNET, we discuss
the requirements of using symbolic execution for checking network protocol implementations in
Section 3.1, followed by a description of the SYMBEXNET system architecture in Section 3.2. In
Section 3.3, we explain how test input packets are generated from protocol implementations using
symbolic execution. Two methods of performing symbolic execution that provides broad and deep
exploration of the state space are introduced in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. Our prototype
implementation of SYMBEXNET is discussed in Section 3.6. The chapter finishes with a discussion
and summary in Section 3.7.
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3.1 Requirements
Although symbolic execution has improved considerably in terms of performance and scalability,
there remain problems when it is applied to network implementations. The main challenges are:
Challenge 1 (C1): Deciding which bytes to mark as symbolic. The behaviour of a network
implementation is determined by the input packets that it receives from other entities. For example,
a DNS server receives UDP query packets from clients and replies with UDP response packets after
having resolved the DNS names in the query packets. Thus, symbolic execution, when checking
network protocol implementations, must consider the input packets from the network as symbolic
values. Since symbolic execution executes an implementation with these symbolic inputs and
generates test input packets, deciding which bytes to mark as symbolic has a big impact on the
quality of generated test cases [AGT08, BCE08].
For large and complex network protocol implementations, it is infeasible to mark the complete
packet as symbolic because this would result in too many paths to be explored during symbolic
execution. As the size of a symbolic input increases, maintaining and solving symbolic constraints
associated with the inputs along the paths becomes expensive. When checking network protocol
implementations, deciding which input packets and bytes to mark as symbolic is an important
factor in order to generate good test packets while avoiding for path explosion problem.
Challenge 2 (C2): Handling of multiple packet exchange. Many network protocol flaws occur
after handling specific sequences of packets, not just a single packet. If a network protocol imple-
mentation is executed symbolically with a single input packet, the generated test packets cannot
detect flaws caused by these specific sequences of packets. Therefore, utilising symbolic execution
to cover not only a single symbolic packet but also a sequence of symbolic packets is an important
challenge in order to detect complex errors appearing only after multiple packets.
Challenge 3 (C3): Detecting incorrect behaviour. By default, performing symbolic execution
on network protocol implementations detects only low-level generic errors, e.g. out-of-bound ac-
cesses, division by zero, assertion failure etc. [CDE08]. However, there are additional errors that
are caused by an incorrect implementation of the specification. These errors are difficult to detect
using symbolic execution, because they require protocol-specific knowledge.
In order to detect these errors, developers can use pre-defined inline assertions. These assertions
specify undesired behaviour or errors in terms of internal program variables, environment variables
and external system states. For example, if a protocol specification states that the time to live (TTL)
field value can never be zero, a developer can add “assert(TTL != 0)” at the proper point in
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the program. However, adding such inline assertions is expensive and requires manual effort.
Challenge 4 (C4): Assuring interoperability. If flaws are caused by misunderstandings of re-
quirements in a protocol specification, they cannot be detected easily because developers believe
them to be correct behaviour. These types of flaws can be found if there are other implementa-
tions faithfully implement the same protocol based on a correct understanding of the specification.
By comparing the output packets in response to the same input packet, multiple implementations
for the same protocol specification can be tested and compared under the same conditions. This
approach can discover interoperability problems.
3.2 SYMBEXNET Architecture
Our goal is to determine the compliance of a network protocol implementation with its protocol
specification and the interoperability with other network entities. Our approach combines the tech-
niques of testing, verification and symbolic execution. It is simple to use yet rigorous enough to
discover non-trivial bugs, providing an automated method to check protocol implementations.
At a high level, our approach performs test packet generation, test packet replay and validation of
packet rules in order to check a network protocol implementation and its interoperability. It uses
symbolic execution on a given network protocol implementation to generate test input packets. We
propose symbolic exploration methods that can explore broad and deep program state spaces so
that the generated packets can achieve high code coverage. During test packet replay, we consider
the implementation as a “black-box”. It processes the set of generated test packets, and we observe
the output packets generated validating them for compliance against to the protocol specification.
The SYMBEXNET architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. To check a network protocol implementa-
tion, SYMBEXNET takes two inputs, the specification and the source code. The specification and
source code are used to derive a set of packet rules and generate test input packets, respectively.
Any violations detected are reported as the output of the protocol checking.
When verifying a network protocol implementation with SYMBEXNET, there are five steps, as
labeled in the figure. First, a set of rules describing the behavioural properties are derived from
the protocol specification by developers (¶). SYMBEXNET symbolically executes the network
protocol implementation to obtain a set of test input packets that result in high code coverage
when processed by the network implementation (·). After that, it executes the set of test packets
under controlled conditions and observes the output packets generated by the network implemen-
tation (¸), which are validated for compliance against the protocol specification (¹) or interoper-
ability checking (º). Each step is described in more detail below:
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Figure 3.1: SYMBEXNET system architecture.
1. Creation of packet rules (cf. Section 4.3). The first step is to develop a rule-based verifiable
specification from a protocol specification. The requirements describing behavioural prop-
erties of the protocol are extracted from the protocol specification and expressed in terms of
the desired input-output behaviour (i.e. the set of packets). SYMBEXNET provides a packet
rule language to describe correct sequences of packets.
2. Generation of test packets (cf. Sections 3.4 and 3.5). To validate as many packet rules
as possible, SYMBEXNET requires a good set of test packets with high code coverage. It
uses symbolic execution to explore a large number of code paths in the network protocol
implementation and, based on this, synthesises a set of test input packets. To satisfy the
challenge C1 requirement (deciding which bytes to mark as symbolic), SYMBEXNET runs
the implementation on a symbolic input packet by repeatedly marking parts of the packet as
symbolic.
Generated test packets can achieve a broad and deep exploration of the state space of the
protocol implementation. To explore state space broadly, SYMBEXNET applies symbolic
execution on a single symbolic input packet and generates test input packets (cf. Section 3.4).
For deep exploration, it repeatedly performs symbolic execution on selected symbolic input
packets to generate sequences of test input packets (cf. Section 3.5). This method satisfies
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the challenge C2 (handling of multiple packet exchange).
3. Replay of test packets (cf. Section 3.4.2). The generated test packets are replayed on the
original network implementation. Each test packet is sent to the implementation in a con-
trolled environment, and the output packets generated by the implementation are recorded
by SYMBEXNET, together with the input packets, as a packet stream.
4. Validation of packet rules (cf. Section 4.6). The challenge C3 (detecting incorrect be-
haviour) can be overcome by means of packet rule validation. In this step, the captured
input and output packets from the previous step are validated against the packet rules from
step 1. SYMBEXNET translates the packet rules into a set of non-deterministic finite au-
tomata (NFAs). Through analysing all captured replay packets against each NFA, SYM-
BEXNET detects rule violations. The rules can also check interoperability between packet
streams from multiple implementations of the same protocol.
5. Checking for Interoperability (cf. Sections 5.3 and 4.4.1). In this step, SYMBEXNET pro-
vides a solution for the challenge C4 (assuring interoperability). To check if multiple im-
plementations of the same protocol specification are interoperable, SYMBEXNET applies
steps 2 and 3 to the implementations and generates packet streams for each implementation.
Generated packet streams obtained from an implementation are replayed not only on the
original implementation but also across implementations. These two steps are performed
under the same conditions, thereby the behaviour of an implementation for a given input can
be compared with others.
For checking interoperability, SYMBEXNET uses interoperability rules that normalise a cap-
tured packet stream. The normalised packets from a stream of an implementation are com-
pared to check for inconsistencies. For each inconsistency, SYMBEXNET reports an interop-
erability error: the test input value that led to the interoperability error and the behaviour of
implementation for the given test input value.
3.3 Symbolic Execution and Exploration
SYMBEXNET uses symbolic execution to check the compliance and the interoperability of network
protocol implementations. In both cases, SYMBEXNET executes the network protocol implemen-
tation symbolically by marking sets of bytes in an input network packet as symbolic variables.
Symbolic execution then explores all (or as many as possible in a given time budget) code paths
in the network implementation that are related to a symbolic variable. To do that, SYMBEXNET
(1) marks packet fields as symbolic variables and (2) injects the symbolic packets into the network
protocol implementation.
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3.3.1 Symbolic Marking
As explained in Section 2.4.2, a set of bytes of an input packet need to be marked as symbolic.
An open challenge is to decide which fields to mark as symbolic while avoiding the path explosion
problem. Marking the complete input packet as symbolic would result in too many paths, and most
of these paths would not increase code coverage because they would refer to invalid packets, which
are normally discarded by an implementation.
Typically a network packet consists of multiple fields, which are part of the packet header. Most
protocol implementations contain logic for handling these fields. Therefore, SYMBEXNET uses
these fields as symbolic variables instead of entire input packets.
Original 
packet
Symbolic 
packet
0x19 0x2b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 ...
0x19 0x2b * 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 ...*
DNS ID DNS 
Flags
DNS Total 
questions
DNS Total 
answers
DNS Total 
authority
DNS Total 
additional
Figure 3.2: Original and symbolic packets.
For example, Figure 3.2 shows how an input packet is processed as a symbolic packet. Let us
consider that the flags field is marked as symbolic. When SYMBEXNET receives an input packet
that needs to be handled as a symbolic packet (original packet in the figure), it marks the flags field
as symbolic and replaces the concrete value of this field within the packet with symbolic values
while keeping the other fields unchanged.
Since the size of the symbolic fields is small compare to the whole packet, fewer symbolic con-
straints are maintained during the execution, thereby alleviating path explosion problem. It is
important to be strategic and only mark packet fields symbolic that are likely to result in high
coverage gains. Our technique allows developers to mark any combinations of packet fields as
symbolic. Comparing the number of generated test packets for different combinations of packet
fields help understand the sensitivity of each field in the implementation. In the experiments in
Section 6.4.1, we consider all combinations of fields in DNS packets, starting with one symbolic
field, and then progressively advancing to more fields, with good results.
We propose two alternative interfaces to developers for symbolic marking: field mode and custom
mode. Figure 3.3 shows how these two modes can be used to mark packets as symbolic. In field
mode, developers decide which fields to mark as symbolic. This requires SYMBEXNET to have
access to a description of the offsets and lengths of packet fields for a given protocol specification.
In custom mode, symbolic bytes in a symbolic packet are specified as pairs of offsets and lengths.
Thus, developers select which bytes of the input packet are marked as symbolic. In this mode,
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Figure 3.3: Marking modes for a symbolic input packet.
SYMBEXNET does not require any information about the packet format.
3.3.2 Symbolic Packet Injection
To perform symbolic execution, symbolic packets must be injected into the network and processed
by the implementation under testing. An important issue is to decide how to inject symbolic packets
without requiring major changes to the network protocol implementation. When an implementation
receives a given input packet, the packet is intercepted by SYMBEXNET, which marks all or parts
of it as symbolic and starts the symbolic execution process using its symbolic execution engine.
Since symbolic packets are delivered over the network, the location in the source code, of which the
implementation receives and processes input packets must be identified. Most C network protocol
implementations use the standard socket API to receive input packets on a given port (e.g. port
5353 for mDNS).
Figure 3.4 shows an example of source code from a network protocol implementation that pro-
cesses incoming packets from the network. Lines highlighted with gray are handcrafted to identify
symbolic input packets. The implementation follows a standard way of network programming: it
creates a socket with the socket() system call, binds the socket to an address consisting of a port
number using the bind() system call and receives data using the recvmsg() system call. When
the implementation receives a symbolic input packet, it marks the packet as symbolic variable using
the klee make symbolic() function.
When SYMBEXNET executes an implementation symbolically on symbolic inputs, it explores the
paths corresponding to various input packets. How to explore the paths is another important fac-
tor for the quality of generated test packets. If a method explores the search space of a program
effectively, it covers many possible execution paths in the program. In order to explore the imple-
mentation effectively, we present two symbolic exploration methods, in the next section.
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1 if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < -1) {
2 avahi_warn(‘‘socket() failed’’);
3 }
5 server_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
6 server_addr.sin_port = htons(AVAHI_MDNS_PORT); // 5353
7 av = bind(fd, &server_addr, sizeof(server_addr);
9 len = recvmsg(fd, &mdns_msg, 0); // receive mdns message
11 if(memcmp(mdns_msg, ‘‘symbolic_packet’’, 15) == 0) {
12 /* discover symbolic packet and mark it as symbolic */
13 char* sym_buf;
14 klee_make_symbolic(sym_buf, sizeof(sym_buf), ‘‘symbolic_variable’’);
15 }
Figure 3.4: An example of network implementation source code.
3.4 Single Packet Exchange Symbolic Execution
In single packet exchange symbolic execution (SPE-SE), SYMBEXNET performs symbolic exe-
cution on a single input packet specified as a symbolic input. Since SPE-SE performs symbolic
execution to a single symbolic input packet and explores program code paths associated with that
packet, it is well suited for stateless network protocol implementations that treat each request inde-
pendently from previous requests. The checking process of SYMBEXNET using SPE-SE is com-
posed of two tasks: test packet generation and test packet replay.
3.4.1 Test Packet Generation
In order to run an implementation symbolically, SYMBEXNET sends a symbolic input packet to the
network. When the implementation receives the symbolic packet, it intercepts the packet and marks
given packet fields as symbolic. When encountering branches that depend on symbolic variables,
symbolic execution automatically generates alternative values and executes paths for these values.
Symbolic execution then explores all possible execution paths corresponding to the various input
packets. At the end of each execution path, SYMBEXNET generates a concrete test packet that is
stored on a local disk.
3.4.2 Test Packet Replay
Generated test packets are then executed (“replayed”) using the original network protocol imple-
mentation. The replay process automatically executes an unmodified version of the implementation
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Figure 3.5: The replay process for a test input packet p.
on all of the test packets generated by SYMBEXNET.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how SYMBEXNET performs replay. The process comprises the following four
steps, as labeled in the figure: it configures the replay conditions and runs the unmodified native
implementation (¶); it runs a test client (·), it coordinates a test client to inject a test packet (¸);
and it captures the network traffic (¹).
Configure the replay conditions (¶). SYMBEXNET executes the unmodified implementation
under the same conditions under which the test packets were generated (e.g. using the same con-
figuration parameters) so that any violations detected during symbolic execution can be confirmed.
At the beginning of the replay process, SYMBEXNET starts the implementation and configures the
replay network. For example, in the case of the Zeroconf protocol, this includes registering the
same services, opening the same port numbers, etc.
Construct test packets during the replay stage (·). When the unmodified implementation exe-
cutes in the configured environment, SYMBEXNET selects one of test cases to construct a test input
packet. The value of the individual test case provides detailed information on how to construct a
test input packet. SYMBEXNET uses this information to create input packets that have concrete
values derived from the test case. For example, if a test case is for the flags field and its value is
0x82, constructing a test input packet p replaces the value of the flags field with 0x82. SYM-
BEXNET communicates to the client information required to send the constructed packet p to the
implementation (e.g. destination IP and destination port).
Inject a test packet to the network (¸). The client establishes a communication channel to
the implementation. After the channel was established, the client injects the test packet p into
the test network. SYMBEXNET controls the client so that it can send the test packet when the
implementation is ready to receive it, such as after completing service registrations. Replayed
packets causing crashes of the implementation are reported during the replay process.
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Capture network traffic (¹). To validate the network protocol implementation, SYMBEXNET
records all network traffic, i.e. input and output packets generated by the implementation and clients
during the replay. The captured traffic is used as one of inputs in the next step, rule validation (see
Chapter 4). If a network protocol implementation shows unintended behaviour for a test packet,
rule validation detects this based on the recorded network traffic.
3.5 Multi Packet Exchange Symbolic Execution
The method described in the previous section is useful to check stateless network protocol im-
plementations because they process each input packet as an independent request. However, it is
not suitable to check stateful network protocol implementations because the generated test pack-
ets cannot explore code execution paths that can be reached only after receiving more than one
input packet. In order to overcome this limitation, we develop multi packet exchange symbolic
execution (MPE-SE). Unlike SPE-SE, MPE-SE performs symbolic execution on multiple sym-
bolic packets instead of a single symbolic packet. It can thereby generate all possible test packet
sequences that a target implementation can receive.
3.5.1 Problem of Symbolic Exploration
Next we illustrate why SPE-SE cannot explore deep code paths using the example in Figure 3.6.
The source code shows a finite state machine in its simplest form, which is used in many network
protocol implementations, such as DHCP, to handle a series of incoming packets based on its
previously received packets.
The protocol has an initial state, ST START, and takes three successive input packets p1, p2 and
p3, which match to the states, ST 1, ST 2 and ST END, respectively. In order to check the code, if
we mark the first input packet p as symbolic, symbolic execution explores the statements located
within the switch statement in line 8. Since we mark p1, the first received packet, as symbolic,
symbolic execution generates the test input packets that start with 0, 1, 2 and 3 for ST 1, ST 2,
ST 3 and ST END, respectively. Note that the switch statement checks the first byte of the input
packet. These test packets are all possible inputs that the program is expected to receive and broadly
explore the statements for the corresponding state. For example, the test input packet starting with
0 explores the statements between lines 10 to 14.
When symbolic execution reaches to line 19, it generates a test packet that starts with 11 because
the if statement accesses the second byte of the input packet. However, the statements in lines 22
and 23 (highlighted with gray in the figure) cannot be explored because of the condition comparing
the value of the first flag. The value of first flag becomes true only after processing the
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1 enum state {ST_1, ST_2, ST_3, ST_END};
2 boolean first_flag = False;
4 while (current_state != ST_END)
5 {
6 input = get_input();
8 switch (input[0])
9 {
10 case ST_1:
11 /* Do something with input and set first_flag to True */
12 handle_first_pkt(&input);
13 first_flag = True;
14 break;
16 case ST_2:
17 if (input[1]==0)
18 handle_query(&input);
19 else if ((input[1]==1) && first_flag) {
20 /* The following routines are not explored */
21 /* if we only mark the first arrived packet as symbolic */
22 handle_requested(&input);
23 abort(); /* error */
24 }
25 break;
27 case ST_3:
28 /* Do something different with input and set current_state */
29 handle_final_packet(&input);
30 break;
32 /* ... etc ... */
33 }
34 }
Figure 3.6: An example C program for a state machine in a traditional network protocol implementation.
first packet, and consequently sending a test packet starting with 11 cannot explore the source code
located within the if statement.
Similar to this example, when receiving an input packet, many network protocol implementations
make decisions based not only on information that is contained in the packet but also from pre-
viously received packets. Therefore, SPE-SE cannot explore the code paths that depend on a
sequence of received packets.
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3.5.2 Generation of Packet Sequences
To explore the statements that were left unexplored in the previous example, SYMBEXNET intro-
duces the concept of multi-packet exchange symbolic execution (MPE-SE). MPE-SE explores all
possible sequences of packets using multiple symbolic input packets.
Since MPE-SE handles multiple symbolic packets and generates a set of packet sequences, it needs
to store the symbolic packet that is currently being processed and the generated packet sequences.
When SYMBEXNET checks a network protocol implementation, it maintains: (1) a symbolic index
indicating the sequence number of an input packet that is to be executed symbolically and (2) a
symbolic sequence tree containing all generated sequences of test packets.
The symbolic sequence tree characterises the set of sequential input packets generated during sym-
bolic execution. In the tree, nodes represent program states, and edges between nodes represent
transitions between states. Each transition is labeled with the input packet required to effect the
state change.
Initially the symbolic index is set to one and the symbolic sequence tree only has a root node.
When SYMBEXNET encounters a branch while executing the implementation symbolically, it ex-
plores all possible values and generates one test input packet for each explored path. Since each
input packet triggers a state change, after generating all possible test packets for a given symbolic
index, SYMBEXNET adds a node for each test packet to the tree and labels the transition with the
packet. For example, if SYMBEXNET generates 10 test packets after symbolically running an im-
plementation with the first symbolic input packet, it adds 10 nodes for these packets to the root of
the tree, labeling each transition with the test packet.
Thus, the final symbolic sequence tree contains all possible sequences of input packets that explore
the program state. By means of MPE-SE, SYMBEXNET exhaustively explores the code paths of
the program and generates a symbolic sequence tree, representing all possible sequences of packets
that the program can handle.
To explore code paths efficiently, SYMBEXNET employs a combination of concrete and symbolic
execution. It uses the generated sequences of packets, which enable it to explore deep states of the
implementation, as input for next round of symbolic execution.
Figure 3.7 gives a high-level overview of MPE-SE. Since MPE-SE repeatedly performs symbolic
execution and updates the maintained symbolic information, it has two phases: execution and
generation.
In the execution phase, the implementation behaves normally, i.e. processes all input packets con-
cretely until it receives a symbolic packet. When the implementation receives a symbolic packet, it
executes symbolically and generates test packets. In the generation phase, SYMBEXNET updates
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Figure 3.7: High-level overview of multi packet exchange symbolic execution.
Require: symbolic index SI , symbolic sequence tree ST
Ensure: symbolic sequence tree ST
1: SI = 1
2: ST = root
3: repeat
4: temp paths = find all path(ST )
5: for all path in temp paths do
6: perform concrete execution(path)
7: receive symbolic packet()
8: generated paths = perform symbolic execution()
9: add generated path(ST , generated paths)
10: end for
11: SI = SI + 1
12: until check for availability(ST )
Figure 3.8: Pseudocode for MPE-SE.
the symbolic index and symbolic sequence tree and derives test packet sequences from them. SYM-
BEXNET repeats both phases until it cannot find a packet sequence that can explore new program
code paths.
The pseudocode for MPE-SE is presented in Algorithm 3.8. It consists of 4 steps, as labeled in
Figure 3.7:
1. Concrete execution. The protocol implementation concretely processes all input packets
that arrive before receiving symbolic packet (line 6). After that, it awaits a symbolic input
packet. SYMBEXNET manages the sequence numbers of the received packets and decides
when to run the implementation symbolically based on the value of the symbolic index SI .
2. Symbolic execution. If the sequence number of an input packet is equal to the value of
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the SI , SYMBEXNET marks the input packet as symbolic and executes the implementation
symbolically instead of concretely (line 8).
3. Update symbolic information. After performing symbolic execution on the implementa-
tion, the generated test packets are inserted into the symbolic sequence tree ST and the value
of SI is increased by one (line 9 and 11).
4. Derive test packet sequences. SYMBEXNET derives all possible packet sequences from the
symbolic sequence tree. For each sequence, SYMBEXNET checks whether the next symbolic
execution can be performed. If no further symbolic execution is required, SYMBEXNET ter-
minates the process of packet sequence generation. For sequences that allow the implemen-
tation to receive the next symbolic packet, SYMBEXNET feeds the selected sequences to the
next execution phase, in order to explore more code execution paths (line 12).
3.5.3 Formal Model
We formalise MPE-SE and show how the defined concepts play a key role in generating sequences
of packets. A model for MPE-SE is a tuple:
M = (ΣS ,ΣT ,Σσ,Σpkt)
where ΣS , ΣT , Σσ and Σpkt are finite sets of states, transitions, symbolic packets and generated
input packets, respectively. Here, Σpkt is the set of generated test input packets using MPE-SE.
Σpkt can be decomposed as follow: Σpkt = Σpkt 1 ∪ Σpkt 2 · · · ∪ Σpkt n where Σpkt n is the set of
generated test packets from the symbolic execution with the symbolic index n. Each transition t in
the set ΣT is a 3-tuple, t = (st, et, pktt), where st, et and pktt are the start state, next state and
input packet, respectively.
States used in MPE-SE, called symbolic states, differ from normal states, on which the usual pro-
gram execution operates. Symbolic states can store information about symbolic execution: the
sequence of packets to reach the current state, the symbolic input packet and the generated test
input packets. A symbolic state is a 4-tuple:
η = (s, pi, σ,Σpkts)
where s ∈ S is a state; pi is a sequence of packets that brings the execution to the state pkt1 : pkt2 :
· · · : pktn for all pkt1, pkt2, · · · , pktn ∈ Σpkt; σ ∈ Σσ is an input packet that needs to be handled
symbolically; and Σpkts is a set of generated test input packets after symbolic execution with the
given symbolic index.
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3.5.4 Code Exploration
Let us revisit the example C program introduced in Figure 3.6, which has statements that cannot be
explored by SPE-SE. We now apply MPE-SE to the example to show how the method can explore
stateful network protocol implementations effectively.
Initially, SYMBEXNET creates an empty symbolic sequence tree and sets the symbolic index to
1. Since the symbolic index is equal to 1, when the implementation receives an input packet for
the first packet exchange, SYMBEXNET marks the input packet as symbolic and starts to explore
the implementation symbolically— the first symbolic execution. After completing the exploration
of the implementation symbolically, SYMBEXNET generates the test input packets that start with
0, 1, 2 and 3 for ST 1, ST 2, ST 3 and ST END and inserts a corresponding four nodes into the
symbolic sequence tree. As discussed, the code between lines 22 and 23 cannot be explored using
the generated test packets from the first symbolic execution.
After updating the symbolic sequence tree, SYMBEXNET increments the index to 2 and com-
putes all possible packet sequences in the tree starting from the root to each leaf node. Next,
SYMBEXNET runs the implementation concretely with each derived sequence where execution
reaches line 6 after completing the first packet exchange. For example, if SYMBEXNET runs the
implementation with a test packet starting with ST 1, the implementation executes the function
handle first pkt() followed by setting first flag to true and awaits the next packet ex-
change.
Since the value of the symbolic index is now 2, SYMBEXNET marks the second input packet
as symbolic and explores the implementation with another symbolic packet—the second symbolic
execution. SYMBEXNET generates a test packet starting with 11 when it reaches a symbolic branch
condition (line 19). Previously, the test packet with the same value did not explore the statements
within the branch because first flag was false. However, since the concrete execution of the
first packet exchange configured the first flag to true, SYMBEXNET can explore lines 22 and
23 successfully.
We have illustrated how SYMBEXNET explores the source code of a network protocol implemen-
tation using MPE-SE. During MPE-SE, SYMBEXNET builds concrete test packet sequences that
lead to new code paths. Whenever SYMBEXNET finishes a symbolic execution with a given sym-
bolic index, it generates test packets and updates the symbolic sequence tree. SYMBEXNET saves
concrete test packet sequences as part of the symbolic sequence tree.
Figure 3.9 compares the program exploration method for (a) SPE-SE and (b) MPE-SE. In SPE-
SE, test packets generated from the first symbolic input packet and these packets explore possible
execution paths. In MPE-SE, test packets are generated not only from the first symbolic packet,
but also from subsequent symbolic packets, which ensure a deeper exploration of execution paths.
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Figure 3.9: The program exploration method for a) SPE-SE and b) MPE-SE.
Symbolic execution availability check. As explained in the previous section, the generated test
packets using MPE-SE trigger the next round of symbolic execution. However, not all test packets
generated by MPE-SE allow an implementation to receive the next symbolic packet. For these
packets, no further rounds of symbolic execution are required. Identifying these test packets can
reduce execution time of MPE-SE. For this purpose, SYMBEXNET uses a symbolic execution avail-
ability check.
Packets that do not trigger symbolic execution are invalid packets. They typically explore func-
tions that validate input packets, thereby making the implementation simply discard these packets.
Therefore, these packets can be identified by checking for the existence of response packets.
Identifying these packets while a protocol implementation is executed symbolically is difficult for
two reasons. First, symbolic execution runs compiled code similar to an interpreter. Execution
takes much longer than running natively. Second, only after spending all the given time budget for
symbolic execution, it knows that no response packet was generated.
Therefore, before running symbolic execution with each generated test packets, SYMBEXNET runs
the unmodified implementation with the generated test packets and verifies if the implementation
can receive a symbolic packet. We refer to this as the symbolic execution availability check. If
the test packets allow the implementation to receive a symbolic packet, SYMBEXNET terminates
the availability check. SYMBEXNET then runs the implementation symbolically with the symbolic
packet and generates further test packets.
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3.5.5 Replaying Sequences of Test Packets
In SPE-SE, symbolic execution generates test input packets and SYMBEXNET replays the packets
on the original version of the implementation. In contrast, MPE-SE uses a sequence tree containing
sequences of input packets that SYMBEXNET must replay.
For replay, SYMBEXNET first derives a set of packet sequences from the symbolic sequence tree.
Since each node of the symbolic sequence tree represents a generated test packet, the packets from
the root to each leaf node of the tree form a packet sequence. Packet sequences are then executed
with an unmodified protocol implementation using the same replay method as described in Sec-
tion 3.4. When injecting the test packets of a packet sequence into the network, SYMBEXNET sends
them in the order of their creation. Any replayed sequence of packets causing crashes is recorded
during the replay process. All the network traffic between the implementation and clients during
replay is also captured to validate the behaviour of the implementation against its specification.
3.6 SYMBEXNET Implementation
In this section, we present our prototype implementation of SYMBEXNET. There are two versions
of SYMBEXNET: a regular version (default) that will be used to detect errors violating requirements
described in the specification and an enhanced version that finds interoperability problems, which
will be introduced in Chapter 5.
In the following, we focus on the regular version, describing the components of the SYMBEXNET
system. The components can be classified into two categories: protocol-specific components and
common components.
3.6.1 Protocol Specific Components
Since SYMBEXNET is a system that checks network protocol implementations, it requires com-
ponents specific to the target network protocol. In SYMBEXNET, three components are classified
in this category: an unmodified implementation, a symbolic implementation and a test client. To
check a target protocol implementation, developers need to prepare these three components. Dur-
ing the process of generating test packets using symbolic execution, SYMBEXNET uses the sym-
bolic implementation and the test client. For the replay process, SYMBEXNET uses the unmodified
implementation together with the test client.
Symbolic implementation. Since SYMBEXNET uses symbolic execution for test input generation,
an implementation need to be compiled into a bytecode format that can be executed by symbolic
execution. For example, a symbolic implementation is in a bytecode format compiled using the
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LLVM compiler.
Unmodified implementation. In SYMBEXNET, an unmodified implementation is an executable bi-
nary program compiled with a default compiler, such as GCC. Each generated test case is replayed
on the unmodified implementation so that the behaviour of the implementation can be analysed.
Test client. SYMBEXNET also requires a test client that can communicate with the unmodified
and symbolic implementations. The client behaves as a network entity to the protocol implemen-
tation. It sends symbolic input packets to the symbolic implementation for symbolic execution and
generated test input packets to the original implementation for replay.
3.6.2 Common Components
Most components in SYMBEXNET are independent of the targeted protocol implementation. These
are the database, the controller, the monitor and the symbolic execution engine.
In SYMBEXNET, the database stores all information required to check a network protocol im-
plementation, including packet rules, interoperability rules, generated test packets and observed
traffic. A controller controls protocol-specific components and coordinates their behaviour. It de-
cides when to start the implementation and sends symbolic and test packets to the network. During
the replay process, SYMBEXNET treats a protocol implementation as a black-box and inspects
traffic entering and leaving the implementation to detect violations. A monitor observes network
traffic between the implementation and the clients during the replay of each test case. It stores the
exchanged traffic into a .pcap file, which is used as one of the inputs to the next step.
Symbolic execution engine. A symbolic execution engine executes an implementation on sym-
bolic inputs resulting in the creation of test input packets. SYMBEXNET uses KLEE [CDE08] as
a symbolic execution engine because it supports C programs, can generate high-coverage tests and
can detect low-level bugs. For symbolic execution, the implementation needs to be compiled to
LLVM bitcode and is interpreted by KLEE. KLEE executes bitcode but collects symbolic con-
straints over the symbolic input values at each branch.
Since SYMBEXNET checks the correctness of network protocol implementations, KLEE must sup-
port network related system calls such as socketcall. Currently, KLEE does not provide net-
working models, thus cannot support socket system calls. In order to perform symbolic execution
on network protocol implementations, we extended KLEE to include a simple networking model.
It supports the semantics of most network-related POSIX system calls, such as socketcall and
sigaction, by extending the existing file system model in KLEE. Thus, KLEE can deal with
requests to these network-related system calls because the model understands the semantics of the
required action in order to generate the desired constraints.
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3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we described a technique that can be used to check network protocol implementa-
tions. Since our technique uses symbolic execution, we started with a discussion of the challenges
when applying it to network protocol implementations. We provided an overview of our technique
and discussed the five steps required to check the implementation of a network protocol. We then
described how our technique generates high-coverage test input packets using symbolic execu-
tion with different exploration methods. Based on that, we introduced SYMBEXNET, a practical
checking system that realises our technique.
We proposed two different symbolic exploration methods, single packet exchange symbolic execu-
tion (SPE-SE) and multi-packet exchange symbolic execution (MPE-SE). First, the SPE-SE method
was described in terms of the generation of test packets using symbolic execution and the replay of
generated test packets. After that, we provided a motivating example for MPE-SE, explaining how
it can explore deep program execution paths using symbolic execution. Next, we described how
it generates sequences of test packets. We also discussed an optimisation method to reduce explo-
ration time of MPE-SE. We illustrated how the generated test packet sequences can be replayed
in order to validate protocol implementations. The rest of the chapter focused on the prototype
implementation of our technique.
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CHAPTER4
Rule-based Verifiable Specifications
PERFORMING symbolic execution on network protocol implementations can detect low-levelgeneric errors, such as crashes or memory leaks. However, there may also be semantic er-
rors, which expose behaviour not addressed in the specification. If errors do not cause crashes or
other obvious behaviour, they become hard to detect using symbolic execution. To discover such
errors and then determine the correctness of the implementation, SYMBEXNET checks replayed
test packets against packet rules extracted from a protocol specification.
Therefore, an important step in using SYMBEXNET is to make a standard protocol specification,
such as an RFC document, verifiable. A verifiable specification allows SYMBEXNET to assess
the correct behaviour of a network protocol implementation automatically. We assume that the
behaviour of an implementation consists of the output packets that it emits in response to input
packets (see Section 3.4.2). We define behavioural violations using a packet rule language that
matches incorrect sequences of packets. Our packet rule description language is intended for use
by developers of network services and designed based on two requirements: readability and ease
of integration with network protocols.
The packet rule language has four operators (i.e. filter, next, union and iteration) in addition to
modifiers that can be used to describe network protocol specific behaviour. Our packet rules are
implemented using extended non-deterministic finite automata (NFA). To detect complex packet
exchange patterns, our NFAs read captured packet streams and efficiently filter out unrelated in-
termediate packets. They can also refer to field values of previously detected packets. We do not
reason about the internal state of the implementation, which means that packet rules are reusable
across different implementations of the same protocol. This allows developers to identify and
correct errors of translation and migration between different implementations of a specification.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Next we provide an overview of packet analysis
techniques. We then illustrate the process of packet rule validation in Section 4.2. After that
we show how rules are derived from specifications in Section 4.3 and introduce our packet rule
language in Section 4.4. The chapter finishes with several examples of packet rules (Section 4.5), a
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brief introduction of the rule implementation (Section 4.6) and related work on rule-based program
analysis in Section 4.7.
4.1 Packet Analysis Techniques
Network traffic data, i.e. input and output packets between network entities, contains considerable
information such as the time and duration of communication, the identities of the parties communi-
cating and the type of communication protocol. Since this can be used to understand the behaviour
of a protocol implementation, traffic analysis techniques have been used to solve many network
management and security problems [BKPR02].
For this purpose, researchers have proposed languages that can formally describe protocol be-
haviour and packet analysis techniques that can examine network traffic to detect undesired input
and output packets in the traffic. However, many of them do not support analysing complex se-
quence of packets and provide techniques that depend on a specific protocol. In addition, perform-
ing network packet analysis at runtime typically requires resources and then degrades performance.
We use a packet analysis technique in SYMBEXNET to detect undesired exchanges of input and
output packets, which violate requirements specified in a protocol specification. However, our
analysis is performed on stored instead of live network traffic. Before providing details of our
packet analysis technique and packet rule language, we give an overview of general packet analysis
techniques in the next section. In Section 4.1.2, we show how rules are described and matched in
our language.
4.1.1 Overview of Packet Analysis Techniques
Packet analysis techniques investigate the content of data packets exchanged in a network, which
includes headers and payloads, and compare it against given rules, for example, network attack
rules [Roe99, Pax98]. Based on these rules, the traffic is analysed to determine whether it con-
tains undesired patterns. As a result, malicious network intrusions or denial-of-service attacks can
be detected. For example, a network monitoring system [MHL94] scans the packet headers and
payloads in order to detect a given set of security signatures.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the two main architectural components of a network monitoring system
are a preprocessor and a detection engine. The preprocessor prepares input network packets for
analysis by the detection engine. For example, it normalises the packets to remove ambiguities,
filters unnecessary packets, or reorders packets according to their sequence numbers. Once network
packets have been pre-processed, the detection engine examines incoming traffic against known
attack patterns. The detection engine performs pattern matching and content inspection using rules
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Figure 4.1: A generic network monitoring system that is comprised of two main components: a pre-
processor and a detection engine.
describing malicious network traffic.
There have been many studies of packet analysis techniques [Roe99, KVB04, Pax98, ULF08]. For
example, Monitor [KVB04] uses network rules to describe network behaviour and identify vio-
lations, such as known attacks and threats, by monitoring real-time network traffic. However, it
applies verification at the end of the development life-cycle and its rule description language is not
expressive enough to describe complex relationships between packets, which are associated with
many network errors.
SNORT [Roe99], a popular open source intrusion detection system, performs packet inspection
and content searching and matching to detect a variety of network attacks and probes. It contains
thousands of rules describing network attack signatures. It is useful to detect attacks in real-time
network traffic but cannot verify protocol implementations and struggle to detect implementation
specific errors.
In terms of network traffic analysis, our solution is similar but traffic is collected in response to
test packets generated using symbolic execution. This traffic and our rule language enable users to
detect many hard-to-detect errors.
4.1.2 Rule Matching
In packet analysis, the header and payload of a packet are matched against a set of rules to detect
specific patterns of attacks, payloads, viruses, etc. These rules can be derived from different origins,
such as protocol specifications [ULF08] and a database of network attacks [Roe99]. Since these
sources are usually written in a human language, such as English, they need to be re-written in a
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Table 4.1: Main syntax of regular expressions
Syntax Description Example
ˆ Matches the starting position of the in-
put
ˆXY matches the input starts with XY.
* Matches the preceding element zero or
more times
X*Y matches “XY”, “XXY”, “XYY”,
etc.
. Matches a single character X.Y matches “XZY”, “XAY”, etc.
[ ] Matches a single character within the
brackets
[XY ] matches “X” or “Y”.
| The choice OR operator X|Y matches “X” or “Y”.
+ Matches the preceding element one or
more times
XY+ matches “XY”, “XYY”,
“XYYY”, etc.
formal language converting into a machine readable form. Traditionally, rules have been expressed
as exact string match consisting of known patterns of interest. Regular expressions replace these
fixed string patterns providing superior expressive power and flexibility [Roe99, YCD+06].
A regular expression gives a flexible means for describing a set of strings without explicitly enu-
merating all of them. Table 4.1 lists the syntax of regular expressions. Once rules are expressed
as regular expressions, they can be converted into finite automata for pattern matching. Most
implementations of pattern matching can be classified into two categories: Deterministic Finite
Automata (DFAs) [KDY+06,SEJK08] and Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFAs) [BSMV06].
A DFA is a finite state machine that recognises a regular expression, therefore accepting or reject-
ing finite input strings or symbols. When performing pattern matching, DFAs provide efficient
matching because they transit deterministically from one state to another when reading a charac-
ter. A NFA is also a finite state machine, but it operates nondeterministically, transferring from
one state to several possible states. Although a NFA can be simulated with a DFA, NFA provide
flexibility in terms of transitions of states over the same input character.
4.2 Packet Rule Validation
In this section, we give an overview of our approach for packet rule validation (PRV). PRV in
SYMBEXNET is the process of validating captured packets with packet rules. It divides into three
parts: rule extraction, packet filtering and packet rule validation.
The three steps are illustrated in Figure 4.2. At first, PRV needs to extract packet rules from the
protocol specification (¶). Next, for each input packet stream, PRV performs packet preprocess-
ing tasks such as filtering unnecessary packets (·). Since monitored packet streams may contain
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Figure 4.2: Procedure for packet rule validation.
incorrect traffic, pre-processing is required to eliminate these packets. PRV can remove incorrect
packets based on not only the header information but also the payload.
Finally, PRV validates the filtered packets against the packet rules (¸). The filtered packets and
packet rules are used as input to a rule-based packet analyser. The analyser checks the packets
against the packet rules. If this detects a violation, the analyser reports the result with an error
trace.
4.3 Rule Extraction
Next we describe how network packet rules can be extracted from protocol specifications. A pro-
tocol specification is a description of the intended behaviour of network entities and a set of logical
rules for exchanging information between the network entities. Therefore, a set of rules can be ex-
tracted from the text of a network protocol specification. In many standards documents, words such
as “MUST” and “SHOULD” are used to express requirements in the specification [Bra97]. For ex-
ample, “MUST” has similar meaning to “REQUIRED” or “SHALL” and means that the statement
is an absolute requirement. We find that phrases containing these words are good candidates for
translation into formal rules.
In particular, there is a specification for “Keywords for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Lev-
els” (RFC 2119) [Bra97], which defines keywords that authors of protocol specifications can use for
requirements. These include “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHOULD”,
“RECOMMENDED”, etc. Table 4.2 lists some keywords included in the RFC 2119.
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Table 4.2: The keywords for describing the requirements in IETF standard documents [Bra97].
Keyword Description
MUST “This word, or the terms “REQUIRED” or “SHALL”, mean that the
definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.”
MUST NOT “This phrase, or the phrase “SHALL NOT”, mean that the definition is
an absolute prohibition of the specification.”
SHOULD “This word, or the adjective “RECOMMENDED”, mean that there may
exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular
item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed
before choosing a different course.”
SHOULD NOT “This phrase, or the phrase “NOT RECOMMENDED” mean that there
may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular
behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should
be understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any
behavior described with this label.”
MAY “This word, or the adjective “OPTIONAL”, mean that an item is truly
optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particu-
lar marketplace requires it or because the vendor feels that it enhances
the product while another vendor may omit the same item.”
Consider how sentences containing such keywords can be used to contribute rules. For example, we
can find the following requirement related to the “Query ID”, which is used to identify a particular
query message and a header field of a multicast DNS packet, in the RFC defining the Multicast
DNS (mDNS) network protocol [CK10]:
“In unicast response messages generated specifically in response to a particular (uni-
cast or multicast) query, the Query ID MUST match the ID from the query message.”
Since the “MUST” keyword is used, this requirement is a mandatory feature for all network dae-
mons that implement this specification. The requirement states how an mDNS daemon has to set
the Query ID in a response packet when answering using a unicast packet. If the daemon does not
follow this behaviour—for example, by selecting a random value for the ID that does not match
the ID from the query—the client may ignore the response packet. Therefore this requirement is a
good candidate for translation into a packet rule.
Usually requirements to be included in protocol specifications address how to communicate with
external network entities and how to manage internal states such as cache data, network parameters
and protocol-specific data. Our packet rules refer to externally observable aspects of packets,
thereby can be reused across different implementations of the same protocol. This means that not
all phrases from specifications containing special keywords can be translated to rules. In particular,
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we cannot translate requirements that do not specify externally observable behaviour into rules.
For example, the following requirement from the mDNS specification cannot be described as a
rule because it refers to internal state, i.e. registered services maintained by a daemon:
“A Multicast DNS Responder MUST NOT answer a Multicast DNS Query if the an-
swer it would give is already included in the Answer Section with an RR TTL at least
half the correct value.”
Although selecting requirements based on keywords from protocol specifications requires human
intervention, users without protocol-specific knowledge can derive requirements. Once require-
ments are found, they need to be translated into rules using a packet rule language, as introduced
in the next section.
4.4 Packet Rule Description Language
In order to check a protocol implementation for behaviour that violates candidate requirements,
SYMBEXNET converts the requirements into packet rules, describing undesired behaviour using
a packet rule description language. SYMBEXNET applies an approach using packet filters for
detecting complex patterns of packet exchanges. Users convert selected requirements into packet
rules in a high-level language with four operators, which are translated into low-level automata.
The main purpose of packet rule description languages is to filter intended network packets from a
sequence of exchanged packets. There have been many studies and developed tools for such lan-
guages in order to check network behaviour. Examples include Snort [Roe99], Monitor [KVB04]
and Bro [Pax98]. Most of these languages rely on Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) [MJ93] rules to de-
scribe network behaviour and identify violations. BPF is a mechanism for filtering network packets
at the data link layer. It allows a program to specify a filter in the form of a rule and capture packets
from the network interface. However, this may be inefficient [IAIK02, BMG99] when describing
complex relationships between packets, as associated with many network implementation errors.
SYMBEXNET uses a BPF-style filter language. Compared with other proposals for using BPF
filters to analyse network behaviour, our packet rule description language enhances the degree of
expressive capability through specific features. In SYMBEXNET, rules describing undesired packet
exchange patterns are specified using four operators, which can reference the header field values
of previously received packets and compare packets in different streams.
We start with introducing types of packet rules in the next section. After that, the detailed syntax
of our language is described in Section 4.4.3.
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1 [ruleExpr] ::= [packetExpr + ZeroOrMore(pop + packetExpr)]
2 [packetExpr] ::= [pname + {filterExpr}]
3 [pop] ::= [next(;) | union(|) | iteration(+)]
4 [pname] ::= [string]
5 [filterExpr] ::= [filter + ZeroOrMore(fop + filter)]
6 [fop] ::= [’and’ | ’or’]
7 [filter] ::= [name + op + value]
8 [op] ::= [’==’ | ’!=’ | ’<’ | ’>’ | ’<=’ | ’>=’]
9 [value] ::= [hex | decimal | name]
10 [name] ::= [string] | [@+string]
Figure 4.3: Packet rule grammar written in as extended BNF.
4.4.1 Types of Packet Rule
Requirements stated in a protocol specification mainly describe packet formats and ways for ex-
changing a series of packets to provide a certain task. Packet rules try to detect undesired packet
exchange patterns, which violate the requirements. Detecting violations of requirements is useful
when the model of protocol implementations is incomplete or has a large number of states. At
high-level, there are two types of requirements:
The first type describes the packet format. Requirements in this category specify necessary fields,
permitted values for each field and their semantics. This type of requirements are translated into
rules, which detect packets violating defined packet formats or specified field values in the speci-
fication. We refer to these as intrinsic packet rules. Examples of intrinsic rules include: detecting
packets match a specific character that must not be included or detecting packets with a wrong
binary bit in a given field.
The second specifies allowed communication behaviour of a network protocol implementation with
external network entities. This type of requirements are translated into rules that detect a sequence
of packets that is not allowed in the specification. We call these sequential packet rules. Examples
include: finding an incorrect response packet to a query packet, which contains invalid field values.
4.4.2 Grammar of Packet Rule Language
In this section, we show the grammar used for the packet rule language in SYMBEXNET. We
specify the abstract syntax for the packet rules using an extended BNF (EBNF) syntax.
Figure 4.3 lists the grammar for describing packet rules. In the notation, ::= means “is defined
to be”. If there are a number of options that can be applied to one particular rule, the option
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is delimited with the ‘|’ symbol. To provide an unambiguous way of composing packet rule
expressions in SYMBEXNET, we use a default precedence of operators, i.e. AND takes precedence
over OR.
Packet rule ruleExpr (line 1) can be expressed using one or more packets packetExpr (line
2) with packet operators pop (line 3). Each packet expression in a packet rule is described in
terms of its name pname (line 4) and the packet filters filterExpr (line 5). Packet filters are an
unordered collection of one of more filters filter (line 7), which are name/value pairs where a
name (line 10) is a string for the name of a packet field and a value (line 9) is a hex, decimal or
name value.
Rules are parsed by SYMBEXNET. Parsed rules are then used to build a corresponding NFA (cf.
Section 4.6).
4.4.3 Rule and Operators
In this section, we introduce the grammar and syntax of our packet description rule language for
describing packet exchange patterns. Our high-level language provides a rich syntax for building
descriptive rules, as well as additional modifiers that can enrich the expressiveness of the whole
rule expression. The rule language describes violations of packet requirements and consists of
expressions of the following form:
packetExpr = pkt{Σfilters}
where pkt is the name of a packet and Σfilters is a set of packet filter predicates. A packet filter pred-
icate represents the possible values of the corresponding fields in packets that match this filter. We
have introduced some of the fields that are part of DNS in Figure 2.2 and DHCP in Figure 2.4 (cf.
Section 2.1). The set of packet filter predicates are sequences of valid packet filters joined by the
logical operators AND/OR. The modifiers ANY and ALL specify that a predicate has to match
at least one or all fields, respectively, if multiple fields with the same name exist. Nested field
names are divided by dots (.). In addition, we introduce a set of operators and modifiers to express
network specific features such as ignoring packets that do not satisfy a given filter condition.
The Filter Operator
The filter operator p detects packets p that satisfy a predicate θ. The predicate θ allows the
operator to filter some packets satisfying the predicate and to fail on others. Consider the following
packet description that filters a query packet:
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1 query {src_ip != 224.0.0.251 AND flag.QR = 0x00 AND questions != 0x00}
This filter matches a query packet (flag.QR=0x00) that is not from the multicast IP address
244.0.0.251 and has more than one question block (questions!=0x00). It ignores all other
packets that do not satisfy these conditions.
The filter operator is suitable for describing intrinsic rules because it can be used to detect a packet
that has specific field values. In order to describe sequential rules, which require to specify multiple
packets in a rule, we need operators that can be used to connect more than one packet. For this
purpose, we introduce three rule operators: next (;), union (|) and iteration (+). Rule expressions
can be built recursively using these three operators.
The Next Operator
If there are irrelevant packets on the network, these packets must be ignored. The next operator
p1;p2 detects the next occurrence of packet p2 after packet p1, ignoring any intermediate packets
that do not satisfy the filter predicates for p2. This operator implies that the timestamp of p1 is
guaranteed to be earlier than the timestamp of p2.
The Union Operator
There exist cases when the occurrence of one or more packets out of a set of packets needs to be
detected. The union operator p1|p2 matches a choice of packets p1 or p2.
The Iteration Operator
When multiple occurrences of the same packet need to be detected, the iteration operator pθ+n
detects n consecutive packets p that satisfy θ. Packets not satisfying θ are skipped. Since there
are requirements that specify multiple occurrences of the same packet during a given time slot, the
iteration operator is often used with the Timeout operator, which will be described below.
ANY and ALL
The ANY and ALL modifiers can be used with a packet filter predicate, which represents the possi-
ble values of the corresponding fields in packets. The ANY modifier takes a set of packet fields as
input and evaluates to True if a predicate matches any of these fields. The ANY modifier is useful
in situations, in which firing of a rule depends on the occurrence of a value in any given packet
field at least once.
The ALL modifier takes a set of packet fields as input and requires that a predicate matches all of
the fields. The ALL modifier is useful when a rule has to be associated with the occurrence of a
value in all packet fields.
58
4.4. PACKET RULE DESCRIPTION LANGUAGE
Variable binding
Often a desired packet can be detected based on specific field values of other packets received
before. In this case, users can use pattern variables to extract field values from received packets.
Using the variable binding operator @, fields from previously detected packets can be stored and
referenced in subsequent filter expressions. If there exist a packet p that previously occurred, a
field name of the form @p.field refers to the field name field of the previous packet p.
For example, the rule below shows how the variable binding operator @ is used to refer to a specific
field value:
1 query{src_ip != 224.0.0.251 AND flag.QR = 0x00 AND questions != 0x00} ;
2 resp {dst_ip = @query.src_ip AND flag.QR = 0x80 AND id != @query.id}
Consider the packet filter of the query packet (line 1). It matches a DNS query packet (flag.QR
= 0x00) that is not from the multicast IP address 244.0.0.251 and has more than one question
block (questions != 0x00). The next operator (;) at the end of query ignores packets that do not
satisfy these filter conditions. In the resp packet filter (line 2), two variable bindings are used—
@query.src ip and query.id. Both refer to the value of the corresponding fields in the query
packet. In particular, @query.src ip is used to detect a packet response to the source IP address
of the query packet while query.id tries to discover a packet not using the same ID as the query
packet.
Timeouts
It is important to include time when describing packet sequences because many aspects of a net-
work protocol are driven by timers and timeouts. To describe timing-related requirements, each
packet contains a virtual field called ts that represents the timestamp at which the packet was
received by the target implementation.
Suppose that the previous Query ID example has another associated requirement that the response
message MUST be generated within at most 10 ms. The violation of this rule can be encoded as
follows:
1 query{src_ip != 224.0.0.251 AND flag.QR = 0x00 AND questions != 0x00} ;
2 resp {dst_ip = @query.src_ip AND flag.QR = 0x80
3 AND ANY data.answer(name = @query.question.name) AND id != @query.id
4 AND ts >= @query.ts+10}
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After matching a query packet (line 1), the rule discards all response packets that do not answer the
question in the query packet within 10 ms (line 4). Most network protocol patterns with a general
query/response model can be described using the operators described above.
4.5 Examples
Using the operators and modifiers introduced so far, we show how the behaviour of network pro-
tocol implementations can be modeled in SYMBEXNET using the packet rule language. We use a
simplified syntax to make the rules readable.
1. “Detect an ICMP ping packet (ICMP ECHO REQUEST) with TTL equal to 0” from RFC
792—Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [Pos81a]. Note that the IP protocol type
is set to “ICMP” (1) to indicate that the packet is to be handled by the remote end system’s
ICMP client.
1 icmp-pkt {protocol_type = 0 AND TTL = 0};
2. “Detect a TCP packet with TTL<= 100 destined to web server 155.168.1.20 at port 80”
from RFC 793—Transmission Control Protocol [Pos81b].
1 tcp-pkt {dst_ip = 155.168.1.20 AND dest_port = 80 AND TTL <= 100};
3. “Discover any packet that originates from an mDNS server of 155.168.1.10 and contains
a ’byte order mark”’ from the mDNS specification [CK10]. The byte order mark is a Uni-
code character used to signal the endianness of a text file or stream and its code character is
U+FEFF. In addition, multicast DNS names MUST NOT contain a byte order mark.
1 mdns-pkt {src_ip = 155.168.1.10 AND src_port = 5353
2 AND ANY dns.data(srv_name = U+FEFF)};
4. “Discover an mDNS answer message that is not directly sent to the client via unicast in
response to a received mDNS query with not the mDNS source port number” from the
mDNS specification [CK10]. If the source UDP port in a received mDNS query is not
port 5353, this indicates that the client originating the query is a simple client that does
not fully implement all mDNS functionality. In this case, the mDNS server MUST send
a UDP response directly to the client, via unicast, to the query packet’s source IP address
and port. Also note that all mDNS messages MUST be sent to the mDNS multicast address
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224.0.0.251 and its port 5353 (0x14e9).
1 mdns-query {src_port != 0x14e9 AND dest_port = 0x14e9
2 AND dest_ip = 224.0.0.251 AND flags.query = 0x00} ;
3 mdns-resp {flags.query = 0x80 AND data.srv_name =
4 @mdns-query.data.srv_name AND dest_ip != @mdns-query.src_ip}
5. “Detect any DHCPNAKmessage that is not sent to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255,
upon receiving a DHCPREQUEST message with giaddr equal to zero” from RFC
2132 [AD97]. In all cases, when giaddr is zero, the server broadcasts DHCPNAK to the
broadcast address. DHCP uses UDP port 67 for sending data to the server, and UDP port 68
for data to the client. The xid field is used by the client to match incoming DHCP messages
with pending requests.
1 dhcp-request {dest_port = 67 AND options.type = 0x01
2 AND giaddr = 0.0.0.0} ; dhcp-nak {dest_port = 68
3 AND xid = @dhcp-request.xid AND options.type = 0x06
4 AND dest_ip != 255.255.255.255}
As shown by the above examples, requirements from protocol specifications can be encoded into
packet rules using our packet rule description language. The process of deriving rules is relatively
easy because specific keywords are used when mandatory requirements are stated in protocol spec-
ifications.
4.6 Rule Implementation and Validation
Network packet rules derived from a specification must be validated. Pattern matching [YKL04,
ADGI08] is a popular technique for checking packet rules. This section provides an explanation
of our method for validating packet rules. Packet rules are verified using non-deterministic finite
automata (NFAs). We use an event model that is similar to the one found in event processing
systems [SMMP09] because it provides a mechanism for detecting complex event matches through
the use of a high-level event query language.
A SYMBEXNET NFA model is defined as a tuple (S,Σpkts, T, s0, sd) where
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Figure 4.4: High level packet rule automaton.
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Figure 4.5: An example of rule automaton.
S: is a finite set of states of the automaton;
Σpkts: is an input packet stream into the automaton;
T : S × Σpkts → P (S) is a transition function. Each transition is la-
beled with packet filters. P (S) is a power set of S. Equivalently,
T can be presented as a relation, i.e. a subset of (S×Σpkts)×S;
s0: s0 ∈ S is the start state; and
sd: sd ∈ S is the set of final states.
An automaton operates as follows. Each NFA state is assigned a name and an input packet. All
the outgoing edges of a state read that input packet. Figure 4.4 shows a high level illustration
of a packet rule automaton. Suppose an automaton instance is in state S with assigned packet p.
Each edge, between states S and T , is labelled with a pair 〈θ, f〉 where θ is a predicate and f is a
transition function returning the next state T . Let a packet e satisfies predicate θ(p, e). As a result,
the NFA transitions non-deterministically to the next state T , as specified by the transition function
f and stores packet p in order to refer back to its field values later.
To show how packet rules are implemented and validated, let us consider an example requirement,
“the response packet for a query must have the same ID and data values as the original query”.
Here the query has the flag field with value 0x08, and the id of the response packet must match
that of the query packet. This requirement can be expressed through the following rule:
1 query{ flag = 0x08 } ; resp { id = @query.id AND data != @query.data }
The corresponding automaton for the rule is shown in Figure 4.5. Now we suppose that we have a
sequence of received packets in the order p1, p2, p3 and p4. The packets are described in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Input test packets used in Figure 4.5.
Step Packet Before After Field values
¶ p1 s0 s0 id=0x35, flag=0x01, data=abc
· p2 s0 s1 id=0x45, flag=0x08, data=sym
¸ p3 s1 s1 id=0x36, flag=0x01, data=net
¹ p4 s1 s2 id=0x45, flag=0x01, data=sym
For an incoming packet, the state of the automaton after processing is decided. Initially, the start
state s0 is active by default. The automaton processes incoming packets as follows:
1. p1 arrives (label¶). The automaton checks if it satisfies δ1, a predicate for the query packet
leading to the next state s1. p1 does not satisfy δ1 but δ0, therefore the automaton stays in
the same state s0.
2. p2 arrives (label ·). Since p2 satisfies δ1, the automaton moves to the next state s1.
3. p3 arrives (label¸). Similarly, the automaton stays in the state s1 after receiving p3 because
it does not satisfy δ3.
4. p4 arrives (label ¹). The arrival of p4 transitions the automaton to the final state s2.
Since here packet rules describe violations of requirements specifying desired packet exchange
patterns, arriving at the final accept state means that a given sequence of packets violates the re-
quirement.
4.7 Related Work on Rule-based Analysis
Rule-based analysis is a technique that uses rules to verify programs and has gained traction in
the validation of network protocol implementations and the detection of intrusions and vulnera-
bilities [Roe99, KVB04]. Tools such as Pistachio [ULF08] define network rules, which describe
what should happen when an implementation receives a packet, as derived from a specification.
Such systems bridge the gap between specifications and implementations, but they achieve only
low code coverage and struggle to detect rare errors because their rules are limited to single packet
exchanges. SYMBEXNET uses symbolic execution to increase code coverage and provides a high-
level packet rule language based on an expressive automata model. While Pistachio’s language
could be used with SYMBEXNET, our packet rules can describe more complex sequences of pack-
ets compared to Pistachio’s single input-output patterns. Furthermore, SYMBEXNET can detect
interoperability problems, which is not supported by other approaches using rule-based analysis
including Pistachio.
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Event processing systems can detect complex event patterns using pattern matching techniques,
e.g. state automata [BDG+07] or event trees [MSS97]. They use high-level SQL-like query lan-
guages, which are designed to support event pattern matching. In these systems, NFAs are the
most widely used method to implement queries for detecting occurrences of specific patterns. As
automata-based models provide sufficient expressiveness for detecting complex sequences, we use
automata to find violations in packet rules. Our packet rule language is similar to the one used by
the NEXTCEP system [SMMP09] but is extended with primitives suitable for describing network
packet exchange patterns.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we described a verifiable protocol specification that assesses the correct behaviour
of a network protocol implementation automatically. Since many network protocols state compul-
sory requirements in their specifications using keywords, we extract a set of rules for a network
protocol from its protocol specification. Packet rules defining behavioural violations are expressed
using a packet rule language and implemented as non-deterministic finite automata, which match
incorrect sequence of packets. Since packet rules capture undesired behaviour of a protocol imple-
mentation instead of an entire specification, they can lead to a concise description.
We introduced packet rule operators and their semantics, described by automata that are an exten-
sion of traditional automata. We enhanced the language with additional features such as timeouts
and variable binding in order to model behaviour occurring in network protocol implementations.
This also improves the readability of our packet rules and makes the language well-suited for de-
scribing network behaviour, compared to previous languages [SMMP09]. We also gave examples
illustrating how invalid patterns of packet exchanges can be stated using our packet rule language.
Finally, we provided a mechanism for matching using NFAs.
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Symbolic Interoperability Testing
THIS chapter introduces a methodology for checking interoperability between multiple net-work implementations of the same protocol specification, including a way to derive test
input packets for triggering interoperability issues. In the domain of communication networks,
Interoperability Testing (IOT) is considered as an essential step toward ensuring a correct imple-
mentation that operates as specified in the specification [MRW03]. Although many researchers
have investigated automated methods for IOT [KSK00, SKKR03, DV08], there still exist many
challenges, such as the difficulty in covering all interoperability issues and the necessity of human
intervention [KSK00, VRA+07].
In this chapter, we propose a method called Symbolic Interoperability Testing (SIOT), which au-
tomatically generates test input packets for IOT using symbolic execution and checks interoper-
ability of an implementation using a rule-based packet inspection technique. An advantage of our
approach is that we can derive high quality test input packets for IOT automatically from protocol
implementations, without deep knowledge of the underlying protocol.
In Section 5.1, we provide an overview and a definition of interoperability testing. After that,
the design and implementation of the interoperability checking in SYMBEXNET is presented in
Section 5.2. We illustrate how test input packets for IOT are generated and tested with multiple
protocol implementations in Section 5.3. Methods for packet filtering and rule-based interoperabil-
ity checking are discussed in Section 5.4. We conclude this chapter with related work in Section 5.5
and a summary in Section 5.6.
5.1 Overview
Network protocol specifications are usually written by standard organisations such as 3GPP and
implemented by different manufacturers. Its standard specifications are the outcome of the agree-
ment between many companies, the compromise of various issues often leads to alternative options
and recommendations within a standard [BU91]. Furthermore, standards are typically written in
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Figure 5.1: (a) Conformance testing ensures that an implementation complies with its protocol specifica-
tions; (b) Interoperability testing ensures that different implementations work as expected
natural languages, and vendors can easily have different interpretations that lead to divergent im-
plementations. Additionally, the complexity of network protocols makes it difficult to deliver a
correct protocol implementation without any interoperability problems.
Two testing techniques can be used to check the compliance of implementations with a network
protocol: conformance testing and interoperability testing. As shown in Figure 5.1, confor-
mance testing is used to check that the behaviour of an individual implementation complies with
its protocol specification. Since conformance testing, which checks an implementation against
the specification, is considered a necessary step before operation, it has been studied and for-
malised [DSU90, Tre99, BFN+05]. Conformance testing can show only the presence of described
functionality and cannot assure the correct communication with other network entities. There-
fore, interoperability testing, which checks that multiple implementations are interoperable with
each other, is desirable to complement conformance testing. The importance of performing both
conformance and interoperability testing is well known in the industry [BU91].
Definitions of Interoperability and Interoperability Testing.
Interoperability is a relative term, understood according to its context. For example, ISO/IEC1 de-
fines interoperability as the capability to communicate among various functional units, and IEEE2
focuses more on the ability to work among systems. Even within the same domain, different defini-
tions of interoperability exist. ATIS3 makes the definition more specific on exchanging information
while others provide a broad concept of interoperability including the end user perspective.
1International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
2Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
3Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions
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Different from conformance testing, IOT is the process of testing implementations from multiple
vendors by interacting in such a manner as to exercise the network protocols under test. The
entities under IOT must be set up and synchronised [KSM96]. In particular, IOT is helpful in the
early stages of developing a new standard protocol because it can used to evaluate the status of
the protocol. Once an implementation is mature, IOT cannot detect new bugs and becomes less
valuable [MRW03].
Since we verify network implementations referring to network protocol specifications, the term
interoperability is defined in this thesis as follows:
Definition 5.1. (Interoperability) “the capability of the network implementation to interact with
other implementations of the same protocol specification.”
We detect interoperability problems of network protocol implementations by comparing their be-
haviour to test input packets. Thus Interoperability testing based on Definition 5.1 is defined as
follows:
Definition 5.2. (Interoperability Testing) “the process of automatically generating a set of in-
teroperability test packets, executing the implementations under test (IUT) with the generated test
packets and comparing the behaviour of the implementations to determine whether they are inter-
operable with each other.”
5.2 Symbolic Interoperability Checking
In this section, we introduce a method for checking the interoperability of protocol implementa-
tions using SYMBEXNET. Similar to prior work [KSK00, SKKR03, DV08], we aim to provide an
automated method for generating interoperability test packets. However, in order to overcome the
limitations of the existing IOT technologies, we provide several new features. First, we derive test
packets from the source code so that users can build an interoperability testing model, even when
there is no specification for a target protocol. Since test packets are generated from the source
code, the method can cover both the control and data parts of a protocol. Most prior work dealt
with test case derivation only for the control part of protocols because they focused on observing
the interface behaviour. Furthermore, interoperability test packets derived using our approach are
the result of running actual code. This enables us to check deeper interoperability behaviour, such
as complex sequences of interoperations and behaviour that depends on accurate value information.
In order to generate interoperability test cases automatically while avoiding the above problems,
we present a novel interoperability testing method called Symbolic Interoperability Testing (SIOT).
Unlike conventional IOT approaches using abstract specifications, SIOT derives test cases directly
from multiple implementations of a protocol. For test case generation, SIOT uses symbolic execu-
tion to explore all possible execution paths of the implementations exhaustively. SIOT checks the
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different behaviour of implementations for each test sequence in order to examine if there are any
interoperability problems. This is done using rule-based packet analysis that compares input/output
packets and detects deviations.
5.2.1 Overview
The four goals of SIOT are (1) automation, (2) flexibility, (3) implementation-based checking and
(4) scalability.
Automation. The first goal is to provide a mechanism for automatically generating a set of test
cases for IOT. Although several IOT methods [KSK00, SKKR03] have targeted automated
test case generation, in most cases an abstract model of a protocol, such as finite state ma-
chine, is extracted manually from its specifications before generating test cases, then requir-
ing human intervention.
Flexibility. The second goal of flexibility is to provide a process that can be flexibly applied to other
protocols. The process of building an abstract model from specifications requires expert
knowledge of a protocol and therefore, when testing implementations of a new protocol,
testers need to be familiar with the protocol, which takes time.
Implementation-based checking. The third goal of SIOT, implementation-based checking, is to
explore implementations under test and check their interoperability instead of an abstract
model. Usually test cases derived from an abstract model of protocol specifications can only
check limited interoperability functions that are described explicitly in the specification. Im-
plicitly addressed interoperability features may be missed by these test cases. An important
objective of SIOT is to accomplish implementation-based interoperability checking between
multiple implementations and not to miss interoperability problems.
Scalability. After deriving test cases for IOT, they are applied to IUTs. In practice, this is per-
formed in an ad-hoc manner by connecting available IUTs together at a central location, at
which testing facilities have been provided. Figure 5.2 shows a typical configuration for in-
teroperability testing that interconnect a number of implementations from different vendors
in a testing network [MRW03]. The figure illustrates a situation, in which implementation 1
is tested with other implementations 2, 3 and 4.
For example, vendor A and B may develop implementations 1 and 2 based on the same pro-
tocol specification S. Interoperability test cases are then executed on both implementations
1 and 2 to examine if they are interoperable with each other. In order to confirm 1 and 2 are
interoperable, a test operator has to perform the testing twice. First, test cases are applied to
1 and its corresponding responses are analysed for the interoperability of 1 with 2. Next, the
operator applies test cases to 2 to check for interoperability of 2 with 1.
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Since each implementation under test needs to be tested with all other implementations, the
number of required tests is n(n−1) where n is the number of IUTs. This gives an important
requirement to SIOT for developing an interoperability testing method that scales better than
prior methods in terms of the number of tested implementations.
Approach. Now we take a brief look at the approach used in SYMBEXNET to achieve inter-
operability testing. Similar to other existing IOT approaches [CTCC98, BG01], SIOT integrates
white-and black-box testing techniques. It first applies a white-box approach to generate test pack-
ets for IOT using symbolic execution, which explore the state space of the implementations. Next,
black-box testing is performed by providing a series of generated test input packets to the imple-
mentations and observing network traffic to check for interoperability problems.
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Current IOT approaches typically use two or more interconnected implementations from different
vendors. Figure 5.3 (a) describes such an approach. Each implementation is connected to other
implementations under test and examined for its interoperability with them. In this approach, the
participation of all vendors implementing the same protocol is an important factor for success. In-
stead of connecting each implementation to all others, SYMBEXNET uses a test client that performs
interoperability testing tasks, as shown in Figure 5.3 (b). Since SYMBEXNET strictly controls the
testing environment by ensuring the same network conditions such as order of input and output
packets, testing is repeatable, and therefore IOT can be performed independently. This can signifi-
cantly reduce the costs for IOT and enables to perform IOT more efficiently.
To validate interoperability between target implementations, SIOT provides a checking method
that is simple and easy to apply. It exploits the fact that the implementations realise the same
protocol specification. Then they are supposed to behave exactly in the same way for any inputs. To
check interoperability, SIOT analyses input/output packets and detects behavioral inconsistencies
between target implementations. Any inconsistencies are considered a potential interoperability
problem and reported.
5.2.2 Formal Model of Interoperability Relation
To define an interoperable relationship formally, let I1 and I2 be two different implementations of
a network protocol. An IOT model is a tuple M = (ΣI ,ΣO,ΣS ,ΣT ) where ΣI , ΣO, ΣS and ΣT
are finite sets of input packets, output packets, states and transitions, respectively. Each transition
t in the set ΣT is a 4-tuple
t = (sst, set, σt, ωt)
where sst, set, σt and ωt are a start state, end state, input packet and output packet, respectively.
Here, ΣI is a set of test input packets generated using symbolic execution for interoperability
testing. Since SIOT performs symbolic execution on both I1 and I2, ΣI can be decomposed as
follows: ΣI = ΣI1 ∪ ΣI2 where ΣI1 (resp. ΣI2) is the set of generated test packets from I1 (resp.
I2).
Each test input packet for IOT is tested with both implementations and the outputs are monitored.
Therefore, we can also decompose ΣO as follows: ΣO = ΣO1 ∪ΣO2 where ΣO1 (resp. ΣO2) is the
set of output packets from I1 (resp. I2). We define In(σ) and Out(ωσ) as a receiving input packet
σ and the corresponding response output packet ω, respectively.
Initially, the state machine is in an initial state sinit ∈ S. Let us assume that the machine is in state
sst. Upon receiving an input packet In(σt), the machine follows the transition t, sending an output
packet Out(ωσ,t) and moving to state set. Since SIOT compares observed outputs to determine if
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Figure 5.4: Overview of SYMBEXNET SIOT system architecture and its steps for checking interoperability
for implementations of IUT-1 and IUT-2 the same protocol specification.
implementations are interoperable, we introduce a formal definition of an interoperability relation
(iot-rel). Let σ ∈ ΣI , then the interoperability relation between I1 and I2 can be defined as follows:
Definition 5.3 (Interoperability relation iot-rel). I1 iot-rel I2 ⇐⇒ ∀σ ∈ ΣI , the following condi-
tions are satisfied:
• InI1(σ)→ OutI1(ωσ) and the state transition to seI1;
• InI2(σ)→ OutI2(δσ) and the state transition to seI2; and
• ω = δ and seI1 = seI2 .
Informally, I1 iot-rel I2 if and only if (i) the output packet and the end state of I1 for a given test
packet σ is the same as the state of I2; or (ii) both I1 and I2 do not respond for a given test packet σ.
5.2.3 Symbolic Interoperability Testing
Based on the approach introduced above, we explain the main steps of SIOT as shown in Fig-
ure 5.4. SIOT takes four steps to check interoperability, as labeled in the figure:
Step (1): Creation of IOT rules. The first step is to derive interoperability rules from a protocol
specification. IOT rules are created to compare fields of response packets from different implemen-
tations. The packet rule language introduced in Chapter 4 is extended to support the comparison
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Figure 5.5: Approach for generating interoperability test packets for protocol X.
of response packets from different implementations.
Step (2): Generation of test packets for IOT. To check the interoperability between multiple
implementations of the same protocol specification. SIOT relies on a set of test input packets that
can detect interoperability problems. Using symbolic execution, as described in Section 3.4, SIOT
explores the source code of each IUT and generates test input packets from the implementations,
IUT-1 and IUT-2.
Step (3): Cross replay of test packets for IOT. The test packets generated for IOT are replayed not
only with their source implementation but also with other implementations of the same protocol.
As described in Section 3.4, each test packet is sent to an IUT in the same testing environment. All
exchanged input/output packets are recorded.
Step (4): Interoperability checking. Since the implementations are based on the same specifica-
tion, they are supposed to behave in the same way for inputs with specific field values, i.e. generate
the same response packets. In this step, the captured input and output packets of both implementa-
tions from the previous step are compared by the IOT rules from step (1). SYMBEXNET translates
the IOT rules into NFAs and runs captured input/output packet streams against each NFA to check
whether they behave identically. For each divergent behaviour, SIOT reports an interoperability
error.
5.3 Generation and Execution of Interoperability Test Packets
In this section, we discuss the generation of test packets for IOT and their cross replay in detail.
SIOT is a subsystem of SYMBEXNET and shares many features, such as the generation of test
packets from the source code of implementations and the replay of generated test packets with
native implementations.
Figure 5.5 shows our approach for generating interoperability test packets. For interoperability
checking, SIOT takes as input the source code of multiple implementations of the same protocol
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developed by different vendors instead of a single implementation. According to the symbolic
execution method described in Section 3.4, SIOT compiles each source code into LLVM bitcode
and then explores all code paths in each implementation, generating test packets.
For example, as interoperability testing compares multiple implementations of the same protocol
specification, SIOT applies symbolic execution to both llvm-A and llvm-B. After generating the
test packets from one implementation, SIOT prepares the same network environment for test case
generation for the others. The generated test packets from each implementation are stored in an
internal database maintained by SIOT.
We now explain how generated test packets are used in SIOT to check interoperability. In SIOT,
interoperability testing is conducted using a different model. After test input packets are generated
from each network protocol implementation, the test packets are replayed with not only their source
implementation but also with the other implementations of the same protocol, which we call cross
replay. The cross replay process is the same as the replay process introduced in Section 3.4,
running unmodified implementations and capturing all generated network traffic. Since each test
input packet is replayed on all IUTs, it generates n packet streams. If each IOT has m test input
packets, cross replay generates m × n packets. Since rules that are used for IOT checks observe
differences in response packets from different implementations for the same input packet, it is
important to perform cross replay under the same network conditions, such as using the same port
number in the generated test packets.
Figure 5.6 gives an example of SIOT of two DHCP implementations, DHCP-S1 and DHCP-S2. Test
packet p is one packet of n generated packets for IOT. As described in Section 3.4, SYMBEXNET
first starts DHCP-S1 for replay, sends the test packet p to DHCP-S1 using the Client and then
waits for the corresponding response r1. SIOT captures network traffics (input and output packets)
between DHCP-S1 and DHCP Client. After finishing the test replay for p with DHCP-S1, SIOT
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does the same replay with DHCP-S2, again recording the traffic. The recorded traffic from both
implementations for the same test packets is compared to check for interoperability.
5.4 Rule-based Interoperability Checking
To determine the interoperability between the IUTs, SIOT analyses the observed input and output
packets for the test input packets, which are called packet streams (cf. Section 2.1). For this anal-
ysis, we extend the packet rule language to detect different behaviour among packet streams and
introduce rules for checking interoperability.
5.4.1 Interoperability Rules
Interoperability rules detect differences between two or more packet streams by comparing re-
sponse packets, appearing in each packet stream, for the test input packets. Interoperability rules
inherit the syntax of sequential packet rules described in Section 4.4.1 but include an identifier that
refers to a specific packet stream among multiple streams.
Stream identifier. Since interoperability checking compares packets from more than one stream,
the source of each packet needs to be identified in rules for checking interoperability. We introduce
stream identifiers to enable SIOT to compare fields of output packets from different streams.
A packet filter that is associated with a specific stream has a prefix S followed by the number of
the stream. For example, S1.p1.flags refers to the field name flags of packet p1 from stream
S1. Packet filters without a stream identifier are used as common filters, which are applied to all
streams, while packet filters with a stream identifier are only used to select a packet from the stream
specified by the stream identifier.
Figure 5.7 shows how streams are structured and compared in SIOT using stream identifiers. A
test client exchanges several packets, p1-p4, with IUT-A and IUT-B to configure the testing envi-
ronment, for example, establishing a connection on a specific port number, followed by sending a
test packet p5 to both IUTs. Upon receiving p5, the IUTs respond with p6-a for IUT-A and with
p6-b for IUT-B. All exchanged packets between the client and IUT-A (resp. IUT-B) are captured
in stream 1 (resp. stream 2). These two packet streams are then compared to check interoperability
using IOT rules. Stream identifiers are used to refer to a specific stream, as follows: S1.p6.flags
= S2.p6.flags.
IOT rules using stream identifiers. Let us consider a sample interoperability rule that discovers
inconsistent response packets from two different packet streams S1 and S2. The rule matches
different response packets p2 from streams S1 and S2, respectively, for a given test packet p1:
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Figure 5.7: Packet stream and stream identifiers.
1 p1{src_ip != 224.0.0.251 AND flag.QR = 0xff AND questions != 0} ;
2 p2 {dst_ip = @p1.src_ip AND id = @p1.id AND flag.QR = 0x80
3 AND ANY data.answer(name = @p1.question.name) AND S1.data != S2.data}
A test query packet p1 (line 1) can be identified by the values of the fields flags and src ip in
the packet. The next operator (at the end of line 1) ignores intermediate packets that do not satisfy
the filters for packet p2 (lines 2 and 3). The rule then matches a response packet associated with
the test packet from two packet streams S1 and S2. The filter with the stream identifier (line 3)
compares the value of the data field of the response packet p2 from the streams S1 and S2.
5.4.2 Features of IOT Rules
Since SIOT compares field values of response packets when creating a set of IOT rules, developers
refer to the packet format defined in a network protocol specification. Developers can build a
set of IOT rules that simply compare the value of each field in response packets and detect any
differences. However, such rules may not reliably discover interoperability problems due to two
reasons: recommended requirements and range of field values.
Recommended requirements. Some requirements in a specification propose a recommended or
optional value for a specific packet field. In this case, one vender may choose to include the
requirement while another vendor may decide to ignore it. For example, the mDNS specification
recommends to add further identifying information at the end of a resource record name if a name
conflict occurs. Since this requirement allows to use any information at the end of a resource
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Figure 5.8: An IOT model (left) and decision criteria (right) used in SIOT.
record name, Zeroconf daemons implement this feature differently. Avahi appends the symbol #
followed by an incremented number such as “R-Name #2” at the end of the name while Bonjour
and JmDNS add an incremented number inside a bracket such as “R-Name (2)”. Since the values
for the record name are different, if IOT rules simply compare the value of the record name field of
two packets from these two implementations, an interoperability problem would be reported, even
though both implementations are correct.
Range of field values. In network protocol specifications, some packet fields can have a value
within acceptable ranges. For example, the DHCP specification allows developers to decide a lease
duration between zero and infinity and administrators select a given lease value based on their pol-
icy. We found that two commonly used DHCP servers, isc-dhcp (7 days) and udhcp (10 days),
define default lease times differently. Again, a simple comparison rule of DHCP response packets
would report this difference as a violation. However, since both values are within the valid range
of the lease time, the response packets from both implementations are correct.
The next example shows an IOT rule that handle fields with a value in a certain range:
1 query {opts.type = DISCOVER} ;
2 resp {opts.type = OFFER AND S1.lease_time >= 0 AND S2.lease_time >= 0}
The rule considers the resp packets in both streams, S1 and S2, as correct if the value of the
lease time field of both resp packets is greater than zero.
5.4.3 Interoperability Decision Criteria
After the comparison, SIOT produces a result showing whether implementations are interoperable
with each other. In this section, we explain a detailed decision criteria for reporting IOT results.
First, we define an IOT model that shows the high-level process performed by SIOT. As shown in
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the Figure 5.8 (left), the IOT model is comprised of a Client that sends test packets and IUTs. The
figure also shows decision criteria (right) used in SIOT. As depicted in the IOT model, Client
sends a test input packet p to both implementations, IUT-A and IUT-B, and waits for response
packets, rsp-a and rsp-b. Based on these response packets, SIOT reports a result as either
PASS (i.e. the implementations are interoperable with each other) or FAIL (i.e. the implementa-
tions are not interoperable). If both IUT-A and IUT-B generate no response packet (case 1) or
identical response packets (case 2), SIOT reports PASS as a result. On the other hand, if both
implementations generate different response packets or only one of implementations generates a
response packet, SIOT reports FAIL. When both implementations respond to the test packet, IOT
rules compare response packets field by field in order to detect any differences. For each FAIL
decision, SIOT reports an error trace as well as field information that led to the interoperability
failure.
5.5 Related Work
Previous research work on interoperability testing can be classified into two categories: (1) provid-
ing general concepts, experiences and formal definitions of interoperability testing and (2) devel-
oping methods for automatically deriving interoperability test cases.
The interoperability of many network protocols have been tested in the past to provide various
concepts and formalisms for interoperability testing [DSU90, VB94, Tre99, BFN+05]. Moseley
et al. [MRW03] present their experience of interoperability testing within the European Telecom-
munications Standards Institute (ETSI). Formal methods were also considered as an approach to
support interoperability testing. Viho et al. [VBT01] extend the concepts of conformance testing
to define a framework for interoperability testing and suggest some guidelines for interoperability
test case generation.
Similar to this prior research, we provide a concept of interoperability testing that enables perform-
ing IOT efficiently (cf. Section 5.2.1) and a formal definition of interoperability relationships (cf.
Section 5.2.2). SIOT provides an automated way to generate test packets for interoperability
testing and check interoperability problems. Unlike previous interoperability testing approaches,
SIOT derives interoperability test cases after exploring a large portion of the program state space
using symbolic execution. Such test cases enable developers to check much deeper interoperabil-
ity behaviour, such as complex sequences of interactions, i.e. behaviour that depends on accurate
value information.
Most recent research work has focused on deriving interoperability test cases [MG08, PPP08,
DV09]. Although many methods to generate test cases for interoperability testing exist, reacha-
bility analysis of finite state machines is a popular approach [KSK00, KC00, HLSG04, VRA+07,
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SWSC07]. Kang et al. [KSK00] propose a technique for generating interoperability test suites for
communication protocols. They first model an implementation as finite state machines and de-
rive the test suite through analysis of reachable states from a start state. Kone´ et al. [KC00] use
a transition system to generate test sequences for communication systems interworking with other
network entities. Their approach automatically computes test patterns through a reachability graph,
which is constructed after reachability analysis of the transition system. For approaches that use
reachability analysis, the state space explosion problem is a major challenge to be overcome. Kone´
et al. have focused on minimising the number of entities during modeling. However, minimising
the model may sacrifice chances to find bugs because important requirements are often not covered
by an abstract model.
In contrast to these approaches, SIOT uses source code, which enables developers to build a model
even when there is no formal specification of the target system. Since test cases are generated
directly from the source code, they cover both the control and data parts of protocols. Most previ-
ous research work deals with test case derivation only for the control part of protocols because it
observes input/output packets only at the network interface.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced symbolic interoperability testing (SIOT), a part of SYMBEXNET for
interoperability checking between different implementations of the same protocol from separate
vendors. We started with an overview of conventional testing methods that are used for checking
network protocol implementations, conformance testing and interoperability testing, discussing
their differences. We also provided the definitions of interoperability and interoperability testing.
Next, we described SIOT in detail. It is designed with four requirements: automation, flexibility,
implementation-based checking and scalability. We also provided formal definitions through an
interoperability testing model and an interoperable relationship. SIOT is divided into three steps:
(1) automated generation of a set of test input packets; (2) execution of the generated test packets;
and (3) performing of IOT rule checking.
As a part of SYMBEXNET, SIOT inherits many features of SYMBEXNET, such as generation of test
cases and replay of generated test cases. SIOT takes as input the source code of IOTs and generates
test packets for them using symbolic execution. We extended the replay process for IOT so that
generated test packets are replayed not only on the original implementation but also across all the
other IOTs. We also enhanced the packet rule language by introducing packet stream identifiers,
thereby allowing rules to compare packet streams from multiple implementations. Finally, we
provided the IOT decision criteria, illustrating how SIOT decides regarding interoperability errors.
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TO check a network protocol implementation, SYMBEXNET takes three steps: (1) derivationof packet rules; (2) generation of test input packets; and (3) replay of test packets and valida-
tion of the implementation and its interoperability. We applied SYMBEXNET to five real-world net-
work protocol implementations. Our experiments show that SYMBEXNET generates high quality
test packets and sequences to check a network protocol implementation as well as its interoperabil-
ity with other implementations. In particular, SYMBEXNET can avoid the path explosion problem,
and the generated packets explore target implementations with high source code coverage.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the methodology for eval-
uating SYMBEXNET. Section 6.2 discusses how rules are derived from protocol specifications.
The environmental set-up used for the experiments is described in Section 6.3, including details on
establishing an isolated network environment. The experimental results on single packet exchange
symbolic execution (SPE-SE), multi packet exchange symbolic execution (MPE-SE) and symbolic
interoperability testing (SIOT) are presented in Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. Finally, we
present the detected violations in Section 6.7.
6.1 Overview
The goal of our evaluation is to demonstrate the suitability of SYMBEXNET as an efficient check-
ing tool for finding implementation flaws in real-world network protocol implementations. We
applied SYMBEXNET to network daemons implementing the Zeroconf [CK10, Stu10] and the
DHCP [Dro97] specifications. A checking system such as SYMBEXNET can be evaluated in terms
of the quality of generated test packets and its ability to detect implementation bugs. To show
the quality of test input packets, we measure the source code coverage achieved by the generated
packets. Bug detection ability is evaluated by validating network protocol implementations against
their protocol specifications and detecting implementations flaws. SYMBEXNET discovered 39
unique flaws (22 for Zeroconf and 17 for DHCP). These bugs are due to implementations mistakes
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Table 6.1: The summary of the network daemons tested using SYMBEXNET.
Protocol Daemon Version Language # LOC # Files
Zeroconf
Avahi 0.6.23 C 7K 31
Bonjour 107.6 C 7.9K 10
JmDNS 3.4.1 Java 2K 9
DHCP
isc-dhcp 2.0 C 3K 15
udhcp 0.9.9-pre C 1.2K 12
and ambiguous requirements in the specifications. In our evaluation, we address the following
questions:
1. How efficiently does SYMBEXNET derive packet rules from protocol specifications? (Sec-
tion 6.2);
2. Does SYMBEXNET generate effective test input packets (or sequences) that can achieve
broad and deep exploration of the program state space using symbolic execution? (Sec-
tions 6.4 and 6.5);
3. Does SYMBEXNET provide an effective way to check interoperability of network daemons?
(Section 6.6); and
4. Does SYMBEXNET manage to detect various types of non-trivial implementation
bugs? (Section 6.7)
The five network protocol implementations tested are summarised in Table 6.1. We investigate
three different implementations of Zeroconf using SYMBEXNET: Avahi 0.6.231, Apple’s Bon-
jour 107.62 and JmDNS 3.4.13. Bonjour has about 8K lines of source code in 10 files for its
Linux version and Avahi has about 7K lines of source code in 31 files. As Bonjour and Avahi
are the most widely used Zeroconf implementations, we use them for symbolic execution. Nowa-
days Zeroconf is becoming a vital part of applications on the iOS and Android platforms. JmDNS is
a Java implementation of Zeroconf and the only available Zeroconf server that can be used on the
Android platform because JmDNS provides a pure Java library. In order to show the effectiveness
of the generated test packets, after we generate test packets from the two C daemons, we use the
same packets on all three daemons.
For DHCP, we use two different implementations: udhcp 0.9.9-pre4 and ISC’s DHCP 2.05. Both
udhcp and isc-dhcp are open source DHCP implementations and their code has been thoroughly
1http://www.avahi.org
2http://developer.apple.com/opensource
3http://jmdns.sourceforge.net/
4http://busybox.net
5http://www.isc.org/software/dhcp
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Table 6.2: The results of the rule derivation from the specifications.
Zeroconf: 25 rules DHCP: 29 rules
Keyword # Total # Translated # Total # Translated
MUST 79 29 72 8
MUST NOT 29 4 46 15
SHALL (& NOT) 2 0 0 0
Others1 0 0 7 7
1 phrases signifying absolute requirements but without usage of the above
keywords.
tested, which makes them suitable for our evaluations.
6.2 Rule Derivation
We manually derive a set of rules from the specifications of the Zeroconf and DHCP protocols
by following the process described in Section 4.3. Our rule derivation for Zeroconf and DHCP
resulted in a total of 25 and 29 rules, respectively. In Table 6.2, we show the result of the rule
derivation from the specifications of both protocols. After becoming familiar with the process of
developing verifiable specifications through the experience with the mDNS specification, it took
around 3–4 hours to analyse the DHCP specification and to derive the DHCP packet rules.
Zeroconf protocol. As explained in Section 2.1, the Zeroconf protocol is defined in two specifi-
cations: multicast DNS (MDNS) and DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD). To obtain a set of
packet rules, as defined in Section 4.4, we examine both specifications to find phrases that contain
the keywords from Section 4.3. As shown in Table 6.2, we find 110 phrases: 79 phrases with a
“MUST” keyword, 29 with “MUST NOT” and 2 with “SHALL/SHALL NOT”.
Not all of these phrases can be translated into rules—we translate successfully 29 phrases based on
“MUST”, 4 phrases based on “MUST NOT” and none of the phrases with “SHALL/SHALL NOT”.
Some statements are purely informative and some contain environmental requirements such as the
interfaces that must be supported. Any phrases referring to the internal state of the daemon, such
as the cache maintained by the Zeroconf daemon, have to be ignored. Finally, some phrases that
are used to describe the same requirement are combined into a single rule. In total, we obtain a
verifiable specification with 25 rules based on 33 valid phrases.
DHCP protocol. After following the same rule derivation procedure, we find 118 phrases in total
(“MUST”: 72, “MUST NOT”: 46 and “SHALL/SHALL NOT”: 0). For these 118 phrases, we
transform 23 phrases into rules. Most untranslated phrases are related to requirements describing
desired behaviour of DHCP clients. Since we are not checking clients but server implementa-
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tions, any statements that are not related to the DHCP daemon are ignored. While analysing the
specification, we find an additional seven phrases stating absolute requirements without the above
keywords. Since these phrases specify how the DHCP daemon must construct response packets,
we derive rules from the phrases. The following shows an example phrase.
“If the ’giaddr’ field is zero and the ’ciaddr’ field is nonzero, then the server unicasts
DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK messages to the address in ’ciaddr’.”
In summary, we obtain a verifiable specification consisting of 29 rules based on 23 phrases associ-
ated with the above keywords and 7 other phrases for the DHCP protocol.
6.3 Experimental Set-up
We conduct our experiments on a 2.4 Ghz Intel Core2 Duo machine with 2 GB of RAM under
32-bit Ubuntu Linux. Usually there exist other network daemons on the network and they generate
network traffic that is not related to our experiments. To control network traffic during test packet
generation and replay, all experiments are done as part of an isolated test network. We configure
the daemons to use the loopback (lo) interface under Linux allowing daemons to receive only
packets from the isolated network.
The general experimental setup used in checking implementations involves two nodes: a network
daemon under test and a client. The network daemon is executed, and the client is constrained
to communicate with the daemon using our SYMBEXNET verification tool, which is called a test
agent. To validate the network daemon, SYMBEXNET captures all network traffic generated by
the daemon and clients during the replay on the network interface. For this, SYMBEXNET uses
libpcap [Law94], a portable packet capture library.
Zeroconf protocol. When a Zeroconf daemon starts, the daemon typically discovers available
services or devices on the network. To emulate a typical environment (i.e. with several network
services or devices), the DNS Service Discovery (DNS-SD) client is configured to register six
services with the Zeroconf daemon. Table 6.3 shows the set of services that are used in the experi-
ments. These are services that are usually available in a small office environment. We register these
services in the same order for each experiment. After registering these services, SYMBEXNET in-
jects a query for browsing a service with the following UNIX dig command, which is a command
line tool for sending a DNS query:
dig -b 127.0.0.1 -p 5353 @224.0.0.251 _http._tcp.local ptr
The Zeroconf daemon is instrumented to detect an input packet that is constructed with specific
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Table 6.3: A set of network services created for the Zeroconf experiments.
Order Service name Type Port Additional properties
1 My music daap. tcp 7800 none
2 My printer printer. tcp 5155 pdl=application/postscript
3 My wiki http. tcp 4653 path=/mywiki.html
4 Music wiki http. tcp 6753 path=/musicwiki.html
5 CS printer printer. tcp 5678 pdl=application/postscript
6 Bob iTunes daap. tcp 6543 none
field values (i.e. a unicast packet querying the service “ http. tcp.local”). When it receives
such an input packet, symbolic execution is started.
DHCP protocol. For the DHCP protocol, we use a DHCP client written in Python to initiate sym-
bolic execution. The client injects a symbolic DHCP query message to the DHCP daemon, which
is instrumented to detect the symbolic DHCP packet. When the daemon receives the symbolic
DHCP packet, it starts to run symbolically. SYMBEXNET initiates the client with the following
command:
sym-dhcp-client -s -p 6868
In order to make the DHCP daemon only handle DHCP requests from our DHCP client, we use a
customised DHCP port number (6868) instead of the well-known port number (68). The -p flag
is used to specify the customised DHCP port number. The -s flag is used to indicate to the client
to send a symbolic input packet to the DHCP daemon.
6.4 Single Packet Exchange Symbolic Execution
In this section, we describe the experiments that check stateless network protocol implementa-
tions (cf. Section 2.1) through generating and replaying test input packets followed by packet rule
checking. The experiments were chosen to evaluate the effectiveness of test packets generation.
We report the number of generated test input packets and their line coverage and give examples of
the detected implementation errors.
In order to avoid the path explosion problem, we try to mark all combinations of fields in given
protocol packets, starting with only one field, and then progressively advancing to larger numbers
of fields marked symbolic at the same time. The following invocation causes SYMBEXNET to
analyse a Multicast DNS daemon:
symbexnet-analysis -p zeroconf -d ./daemon/mdns.bc
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Figure 6.1: Number of completed paths and generated test packets with various symbolic execution timeout
values for Bonjour (a and c) and udhcp (b and d), while progressively marking more fields
as symbolic.
It provides the protocol name with the -p option and the file path of the daemon that needs to be
executed symbolically with the -d option.
6.4.1 Test Packet Generation
First we explore how the amount of symbolic data per input packet affects the number of generated
test cases and the code coverage for specific network daemons. Initially, we attempt to mark each
field of an input packet as a symbolic variable. In our experiments, DNS and DHCP input packets
have 12 and 10 fields, respectively. Each field has a size between 2 bytes (e.g. the ID field) to 299
bytes (e.g. the pad field). Since the length of these input packets are 512 bytes (DNS) and 5048
bytes (DHCP) in total, it is impractical to mark the entire packet as symbolic and run a daemon
symbolically for a long amount of time.
We generate test packets first for the mDNS daemons and then for DHCP daemons. For the mDNS
daemons, we start with the ID field, as the only symbolic field, run symbolic execution to generate
input test packets and then progressively mark more fields as symbolic. As more fields are made
symbolic, the number of paths explored by SYMBEXNET increases. By default, one test packet
is generated for each path that is explored. To avoid unnecessarily generating a large number of
packets, SYMBEXNET configures KLEE to generate only test packets for paths that cover new
statements in the code. We also explore different timeout values for the symbolic execution.
Figure 6.1 shows (a) the number of explored paths and (c) generated test packets when we increase
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Figure 6.2: Number of generated test packet comparisons for Zeroconf and DHCP.
the number of symbolic packet fields and use different timeout values. The results reveal two
insights. First, in the case of Bonjour and Avahi, a 50s timeout value offers a good tradeoff
between the time needed to run the experiments and the number of generated test packets. With a
10s timeout, SYMBEXNET generates significantly fewer test packets, but increasing the timeout to
1 hour does not significantly increase the number of generated packets (i.e. SYMBEXNET generates
many more paths, but most of them cover the same lines of code). Therefore, we use a 50s timeout
value in all of our experiments. In some cases (for example, Figure 6.1(c)), non-determinism in
KLEE produces slightly fewer packets for a long timeout value than a short timeout value.
We apply the same timeout selection approach to the udhcp daemon. Figures 6.1(b) and 6.1(d)
show the number of explored paths and generated test packets for udhcp. The results suggest a
500s timeout value for udhcp and we use this timeout value in all udhcp and isc-dhcp experi-
ments. Since the udhcp implementation is less complex than the Bonjour one, SYMBEXNET can
explore udhcp’s state space for a longer period of time before exceeding the memory usage limit.
In order to analyse the sensitivity of each field in different implementations of the protocol, we
conduct an experiment, in which we mark one field at a time as symbolic and compare the number
of test packets generated for Zeroconf (i.e. Avahi and Bonjour) and DHCP (i.e. udhcp and
isc-dhcp).
Figure 6.2 shows the results. As expected, we obtain similar sets of test packets for the dae-
mons implementing the same protocol. For example, when we mark the port field as symbolic,
SYMBEXNET generates the port values 0, 512 and 5353 for Avahi and 0, 2, 5351 and 5353
for Bonjour. There are certain fields, such as srv proto and domain in Zeroconf, however
for which we obtain more test packets for Avahi than for Bonjour. By examining the code, we
discover that the Avahi implementation compares the different fields (e.g. domain names) in a
complex fashion, i.e. using if statements and thus requires more test packets to cover all possible
code statements.
Next we try all 4095 (and 1023) possible combinations of symbolic fields for multiple implemen-
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Table 6.4: Summary of symbolic execution for all combinations of packet fields
Description Avahi Bonjour isc-dhcp udhcp
1 Number of packet fields 12 12 10 10
2 Number of combinations 4095 4095 1023 1023
3 Number of generated test packets 34,047 32,069 16,777 14,271
4 Symbolic execution timeout (seconds) 50 50 500 500
5 Total execution time (hours) 31 22 27 26
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Figure 6.3: Number of generated test packets for pairs of fields in Zeroconf (subset of all combinations for
each daemon)
tations of Zeroconf (and DHCP). Obtaining and comparing the number of generated test packets
for different packet field combinations helps us understand how each packet field is handled by the
implementation.
As shown in Table 6.4, using all combinations of the packet fields, SYMBEXNET generates 32,069
test packets, with a total execution time of around 22 hours for Bonjour; and 34,047 test pack-
ets in 31 hours for Avahi. Each combination is timed out after 50 seconds. For DHCP, SYM-
BEXNET generates 16,777 test packets in 26 hours for udhcp and 14,271 test packets in 27 hours
for isc-dhcp, with a 500 second timeout value. Overall, symbolic execution generates more test
packets for the Zeroconf daemons than for the DHCP daemons. The daemons of the same protocol
generate similar numbers of test packets. This implies that the daemons of the same protocol are
not that different in the way that they handle input packets.
Comparing the number of generated packets for each field (or pairs of fields) of the daemons imple-
menting the same protocol can show how similar they are in terms of processing an input packet.
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the number of generated test packets for a subset of these combinations,
namely those in which pairs of fields are marked as symbolic. The results show that the number of
generated packets depends on which fields are marked as symbolic.
In Figure 6.3(a), when the flags field is marked as symbolic, a relatively high number of test
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Figure 6.4: Number of generated test packets for pairs of fields in DHCP (subset of all combinations for
each daemon)
packets is generated because the flags field contains control information that is used extensively
by the network daemon to decide how to process a packet. When the authority or additional
fields are marked as symbolic, however, fewer test packets are generated because these fields are
only used to specify the number of associated data in the payload part of the packet.
The figure also reveals that implementations of the same protocol specification show similar num-
bers of generated test packets. For example, Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) show that the circles asso-
ciated with the addrs and option fields lead to relatively high number of test packets. These
two fields contain information, such as a lease address, a client MAC address and message type,
which affect the behaviour of the DHCP server for an input message. Consequently these values
are checked by many functions when the daemon handles an input packet.
6.4.2 Line Coverage Results
We use line coverage to measure the quality of test packets generated by symbolic execution.
Coverage is measured on the instrumented original binary using the gcov tool, which is part of
the GNU GCC compiler suite [Lic]. We disable unnecessary compile options, such as debugging
features, and exclude from the calculation library files that are not relevant to our experiments.
Table 6.5 shows the line coverage numbers for each daemon. First, we measure the coverage when
a daemon is in an idle state. When a daemon is started, it sets up its configuration parameters and
environment variables, such as the domain name and the cache size, before waiting for requests.
SYMBEXNET injects the test packets generated using symbolic execution and measures coverage.
We observe the line coverage that can be obtained from these test packets and compare it with
random testing. For this, we prepare randomly generated test packets using the D-ITG (Distributed
Internet Traffic Generator) random packet generator [AGE+04]. It is able to produce traffic for
various protocols, such as TCP, UDP, ICMP and DNS. Using the generator, we create a similar
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Table 6.5: Line coverage of each daemon for generated test packets.
No. Daemons # files
total
LOC Baseline (%)
1 uncovered
LOC (%)
Random Test 2 SYMBEXNET-gen 3
# pkts Cov.(%) # pkts Cov.(%)
1 Avahi 31 7K 29.53 21.75 30K 63.19 34,047 75.25
2 Bonjour 10 7.9K 20.3 28 30K 48.47 32,069 61.5
3 isc-dhcp 15 3K 31.65 30.85 15K 35.59 16,777 66.85
4 udhcp 12 1.2K 31.21 16.43 15K 59.86 14,271 79.15
1 Baseline shows the coverage when a daemon is in its idle state.
2 Random shows the coverage with the randomly generated test packets using D-ITG packet generator.
3 SYMBEXNET-gen shows the coverage with test packets generated by SYMBEXNET.
number of random test packets for Zeroconf (30K) and DHCP (15K). There is a trade-off between
the number of test packets and the total test execution time. In order to finish the testing within a
reasonable time, such as less than 24 hours, we generate a similar number of test packets instead
of generating test packets for a similar period of time.
Zeroconf protocol. First, we explore the source code coverage of the Bonjour daemon. On
average, the generated test packets by SYMBEXNET cover 61.5% of the code, while the baseline
tests that execute the daemon without test packets cover only 20%.
Note that our test scenario cannot cover 28% of the source code: in addition to DNS respon-
se/request packets, the daemon accepts service registrations from DNS-SD clients, which are not
explored symbolically in our experiments. About 15% of the source code is used to handle such
requests; another 13% implement other features, such as cache maintenance and name conflict
resolution. We also achieve similar coverage for the Avahi daemon of 75.25%.
DHCP protocol. SYMBEXNET generates test packets covering 66.85% and 79.15% for isc-dhcp
and udhcp, respectively. About 30% (isc-dhcp) and 15% (udhcp) of the source code are not
covered by our test scenario because they are mostly related to BOOTP packet handling, static IP
address allocation and unsupported server configurations. Since isc-dhcp contains additional
features such as DNS lookup, it achieves lower line coverage than udhcp.
6.4.3 Discovered Implementation Errors
Using SYMBEXNET, we apply the generated test packets to all three Zeroconf implementations in
order to find violations of our packet rules. Although the generated packets come from the Avahi
and Bonjour implementations, they can be used to test other Zeroconf implementations because
they are highly effective test packets containing malformed data and corner cases.
Using single packet exchange symbolic execution (SPE-SE), SYMBEXNET discovers five different
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1 mDNSexport mStatus mDNSPlatformSendUDP
2 (const mDNS *const m, void *const msg, mDNSu8 *const end,
3 mDNSInterfaceID InterfaceID, mDNSAddr *dst, mDNSIPPort dstPort) {
4 ...
5 assert(m != NULL);
6 assert(end != NULL);
7 assert(dstPort.NotAnInteger != 0);
8 ...
9 }
Figure 6.5: Code fragment from the Bonjour daemon implementation that sends UDP response packets.
errors: two in the JmDNS implementation, one in each Avahi and Bonjour and two in Bonjour.
We describe two of these errors, one generic and one semantic bug.
Violation 1 (Generic error): Vulnerability caused by source port number of zero. When
SYMBEXNET marks the source port field as symbolic, we obtain test packets with the following
four values: 0, 2, 5351 and 5353. All these port numbers are used as well-known ports — e.g.
port 5353 is assigned to mDNS. According to the mDNS specification, a query must be sent as a
multicast packet from port 5353 or as a unicast packet from a random port number. If the source
port in a received query is not 5353, the daemon should consider the packet to be a unicast query
and generate a conventional unicast response, for example, by repeating the query ID and sending
a response to that source port. Therefore, we expect the daemons simply to reply with a response
packet to all port numbers without any errors. However, we detect abort errors in Bonjour and
Avahi. Both errors are caused by the source port number of a query packet.
During the replay process, when SYMBEXNET crafts a packet with the source port of 0, the
daemons abort after receiving the packet due to an assert statement violation. In the case of
Bonjour, the daemon calls the mDNSPlatformSendUDP function to send a response packet as
shown in Figure 6.5. Line 8 causes the daemon to abort. Therefore, sending the crafted packet
to a multicast address (224.0.0.251) terminates all Bonjour daemons in the network, which have
an answer to the query. The crafted packet also aborts Avahi daemons. This occurs regardless of
the existence of a response packet because the assertion is located in a function that handles any
received packets.
We have reported this bug to Apple who confirmed it. The latest version of Bonjour as of this
writing (Bonjour 320.5.1) does not exhibit the problem any more. The bug in Avahi was detected
and its patch applied to version 0.6.28.
Violation 2 (Semantic error): Incorrect response for unknown record class. When a Zeroconf
daemon receives a query packet asking for a specific service, it must compare three values (name,
type and class) against its records. The daemon only responds to a query packet when it has a
record with the same values for these three fields. This requirement is stated in the specification:
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“The record name must match the question name, the record rrtype must match the
question qtype unless the qtype is ANY (255) or the rrtype is CNAME (5), and the
record rrclass must match the question qclass unless the qclass is ANY (255)” [CK10]
From the above statement, we derive the following rule:
1 query{src_port != 5353 AND dst_port = 5353 AND flag.QR = 0x00} ;
2 resp {dst_port = @query.src_port AND flag.QR = 0x80 AND data.answer(class !=
’ANY’ AND class != @query.question.class)}
The class field states the value of services that define the protocol type. The normal value is “IN”,
which refers to the Internet protocol. When SYMBEXNET marks the class field as symbolic, we
obtain the following two test packets: “IN (Internet)” and “0x00 (unknown type)”. Both Bonjour
and Avahi respond only to the query with class value “IN”, which is the correct behaviour. How-
ever, JmDNS incorrectly sends a response even when it receives a query with an unknown class
value. This can give incorrect service information to clients, which may in turn send further un-
necessary queries.
6.5 Multi Packet Exchange Symbolic Execution
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of multi packet exchange symbolic execution (MPE-
SE) by analysing line coverage results of test packets generated using MPE-SE. As described
in Section 2.1, both Zeroconf and DHCP contain state machines. The state machine of DHCP
changes its current state based on input packets. Zeroconf also performs transitions based on
timeouts (i.e. the transition occurs when there is no input packet for a given amount of time). Since
MPE-SE is for stateful network protocols that exchange multiple packets, we focus our evaluation
of MPE-SE on DHCP.
6.5.1 Generation of Test Sequences
As described in Section 2.1, the state machine of DHCP is built based on the life cycle of a dy-
namically assigned IP address between a DHCP client and the daemon. For the life cycle, the
DHCP daemon receives three input packets from the client. To generate a series of test inputs that
can cover all possible combinations of input/output packets of the life cycle, SYMBEXNET runs
MPE-SE on three DHCP input packets.
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Table 6.6: Generated sequences of packets for DHCP.
Cycle Test sequence
1 DHCPREQUEST
2 DHCPDISCOVER – DHCPREQUEST
3 DHCPDISCOVER – DHCPREQUEST – DHCPINFORM
Table 6.7: Results after applying MPE-SE to the DHCP daemons.
No. Description
udhcp server isc-dhcp server
120 min 60 min 60 min 30 min
1 Total # of test cases 293 248 608 397
2 Total # of test cases from the first packet (Discovery) 41 40 46 32
3 Total # of test cases from the second packet (Request) 217 174 407 198
4 Total # of test cases from the third packet (Release) 35 34 155 167
5 Total # of test paths 286 242 595 385
6 Total elapsed time for MPE-SE (hours) 16.9 7.67 17.8 8.5
In the first MPE-SE cycle, SYMBEXNET marks the DHCPDISCOVER packet, which is the first input
packet in the life cycle, as a symbolic packet and generates test packets that are used as input in the
second cycle. After performing the same procedure in the second and third cycles, SYMBEXNET
generates a set of test input sequences. Table 6.6 shows the three test input sequences generated
after performing MPE-SE on each symbolic packet. As shown, the generated test sequences can
have either one, two or three input packets, each exploring different execution paths in the DHCP
daemon.
Table 6.7 shows results after applying MPE-SE to the udhcp and isc-dhcp daemons with dif-
ferent timeout values. We run both daemons with three symbolic DHCP input packets and mark
548 bytes of symbolic input packet as symbolic because the DHCP messages have a maximum
length of 548 bytes. The experiment suggests 120 mins (udhcp) and 60 mins (isc-dhcp) of time-
out values for each MPE-SE cycle in order to get test input sequences within a day. Otherwise
SYMBEXNET generates fewer test sequences or requires too much time for the experiments. Since
each MPE-SE cycle is performed based on the test packets generated in the previous cycle, more
test packets in earlier cycles increases the total execution time for the whole MPE-SE cycle expo-
nentially. With these timeout values, udhcp and isc-dhcp generate a total of 286 and 595 unique
test sequences, respectively.
The symbolic path trees (see Section 3.5) for isc-dhcp and udhcp have depth three because
MPE-SE is performed on three symbolic input packets. The set of all nodes at each depth represent
the generated test cases in each cycle. Test sequences of packets are obtained by finding all paths
from the root to the leaves.
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Although SYMBEXNET uses smaller timeout values for isc-dhcp (60 mins), the number of gen-
erated packets for isc-dhcp from each MPE-SE cycle is greater than for udhcp. After analysing
the source code of both daemons, we find that the isc-dhcp daemon contains more conditional
statements than udhcp to handle input packets. Generated test input packets after the first cycle
contain all possible DHCP message types as well as invalid packet formats, thereby broadly ex-
ploring the source code of the daemons. For both daemons, the second cycle generates a large
number of test packets, and fewer packets are part of the third cycle. A large portion of generated
packets in the second cycle either transfer the state of both daemons to invalid states or have an
invalid packet format. As these packets can be received only after receiving a packet from the first
cycle, we find that they can cover source code that can only be reached after exchanging several
packets in a specific order.
6.5.2 Line Coverage Results
In this experiment, we investigate line coverage to show how test packets generated using MPE-SE
explore the source code. We run generated test sequences of packets on each unmodified network
daemon and use gcov to measure coverage. To send DHCP packets in a test sequence to the DHCP
daemon in the correct order, we use a DHCP client written in Python.
As a baseline, we first measure the coverage achieved by a DHCP conformance test suite that
checks the functional correctness of the DHCP daemon. The conformance test [Dro97, Vit] sends
a series of DHCP messages to the daemon in the order of DHCPDISCOVER, DHCPREQUEST and
DHCPRELEASE. It checks if the daemon responds correctly. Since we perform MPE-SE on three
symbolic DHCP input packets and generate test packets, it is reasonable to use the coverage from
the conformance test as a baseline.
We then measure the coverage after applying MPE-SE on the first symbolic input packet (first cy-
cle). For the test packets generated from second and third cycles, we also observe the achieved
coverage. By comparing the obtained coverage from each cycle with each other and the baseline,
we determine to what degree symbolic execution on multiple symbolic input packets affects cov-
erage. We also generate test packets with an extended timeout value in the first cycle and measure
the coverage. This enable us to compare the effectiveness of MPE-SE and SPE-SE with a long
timeout value.
6.5.3 Source Code Analysis
Table 6.8 shows that the test sequences generated after the second MPE-SE cycle achieve more
line coverage than the sequences generated after the first MPE-SE cycle. Since the second cycle
occurred after handling the first input packet, it can eliminate several constraints that are associated
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Table 6.8: Comparison of source code coverage measurements for the udhcp and isc-dhcp servers.
Daemon Description
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udhcp
Symbolic input size (bytes) - 548 548 548 548 548
Elapsed time for single symbolic execution (hours) - 2 2 2 16.9 -
Total execution time (hours) - 2 12.9 2 16.9 -
Source code lines executed 469 507 536 536 533 558
% of line coverage 66.52 71.91 76.03 76.03 75.60 79.15
isc-dhcp
Symbolic input size (bytes) - 548 548 548 548 548
Elapsed time for single symbolic execution (hours) - 1 1 1 17.8 -
Total execution time (hours) - 1 9.4 7.4 17.8 -
Source code lines executed 1395 1600 1658 1658 1634 1698
% of line coverage 59.82 68.61 71.1 71.1 70.07 72.81
with symbolic input packets, thereby enabling a deeper state exploration that can be reached after
exchanging several packets in a specific order.
The last column in Table 6.8 shows the accumulated coverage of all experiments. It is greater than
that of any individual result. This means that our two symbolic execution methods, MPE-SE and
SPE-SE with longer execution times, are complementary because there exist statements that can
only be covered by test packets generated by one of the methods. Consequently combining the two
methods enable developers to achieve even higher line coverage.
Figure 6.6 shows a fragment from the udhcp source code that handles an input DHCP packet
based on its message type and the current state of the daemon (with additional comments and some
omissions). When a DHCP daemon receives a DHCPDISCOVER message (line 6) requesting an
IP lease from a client as the first input packet, it reserves an IP address and sends a DHCPOFFER
message (line 9) to the client. The client accepts the DHCP offer and broadcasts a DHCPREQUEST
message (line 12) because the DHCPOFFER does not contain the IP address. The daemon then
simply responds with a DHCPACK message (line 21) with the IP address to confirm the allocation.
Before sending a DHCPOFFER message, the udhcp daemon stores the offered IP address in an
internal array (line 9). When the udhcp daemon receives a DHCPREQUEST message, it first checks
the message to see if any IP address has been leased to the given client’s hardware address by
calling the find lease by chaddr function (line 1). If there is an address that matches the
client’s hardware address, the daemon sends a DHCPACK response (lines 19–23). Otherwise a
DHCPNAK message is sent to the client (lines 25–27). The variable lease, assigned in line 1,
is used to decide which message the daemon sends to the client when it receives a DHCPREQUEST
message. The find lease by chaddr function returns the first lease that matches a given client’s
hardware address. If there is no match, the function returns NULL. Since a lease is assigned to a
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1 lease = find_lease_by_chaddr(packet.chaddr);
2 /* find the first lease that matches client’s hardware address */
3 /* lease becomes NULL if no match */
5 switch (state[0]) {
6 case DHCPDISCOVER:
7 /* sendOffer function gets an lease address and stores it into
8 an internal array, then sends an offer message */
9 sendOffer(&packet);
10 break;
12 case DHCPREQUEST:
13 requested = get_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP);
14 server_id = get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
16 if (lease) {
17 /* For single round symbolic execution, lease becomes always NULL */
18 /* Routines within this if statement are not covered by SPE-SE */
19 if (server_id) {
20 if (requested && requested_align == lease->yiaddr) {
21 sendACK(&packet, lease->yiaddr);
22 }
23 }
24 } else if (requested) {
25 if ((lease = find_lease_by_yiaddr(requested_align))) {
26 sendNAK(&packet); /* Send NAK message */
27 }
28 }
29 break;
Figure 6.6: Code fragment from the main function in udhcp.
client when the server sends a DHCPOFFER message, the variable lease can have a value only
after the server receives a DHCPDISCOVER followed by a DHCPREQUEST message.
One of the generated test input sequences after the first MPE-SE cycle is a DHCPREQUEST message.
During replay, the generated DHCPREQUEST message is sent to the daemon as the first input from
the client. Since the daemon has not yet assigned an IP address to the client, the lease variable
becomes NULL (in line 1). The lease variable can only have a proper value once the daemon
has received a DHCPDISCOVER message from a client and assigned an IP address to the client.
The DHCPREQUEST message is supposed to execute the statements (lines 13–29) below the case
DHCPREQUEST statement. However, the statements highlighted in gray (lines 19–23) cannot be
covered by the message because of the lease variable.
In contrast, a test sequence generated after the second cycle, DHCPDISCOVER-DHCPREQUEST, cov-
ers the unexplored statements (lines 19–23). With this test sequence, a client sends a DHCPDIS-
COVER message followed by DHCPREQUEST. When the daemon receives the first message, it as-
signs an IP address to the client and stores the address as a leased address mapped to the client’s
hardware address. Therefore, once the daemon receives the second message, DHCPREQUEST, SYM-
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BEXNET can explore the statements (lines 13–29).
Although MPE-SE achieves high source code coverage and enables to explore uncovered execution
paths, we could not detect errors from these new covered execution paths.
6.6 Symbolic Interoperability Testing
Response packets from network implementations of the same protocol typically have common
packet field values because they refer to the same protocol specification. If they behave differ-
ently, i.e. generate different response packets, interoperability problems may occur. In this section,
we explore interoperability between multiple implementations of the same protocol by different
vendors. The purpose of this evaluation is to show that SYMBEXNET provides an efficient inter-
operability testing method. For interoperability testing, we use the generated test packets from two
implementations of Zeroconf (Avahi and Bonjour) and DHCP (udhcp and isc-dhcp). The test
packets are replayed across all implementations of the same protocol. Response packets of these
implementations are then compared to check their interoperability.
6.6.1 Interoperability Rule Derivation
SYMBEXNET checks whether the daemons under IOT generate consistent response packets for a
given test input packet. Any deviations between the daemons, such as generating response packets
that have different values for certain fields or only one of them responds to a given test packet, are
reported as interoperability bugs. For this purpose, a list of IOT rules are derived from protocol
specifications.
When we derive IOT rules, not all the fields of the response packets from the daemons are com-
pared. Packet fields can have values that depend on the time or are within a range. For example,
packets may have different timestamp fields and the destination ip address may be differ-
ent according to the device. Therefore, we check these fields from specifications and do not derive
IOT rules from them.
For the Zeroconf protocol, we prepare eight interoperability testing rules for the fields of a Zeroconf
packet: destination port, flags, number of answers, number of authority records,
number of additional records, answer name, TTL and record class. The id and ip
address fields are excluded from the rules.
For the DHCP protocol, we generate nine interoperability testing rules for the fields composing
a DHCP packet: destination port, message type, flags, ciaddr, yiaddr, giaddr,
chaddr, options and lease time. The op and xid fields are also excluded because they
depend on the client and the incoming DHCP packet.
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1 query{src_port != 5353 AND dst_port = 5353 AND flag.QR = 0x00} ;
2 resp {dst_port = @query.src_port AND flag.QR = 0x80 AND Questions != 0
3 AND S1.data.answer.ttl != S2.data.answer.ttl}
(a) Zeroconf interoperability rule
1 query{src_port != 5353 AND dst_port = 5353 AND flag.QR = 0x00} ;
2 resp {dst_port = @query.src_port AND flag.QR = 0x80 AND Questions != 0
3 AND S1.data.answer.ttl != S2.data.answer.ttl}
(b) DHCP interoperability rule
Figure 6.7: Examples of derived interoperability rules for Zeroconf and DHCP.
Figure 6.7 gives examples of interoperability rules for both Zeroconf and DHCP. Rules compare
two packet streams, i.e. S1 and S2, that store captured input and output packets during replay,
each from different daemons, and detect differences. For example, the Zeroconf rule in Figure 6.7
checks the equality of two packet streams in terms of the TTL field. The expression starting with
query (line 1) filters a test query packet, and the statement starting with resp (line 2) detects an
answer packet for the query. The third line compares the value of the data.answer.ttl field of
the two packet streams.
6.6.2 Interoperability Test Packet Generation
We generate the input packets for interoperability testing from each implementation by symbol-
ically executing LLVM-compiled implementations. The generated test packets are then replayed
against an unmodified daemon as well as other daemons implementing the same protocol specifi-
cation under the same testing environment. All network traffic generated during the replay phase
is captured to check the interoperability between the daemons under testing. We use the test input
packets generated in the previous experiments (see Section 6.4.1).
The generated test packets are replayed against multiple implementations of each protocol (i.e.
Zeroconf — Avahi, Bonjour and JmDNS and DHCP — udhcp and isc-dhcp). All input/output
packets during the replay phase are stored. We check interoperability between daemons using
interoperability rules that compare input/output packets.
Figure 6.8(a) shows the results of SIOT for the three Zeroconf daemons. The daemons ignore
60,066 (out of 66,116) test cases because the test packets are malformed. As all daemons exhibit
the same behaviour, these cases do not incur interoperability problems. We find that the daemons
show different behaviour in the remaining 6,050 test cases. These test cases include the cases in
which (1) all the daemons respond (3,190 test cases); (2) two of them respond; and (3) only one
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Response Check
Avahi
jMDNS
Bonjour
No response
1 6
1,201
65
1,529
58
3,190
60,066
Total test cases: 
66,116
(a) Zeroconf
DHCPOFFER Check
ISC-DHCP uDHCP No DHCPOFFER
841 64,921 25,206
Total test cases: 
31,048
(b) DHCP
Figure 6.8: Venn diagrams illustrating the results of checking the generated response packets for Zeroconf
and DHCP.
daemon sends an answer packet.
Figure 6.8(b) shows the response behaviour of the two DHCP daemons for all test input packets.
Both daemons do not generate response packets for 25,206 (out of 31,048) test packets. For test
input packets that only one daemon generates a response for, SYMBEXNET reports interoperability
bugs.
6.6.3 Detected Interoperability Errors
Using our IOT rules, SYMBEXNET discovered 24 inconsistencies that cause interoperability errors.
We describe three of these IOT errors, one from Zeroconf and two from DHCP.
IOT violation 1 (Zeroconf): Incorrect behaviour for packets with inconsistent field sizes.
Bonjour and JmDNS behave incorrectly when they receive a packet claiming to have more data
than it actually contains. According to the DNS specification, implementations are expected to ver-
ify the size reported in DNS packets. However, the Bonjour daemon fails to check the validity of
received packets. If Bonjour receives a query message with a wrong AUCOUNT value, it responds
to that packet incorrectly. Note that the Avahi daemon ignores the same corrupted packet.
Similarly, SYMBEXNET injects a conflict response packet to test the name conflict function. The
correct response includes two answer records (SRV and TXT). When the Bonjour daemon receives
a corrupted response message with a wrong ANCOUNT, it still processes the packet. Again, the
Avahi daemon ignores the corrupted response message.
IOT violation 2 (DHCP): Incorrect response to broadcast address.
The DHCP specification states about responding to unicast addresses in Section 4.1:
“If the broadcast bit is not set and ’giaddr’ is zero and ’ciaddr’ is zero, then the server
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unicasts DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK messages to the client’s hardware address and
’yiaddr’ address.” [Dro97]
SYMBEXNET generates a test DHCPDISCOVER packet with both giaddr and ciaddr addresses set
to zero and the broadcast bit not set. In this case, the server receiving this DHCPDISCOVER packet
is supposed to respond with a DHCPOFFER message to the client’s hardware address and yiaddr
address. However, if the isc-dhcp daemon receives such a test packet, it responds incorrectly with
a DHCPOFFER message to broadcast address 255.255.255.255. In contrast, the udhcp daemon
correctly sends a DHCPOFFER message to the client’s hardware address and yiaddr address.
IOT violation 3 (DHCP): Inconsistency in the response to DHCPREQUEST message. The DHCP
specification defines the DHCPNAK message as follows:
“DHCPNAK - Server to client indicating client’s notion of network address is in-
correct (e.g. client has moved to new subnet) or client’s lease as expired [...] If the
selected server is unable to satisfy the DHCPREQUEST message (e.g. the requested
network address has been allocated), the server SHOULD respond with a DHCPNAK
message. ” [Dro97]
If SYMBEXNET marks chaddr as symbolic, it generates a DHCPDISCOVER message that has a
randomly generated address for chaddr. Both udhcp and isc-dhcp correctly respond with a
DHCPOFFER message to a client if they receive this input. The client then sends a DHCPREQUEST
message that contains a lease address provided in the DHCPOFFER message. However, this time the
client uses its correct hardware address because the DHCPREQUEST message is not a symbolically
generated message but a regular packet that must be handled concretely.
If the daemons receive the DHCPREQUEST message requesting the lease address offered to the
client, they assume that the requested address is not available because the offered address stored
internally is associated with the client’s hardware address. In this case, as the above requirement
states, the daemon is supposed to send a DHCPNAK message.
According to the observed behaviour of both daemons, isc-dhcp responds correctly with a DHCP-
NAK message while udhcp ignores the DHCPREQUEST message. Although this requirement con-
tains the keyword “SHOULD”, which can be interpreted as a recommended feature, the implemen-
tation of udhcp is preferable, otherwise the client has to wait for a timeout before retransmitting a
DHCPREQUEST message or restarting the initial procedure by sending a DHCPDISCOVER message.
Note that the above phrase is not translated to a packet rule because it is associated with state, i.e.
the expiration of a client’s lease. However, SYMBEXNET detects this issue using IOT.
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Table 6.9: A complete list of all detected bugs for each class
Daemon No. K
L
E
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B
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Bug Description
Avahi
1
√
Vulnerability caused by source port number zero
2
√ √
Generated wrong answer RR fields
3
√ √
Generated wrong additional RR fields
4
√
Response to a query with port number 5351
Bonjour
5
√
Source port 0 vulnerability
6
√ √
Incorrect behaviour for a query (non-zero RCODE)
7
√ √
Missing records in query packets
8
√
Query with wrong additional RR is not ignored
JmDNS
9
√ √
Incorrect response for a query with unknown class
10
√
Missing desired behaviour for OPCODE
11
√
Wrong TTL value for PTR record
12
√
Wrong TTL value for TXT record
13
√
Wrong TTL value for SRV record
14
√
Response to a query with port number 5351
15
√ √
Query with non-zero response code is not ignored
16
√ √
Query with server status request is not ignored
17
√ √
Query with non-authenticated flag is not ignored
18
√ √
Query with wrong additional RR is not ignored
19
√ √
Query with wrong answer RR is not ignored
20
√ √
Query with unknown class is not ignored
21
√ √
Generated wrong answer RR fields
22
√ √
Generated wrong additional RR fields
udhcp
23
√
Out of bound pointer error (options.c at line 79)
24
√
Out of bound pointer error (options.c at line 94)
25
√
Out of bound pointer error (options.c at line 99)
26
√
Out of bound pointer error (options.c at line 111)
27
√
Four bytes read overflow (dhcpd.c at line 213)
28
√
Four bytes read overflow (dhcpd.c at line 214)
29
√
Out of bound pointer error (dhcpd.c at line 319)
30
√
Out of bound pointer error (serverpacket.c at line 113)
31
√
Out of bound pointer error (serverpacket.c at line 119)
32
√
Failed to send DHCPOFFER to gateway server
33
√
Incorrectly generated DHCPOFFER
34
√
Incorrectly ignored DHCPREQUEST
35
√
Incorrect response to unicast address
isc-dhcp
36
√
Out of bound pointer error (conflex.c at line 114)
37
√
Out of bound pointer error (dhcp.c at line 205)
38
√ √
Missing requirement for the broadcast bit
39
√
Incorrect response to broadcast address
# Total 39 13 15 25 There exist 14 shared bugs
6.7 Discovered Implementation Errors
In this section, we summarise the detected bugs and classify them according to three classes based
on the method that is used to discover them: Generic Bugs (GB), Semantic Bugs (SB) and Interop-
erability Bugs (IB).
We evaluate SYMBEXNET with five real-world network protocol implementations. As shown in
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the last row of Table 6.9, SYMBEXNET detected 39 unique bugs in the network daemons. Most
of these bugs have been confirmed and fixed by the responsible developers. More specifically,
SYMBEXNET detected 4 bugs in Avahi, 4 bugs in Bonjour, 14 bugs in JmDNS, 13 bugs in udhcp
and 4 in isc-dhcp. These bugs were found by the checking process of a daemon in SYMBEXNET,
i.e. using symbolic execution (GB), rule-based analysis (SB) and interoperability testing (IB).
Eleven of the detected bugs using packet rules were also found by interoperability testing. Table 6.9
provides a complete list of all detected bugs for each bug class with their descriptions.
A blind comparison of a field value of response packets causes false positives due to recommended
requirements and ranges of field values as described in Section 5.4.2.
These false positivies are prunded by applying derived IOT rules from the DHCP protocol specifi-
cations.
Generic Bugs (GB). During symbolic execution, SYMBEXNET detects generic errors. SYM-
BEXNET found 13 bugs in this category. Most errors are out of bound pointer errors. Two security
errors in Bonjour and Avahi have already been described in Section 6.4.3. For udhcp, SYM-
BEXNET with KLEE was able to reproduce five memory errors that were previously detected by
EXE [CGP+06] in addition to four new memory errors.
Semantic Bugs (SB). SYMBEXNET detected 15 bugs classified as semantic bugs. Semantic bugs
are difficult to detect because they often require a deep analysis of exchanged packets to verify that
the daemon behaves incorrectly. SYMBEXNET uses rule-based packet analysis technique to find
these bugs.
Bug #12 in Table 6.9 shows an example of a semantic bug. The bug is related to the RCODE field,
which is used to get information about the status of a mDNS operation such as a format error (1).
The mDNS specification stipulates about RCODE in Section 18.11:
“18.11. RCODE (Response Code)
In both multicast query and multicast response messages, the Response Code MUST
be zero on transmission. Multicast DNS messages received with non-zero Response
Codes MUST be silently ignored.” [CK10]
From the above statement, we derive the following rule:
1 query{src_port != 5353 AND dst_port = 5353 AND flag.QR = 0x00
2 AND flag.RCODE != 0x00} ; resp {dst_port = @query.src_port
3 AND flag.QR = 0x80 AND ANY data.answer(name = @query.question.name)}
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The specification states that an mDNS packet with a non-zero RCODE must be ignored. However,
if a Bonjour daemon receives a query packet requesting a service with a non-zero RCODE value,
it does not ignore the packet but instead returns an answer. When the Avahi daemon receives the
query packet, it ignores the packet, as expected.
SYMBEXNET prepares a test packet replacing the flags value with 0x02, which is one of the
generated test cases, and sends it to the mDNS daemons. When Avahi receives the test packet,
it validates the packet by invoking the avahi packet check valid mcast function in dns.c.
The function has a statement that checks the RCODE value as follows:
if (flags & AVAHI_DNS_FLAG_RCODE)
return -1;
Therefore, Avahi returns -1 and the packet is ignored. In contrast, Bonjour does not check the
RCODE value of a received mDNS packet.
Table 6.10: Detected inconsistencies through interoperability testing for Zeroconf daemons.
No. Description Test value and its source
Daemons
Avahi BonjourJmDNS
1
Source port number with 5351 (assigned
for NAT Port Mapping Protocol)
sport=5351 (Bonjour) O X O
2 Query with source port number 0 sport=0 (Avahi &Bonjour) abort abort O
3
Query with non-zero Response code is not
ignored
flag=0x0002 (Avahi) X O O
4
Query with server status request is not ig-
nored
flag=0x1000 (Avahi &Bonjour) X X O
5
Query with non-authenticated data flag is
not ignored
flag=0x1010 (Bonjour) X X O
6
Query with opcode for inverse query is not
ignored
flag=0x0800 (Bonjour) X X O
7
Query with wrong number in Additional
RRs
AddRRs=2 (Avahi) X O O
8 Query with wrong number in Answer RRs AnswerRRs=2 (Avahi &Bonjour) X X O
9 Query with unknown class is not ignored class=unknown (Avahi &Bonjour) X X O
10
Different number of records in Answer
RRs field
any value incurring response 4 1 4
11
Different number of records in Additional
RRs field
any value incurring response 0 3 0
12
Destination port number of response
packet must not 5353
any value incurring response 6= 5353 6= 5353 5353
13 TTL values of PTR record are different any value incurring response 10 sec 10 sec 1 hr
14 TTL values of TXT record are different any value incurring response 10 sec 10 sec 1 hr
15 TTL values of SRV record are different any value incurring response 10 sec 10 sec 1 hr
Interoperability Bugs (IB). SYMBEXNET found 25 bugs classified in this bug class. Table 6.10
shows the summary of detected inconsistencies for Zeroconf daemons after conducting interoper-
ability testing.
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For example, the bug in the sixth row of Table 6.10 is related to the OPCODE field, which is origi-
nally defined in the DNS specification [Pau87b] as a command given to the DNS server requesting
some action, such as a query (0x00), an inverse query (0x01) or a server status request (0x02).
The mDNS specification states about OPCODE in Section 18.3:
“18.3. OPCODE
In both multicast query and multicast response messages, it MUST be zero.” [CK10]
The specification states the values for OPCODE but does not describe how to proceed when the value
is not zero. Developers can implement a daemon differently to handle a query packet with a non-
zero OPCODE, either ignoring the packet or the value. Both Avahi and Bonjour ignore a packet
with a non-zero OPCODE. However, JmDNS behaves differently from the other two daemons. It
replies with a query with the OPCODE value of 0x02. We have reported this bug to the JmDNS
developers who confirmed it. The latest version of JmDNS behaves as the other two daemons.
6.8 Summary
This chapter has presented the experimental evaluation of SYMBEXNET. The first experiment
showed the quality of the test packets generated by SYMBEXNET for stateless network proto-
col implementations. The number of generated test packets and their achieved source coverage
were compared with random testing. In general, SYMBEXNET-generated test packets achieve high
source coverage and effectively detect non-trivial errors in the tested network protocol implemen-
tations. The second experiment showed that the proposed method for stateful network protocol
implementations can explore deep code paths that can only be reached after exchanging several
packets. The results from the third experiment illustrated that SYMBEXNET’s IOT approach can
effectively check interoperability between multiple implementations of the same network protocol.
Our experience with using SYMBEXNET has yielded several insights. The majority of detected
violations are caused by different interpretations of the same specification. Since ambiguities in
the specification may lead to problems such as incorrect functionality, interoperability errors and
security problems, it is important to eliminate and detect them from specifications and implementa-
tions. By translating textual specifications into verifiable rules, one can eliminate such ambiguities.
Since rules only need to be extracted from a specification once, this can be done by domain experts
who can resolve ambiguities correctly. Developers can detect ambiguities that lead to different
implementations or incorrect functionality by comparing response behaviour for test input packets
generated by SYMBEXNET.
Since SYMBEXNET uses a blackbox approach, it cannot reason about the internal state of the
network implementation. Any requirements referring to the internal state maintained by the im-
plementation are ignored because they are not visible externally. However, executing multiple
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implementations for the same protocol specification and comparing their response behaviour for
the same test input packet enable SYMBEXNET to check some parts of functions handling internal
states.
We generated test packets from both Avahi and Bonjour and replayed them against the JmDNS
daemon, which resulted in the discovery of a range of violations. SYMBEXNET can be used to
check network implementations whose source code is not available, as long as appropriate test
packets have been generated by other implementations of the same network protocol. Since net-
works may run legacy daemons without the availability of source code, a behavioral checking
technique that are not depend on the availability of source code can be a practical solution to these
legacy situations.
The number of generated test packets, the runtime and memory consumption of SYMBEXNET, and
the source code coverage achieved are all dependent on the amount of symbolic input in packets.
Making all fields in an input packet symbolic is usually not possible because it can lead to path
explosion. However, our approach of systematically making all possible combinations of fields
symbolic, starting with only one field and gradually making more fields symbolic, seems to achieve
a good trade-off between run time and code coverage.
Unlike stateless network protocol implementations, stateful implementations that exchange a series
of packets to perform a task are more difficult to explore. MPE-SE, our approach for performing
symbolic execution repeatedly on selected symbolic inputs, guides the implementation to reach
deep execution paths that can only be explored after exchanging specifically ordered packets. This
generates sequences of packet that can achieve broad and deep exploration of program code paths.
In summary, SYMBEXNET generates high quality test suites for checking network protocol imple-
mentations. With the rule-based packet inspection technique, SYMBEXNET detects various types
of flaws in implementations of network protocols. The generated test packets from multiple im-
plementations of the same network protocol can also be used to check the interoperability between
the implementations.
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Conclusions
IMPLEMENTATIONS of modern network protocols, such as DNS and DHCP, are prone to flawsand security vulnerabilities caused by ambiguous requirements in protocol specifications. Such
problems are hard to detect because they are often triggered by complex sequences of packets that
occur only after prolonged operation. Traditional verification and testing approaches have been
used to detect problems in network protocol implementations. However, it is difficult to detect com-
plex problems using these techniques. We found symbolic execution to be a powerful technique for
generating test inputs that explore a protocol implementation in order to check it against its specifi-
cation. Although recent symbolic execution techniques improve source code coverage while avoid-
ing computational cost, they are often limited to explore shallow execution states of network proto-
col implementations because deep states can only be reached after exchanging a series of packets.
In this thesis, we described SYMBEXNET, a practical checking system for network protocol im-
plementations. A set of packet rules derived from a standard protocol specification and a set of
input packets using symbolic execution enable SYMBEXNET to discover violations in real-world
network daemon implementations as well as interoperability problems. SYMBEXNET leverages
exploration methods based on symbolic execution to generate high quality test packets. We found
that these test input packets can also be used to check the interoperability of network protocol
implementations.
SYMBEXNET combines symbolic execution with automata-based rule checking and is capable of
discovering different types of network protocol flaws in implementations. To explore complex
packet exchange sequences, we developed an exploration method (MPE-SE) that repeatedly per-
forms symbolic execution on selected test input packets. To check interoperability, we introduced a
method that detects behavioural deviations between implementations of the same network protocol
specification.
We began with an overview of the formal techniques that can be used to verify network protocols.
In order to understand the benefits of formal verification as well as their limitations, we applied
one of the techniques, model checking, to a network management protocol that is widely used to
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configure cellular 3G base stations. Our case study reveals that verification can rigorously detect
incorrect behaviour but is limited to trivial deployment scenarios.
SYMBEXNET enables developers to create a link between specifications and implementations of
network protocols. The input to SYMBEXNET is the C source code of a network protocol imple-
mentation and a set of rules extracted from the specification that describes invalid patterns of input
and output packets. Using symbolic execution, SYMBEXNET generates an exhaustive set of input
packets and sequences that can achieve broad and deep exploration of program execution paths. It
then replays the test packets against the implementation and uses a rule-based packet analyser to
detect rule violations indicating implementation errors.
In order to automatically generate effective interoperability test packets, we introduced symbolic
interoperability testing (SIOT), a novel interoperability testing method that: (1) generates a set of
test packets for IOT by integrating the generated test packets from each implementation under test
using symbolic execution; (2) replays the test packets across multiple implementations and records
all input and output network traffic; and (3) compares the behaviour of these implementations
to check if they are interoperable. Since the implementations are developed based on the same
protocol specification and tested under the same conditions, they are expected to behave in the
same manner. For checking interoperability, SYMBEXNET uses an extended rule-based packet
analysis technique that is able to compare the behaviour of multiple implementations.
These techniques enable SYMBEXNET to check automatically a network implementation against
its protocol specification and discover three different types of violations: generic errors, semantic
errors and interoperability errors. We implemented SYMBEXNET and validated it on multiple
network protocol implementations of two protocols: the Zeroconf network configuration protocol
and the DHCP protocol. SYMBEXNET successfully detected a total of 39 non-trivial errors in the
evaluated implementations. Most of these errors have been confirmed and fixed by the responsible
developers.
7.1 Future Work
SYMBEXNET can be extended in a number of directions. First, it can achieve higher code cov-
erage through the development of smart symbolic marking strategies. Next, SYMBEXNET can
be enhanced to check mobile applications. Finally, SYMBEXNET can be extended to become a
framework providing fully automated network service verification across multiple network hosts.
Enhanced Conformance Testing. To ensure the reliability of network protocols, they must be
checked for conformance with their protocol specifications. Usually test packets suites are derived
from an abstract model such as a finite state machine (FSM). The implementation is tested for
conformance by applying test packets and verifying the corresponding outputs. However, confor-
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mance testing suites are not sound and often unable to detect critical errors [Tre94]. In addition,
testing suites provide only limited coverage [TCM98].
We propose developing a verification methodology that can be used for generating high-coverage
conformance testing suites. The methodology can be viewed as a combination of conformance
testing and symbolic execution, thereby providing a means for generating test input cases that
enhance conformance testing and can achieve high testing coverage. Similar to SYMBEXNET, the
proposed method could generate a conformance test suite by symbolically executing a protocol
implementation with carefully selected conformance testing inputs.
Verification Framework for Mobile Applications. Mobile applications are increasingly ubiq-
uitous. However, there are concerns about how third-party mobile applications may misuse
or improperly handle privacy-sensitive data. Although many providers and researchers try to
provide secure application frameworks for today’s mobile devices, this is still an open prob-
lem [EGC+10, GE11, SFK+10].
We believe that new verification frameworks are required to cope with these types of security
problems. Current mobile application markets distribute applications in a centralised way. There-
fore introducing an application verification step could improve significantly the security of mobile
devices. While the choice of verification technique remains an open question, symbolic execu-
tion could be used to explore all possible code paths of an application and examine whether any
privacy-sensitive data could be leaked.
Predictive Runtime Verification. Verification is a rigorous way for discovering incorrect be-
haviour but may suffer from the state explosion problem. This problem precludes its use in non-
trivial deployment scenarios. As a solution, we propose a new verification architecture for au-
tonomous networks that exploits runtime verification [BS01, HR01, KLS+02]. The approach aims
to combine the scalability of simulations with the rigour of verification techniques such as model
checking and symbolic execution. Within such an architecture, a runtime verifier is embedded into
network service daemons and continuously monitors and checks the network state against desired
properties to provide correctness guarantees.
The main idea is to apply runtime verification techniques to verify autonomous networks. Runtime
verification applies verification techniques during program execution to detect faults. A runtime
verifier periodically checks the correctness of a protocol and implementation at runtime. During
normal system operation, runtime verification observes the system’s input and output behaviour to
verify given properties. Desired correctness properties are checked in potential future states of the
network model derived from the protocol. Since this results in a bounded state depth without con-
sidering the entire state space, it minimises the number of explored states and thus avoids the state
explosion problem. When a potential violation is detected, a fault-avoidance mechanism such as ig-
noring an input packet causing the violation could be used to influence the operation of the network.
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APPENDIXA
Evaluation Results for Case Study
The goal of this experimental evaluation is to evaluate the feasibility of formal verification com-
pared to simulation. We use the SPIN model checker to search the state space for collision or
confusion violations of the PCI selection algorithm described in Section 2.3.1. We choose the
minimum number of available PCIs to be 30 to ensure enough PCIs for the 5 × 5 matrix. For the
case study scenario, we limit the maximum number of available PCIs to 110 to reduce the number
of verifiable states. We use this range of PCIs in the experiments unless otherwise stated. For
simulation results, we run each experiment 500 times to ensure a reasonable number of samples.
Single base station scenario. In this scenario, one eNB is deployed in a 5 × 5 matrix and the
other 24 places have pre-deployed eNBs. The self-configuration requirement is that the PCI of the
new eNB is collision- and confusion-free in relation to the other cells. We evaluate this scenario
according to the PCI assignment algorithm (described in Section 2.3.1) in three cases: (1) PCI
LIST: the eNB can only receive a valid list of available PCIs from the OAM; (2) NEIGHBOUR
DETECT: the eNB can detect its neighbours’ PCIs; and (3) X2: eNBs can exchange neighbour
information over the X2 interface.
The verification results show that for (1) PCI LIST, there are 8 collisions and 16 confusions; for
(2) NEIGHBOUR DETECT, there are no collisions and 16 confusions; and for (3) X2, there are no
collisions and confusions. It shows the potential number of states that the deployed eNB has with
collisions and confusions. When the eNB cannot detect neighbours’ PCIs and communicate with
other eNBs through the X2 interface (PCI LIST), both collisions and confusions may occur. When
the eNB is capable of detecting its neighbours’ PCIs (NEIGHBOUR DETECT), the collision-free
property can be guaranteed but confusions may still happen due to the lack of PCI information
about neighbours’ neighbours. When the X2 interface is added (X2), there are no collisions or
confusions. This result provides evidence for the usefulness of the 3GPP’s recommendation of
neighbour detection and the X2 interface.
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Figure A.1: Verification and simulation results for two deployed eNBs
Multiple base station scenario. We consider two eNBs that are deployed concurrently as neigh-
bours. We assume that all optional extensions are implemented by each eNB, which is why we do
not expect collisions or confusions.
Figure A.1(a) presents the verification results in terms of potential collisions and the total number
of state transitions. The x-axis shows the number of available PCIs, the y-axis shows the collisions
(left) and the total state transitions (right). As the number of available PCIs increases, the number
of collision states also increases linearly and the total transition states of the model increase faster
than the collision states. This indicates that, with more PCIs, the possibility of collisions occurring
is lower, but they still exist.
Figure A.1(b) shows the simulation results of the average number of occurred collisions. We can
see that, as we increase the number of available PCIs, the number of detected collisions decreases.
This implies that when there are more PCIs, the possibility of collisions can be reduced. Simulation
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cannot detect all potential collisions when there are many candidate PCIs, while verification can
always detect all possible collision states. For assessing the collision-free property, verification is
more rigorous.
Overall, both our verification and simulation results provide evidence that collisions and confusions
cannot be avoided due to the concurrent PCI selection, which has not been addressed in the 3GPP
specification.
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Packet Rules
This appendix lists the packet rules used in the experiments. The derived packet rules for the
Zeroconf and DHCP protocols are listed in Section B.1 and B.2, respectively.
B.1 Packet Rules for the Zeroconf Protocol
The following gives the full list of rules for the Zeroconf protocol.
#Rule1:
# If the source UDP port in a received Multicast DNS Query is not port 5353, this
# indicates that the client originating the query is a simple client that does not
# fully implement all of Multicast DNS. In this case, the Multicast DNS Responder
# MUST send a UDP response directly back to the client, via unicast, to the query
# packet’s source IP address and port.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.sport != 0x14e9 AND pkt1.dport = 0x14e9 AND pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.QR = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.qu = @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.dport != @pkt1.sport}
MSG: MDNS Responder MUST send a UDP response directly to the query packet’s source port.
#Rule2:
# If the source UDP port in a received Multicast DNS Query is not port 5353, this
# indicates that the client originating the query is a simple client that does not
# fully implement all of Multicast DNS. In this case, the Multicast DNS Responder
# MUST send a UDP response directly back to the client, via unicast, to the query
# packet’s source IP address and port.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.sport != 0x14e9 AND pkt1.dport = 0x14e9 AND pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.QR = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.qu = @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.d_ip != @pkt1.s_ip}
MSG: MDNS Responder MUST send a UDP response directly to the query packet’s source ip.
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# Rule3:
# In multicast responses, including gratuitous multicast responses, the Query ID
# MUST be set to zero on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.destip = 0xe00000fb AND pkt1.dport = 0x14e9 AND pkt1.flag.QR = 0x80
AND pkt1.id != 0x00}
MSG: The Query ID of response packet to multicase request MUST be set to zero.
# Rule4:
# In unicast response messages generated specifically in response to a particular
# (unicast or multicast) query, the Query ID MUST match the ID from the query message.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.QR = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.destip != 0xe00000fb AND pkt2.flag.QR = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu
AND pkt2.id != @pkt1.id}
MSG: The Query ID of response packet to multicase request MUST match the ID from the
query message.
# Rule5:
# In response messages for Multicast Domains, the Authoritative Answer bit MUST be
# set to one.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.authoritative != 0x04}
MSG: In response messages, the Authoritative Answer bit MUST be set to one.
# Rule6:
# In multicast response messages, the TC bit MUST be zero on transmission, and MUST
# be ignored on reception.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.truncated != 0x00}
MSG: The TC bit MUST be zero on transmission.
#Rule7:
# In both multicast query and multicast response messages, the Recursion Available
# bit MUST be zero on transmission.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.recurA != 0x00}
MSG: The Recursion Available bit MUST be zero on transmission.
#Rule8:
# In both query and response messages, the Zero bit MUST be zero on transmission.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.z != 0x00}
MSG: The Zero bit MUST be zero on transmission.
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#Rule9:
# In both multicast query and multicast response messages the Authentic Data bit
# MUST be zero on transmission
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.answerAuth != 0x00}
MSG: The Authentic Data bit MUST be zero on transmission.
#Rule10:
# In both multicast query and multicast response messages, the Checking Disabled bit
# MUST be zero on transmission,
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.cd != 0x00}
MSG: The Checking Disabled bit MUST be zero on transmission.
#Rule11:
# In both multicast query and multicast response messages, the Response Code
# MUST be zero on transmission.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.flag.rCode != 0x00}
MSG: The Response Code MUST be zero on transmission.
#Rule12:
# The resource record TTL given in a legacy unicast response SHOULD NOT be greater
# than ten seconds, even if the true TTL of the Multicast DNS resource record is higher.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.destip != 0xe00000fb AND pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu
AND pkt2.data.an.ttl > 0x00000a}
MSG: TTL in a legacy unicast response SHOULD be greater than ten seconds.
#Rule13:
# Multicast query message has to include more than one question.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.questions = 0x00} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu}
MSG: Multicast responder MUST NOT response to malformed query.
# Rule14:
# Multicast response message has to include more than one answer
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.answerRRs = 0x00}
MSG: Multicast response message MUST include more than one answer.
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# Rule15:
# Multicast query message has to include more than one question and data field
# has to contain exact number of questions
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.questions != 0x00 AND pkt1.questions != pkt1.data.qu};
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu}
MSG: MDNS responder received a malformed packet that has inconsistence questions field,
but it replied to the question.
# Rule16:
# Multicast response message has to include more than one answer and data field
# has to contain exact number of answers
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.answerRRs != 0x00 AND pkt2.answerRRs !=
pkt2.data.an}
MSG: The number of answers in data field MUST same to the answers in header field.
# Rule17:
# Multicast response message has to include more than one Authority RRs and data
# field has to contain exact number of answers.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.authorRRs != 0x00 AND pkt2.authorRRs !=
pkt2.data.ns}
MSG: The number of authority records in data field MUST same to the authority bytes in
header field.
# Rule18:
# Any DNS query for a name ending with ".local." MUST be sent to the mDNS multicast
# address (224.0.0.251 or its IPv6 equivalent FF02::FB).
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff AND pkt1.data.qu.name ˆ ’local’
AND pkt1.destip != 0xe00000fb} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.
data.qu}
MSG: MDNS responder responded to a DNS query for a name ending with local not to be sent
to the mDNS multicast address.
# Rule19:
# Multicast DNS Responses MUST NOT contain any questions in the Question Section.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.destip = 0xe00000fb AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu
AND pkt2.questions != 0x00}
MSG: Multicast DNS Responses MUST NOT contain any questions in the Questions field.
#Rule20:
# MDNS Responder MUST not response to a malformed query that contains inconsistence
# questions and questions’s data
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.questions != 0x00 AND pkt1.questions != pkt1.data.qu};
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80 AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu}
MSG: MDNS Responder MUST NOT response to a malformed query.
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#Rule21:
# 250ms after the first probing query the host should send a second, then 250ms after
# that a third.
==
BOF ; pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type = 0x00ff} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt2.data.qu.type = 0x00ff AND pkt2.data.qu = @pkt1.data.qu
AND pkt2.timestamp > @pkt1.timestamp + 0.5}
MSG: MDNS Responder sends successive proving packets not within 250ms.
#Rule22:
# For probing query, 250ms after the first query the host should send a second, then
# 250ms after that a third.
==
BOF ; pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type = 0x00ff} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt2.data.qu = @pkt1.data.qu} ; pkt3 {pkt3.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt3.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu}
MSG: MDNS Responder enters announcing packet too late
# Rule23:
# Because of the mDNS multicast rate limiting rules, the first two probes SHOULD be
# sent as "QU" questions with the "unicast response" bit set, to allow a defending
# host to respond immediately via unicast, instead of potentially having to wait before
# replying via multicast.
==
BOF ; pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type = 0x00ff
AND pkt1.data.qu.class = 0x0001}
MSG: The first two probes SHOULD be sent as QU questions with unicast response.
# Rule24:
# Because of the mDNS multicast rate limiting rules, the first two probes SHOULD
# be sent as "QU" questions with the "unicast response" bit set, to allow a defending
# host to respond immediately via unicast, instead of potentially having to wait before
# replying via multicast.
==
BOF ; pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type = 0x00ff
AND pkt1.data.qu.class = 0x8001} ; pkt2 {pkt2.flag.qr = 0x00
AND pkt2.data.qu = @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.data.qu.class = 0x0001};
MSG: The first two probes SHOULD be sent as QU questions with unicast response.
# Rule25:
# The "cache flush" bit MUST NOT be set in any resource records in a response packet
# sent in legacy unicast responses to UDP ports other than 5353.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.flag.qr = 0x00 AND pkt1.data.qu.type != 0x00ff} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.destip != 0xe00000fb AND pkt2.dport != 0x14e9 AND pkt2.flag.qr = 0x80
AND pkt2.data.an ˆ @pkt1.data.qu AND pkt2.data.an.flushbit = 0x8000}
MSG: The "cache flush" bit MUST NOT be set in any resource records in a response packet
sent in legacy unicast responses to UDP ports other than 5353.
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B.2 Packet Rules for the DHCP Protocol
The following gives the full list of rules for the DHCP protocol.
# Rule 1:
# If ’giaddr’ is 0x0 in the DHCPREQUEST message, the client is on the same subnet as
# the server. The server MUST broadcast the DHCPNAK message to the 0xffffffff
# broadcast address because the client may not have a correct network address or
# subnet mask, and the client may not be answering ARP requests
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x04 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid
AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06 AND pkt2.destip != 0xffffffff}
MSG: DHCPNAK message MUST be broadcasted to the 0xffffffff broadcast address.
# Rule2:
# If ’giaddr’ is not 0x0 in the DHCPREQUEST message, the server MUST send the DHCPNAK
# message to the IP address of the BOOTP relay agent, as recorded in ’giaddr’.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x04 AND pkt1.giaddr != 0x00000000} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid
AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06 AND pkt2.destip != @pkt1.giaddr}
MSG: DHCPNAK message MUST be broadcasted to the giaddr in the DHCPREQUEST message.
# Rule3:
# OFFER - IP address lease time MUST be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.51 = NULL}
MSG: DHCPOFFER message MUST provide IP address lease time
# Rule4:
# ACK - IP address lease time MUST (DHCPREQUEST) be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.51 = NULL}
MSG: DHCPACK message MUST provide IP address lease time
# Rule5:
# OFFER - Server identifier MUST be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.54 = NULL}
MSG: DHCPOFFER message MUST provide sever identifier
# Rule6:
# ACK - Server identifier MUST be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.54 = NULL}
MSG: DHCPACK message MUST provide sever identifier
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# Rule7:
# NAK - Server identifier MUST be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.opts.54 = NULL}
MSG: DHCPNAK message MUST provide sever identifier
# Rule8:
# The server MUST return to the client about the client’s network address
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.yiaddr = 0x00000000}
MSG: The server MUST return the client’s network address to the client
# Rule9:
# OFFER - Requested IP address MUST NOT be included
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.50 != NULL }
MSG: OFFER message MUST NOT provide requested ip address
# Rule10:
# ACK - Requested IP address MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.50 != NULL }
MSG: ACK message MUST NOT provide requested ip address
# Rule11:
# NAK - Requested IP address MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.opts.50 != NULL }
MSG: NACK message MUST NOT provide requested ip address
# Rule12:
# ACK - IP address lease time MUST NOT (DHCPINFORM) be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x08} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.destip = @pkt1.ciaddr AND pkt2.opts.51 != NULL }
MSG: ACK message for DHCPINFORM MUST NOT provide IP address lease time
# Rule13:
# NAK - IP address lease time MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.opts.51 != NULL }
MSG: NACK message MUST NOT provide IP address lease time
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# Rule14:
# NAK - ’file’/’sname’ fields MUST NOT be used
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.sname != 0x00 }
MSG: NACK message MUST NOT use ’file’/’sname’ fields
# Rule15:
# OFFER - Parameter request list MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.55 != NULL }
MSG: OFFER message MUST NOT provide Parameter request list
# Rule16:
# ACK - Parameter request list MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.55 != NULL }
MSG: ACK message MUST NOT provide Parameter request list
#Rule17:
# NACK - Parameter request list MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.opts.55 != NULL }
MSG: NACK message MUST NOT provide Parameter request list
# Rule18:
# OFFER - Client identifier MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.61 != NULL }
MSG: OFFER message MUST NOT provide Client identifier
#Rule19:
# ACK - Client identifier MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.61 != NULL }
MSG: ACK message MUST NOT provide Client identifier
# Rule20:
# OFFER - Maximum message size MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND pkt2.opts.57 != NULL }
MSG: OFFER message MUST NOT provide Maximum message size
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#Rule21:
# ACK - Maximum message size MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND pkt2.opts.57 != NULL }
MSG: ACK message MUST NOT provide Maximum message size
#Rule22:
# NACK - Maximum message size MUST NOT be provided
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x03} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06
AND pkt2.opts.57 != NULL }
MSG: NACK message MUST NOT provide Maximum message size
#Rule23:
# If the ’giaddr’ field is zero and the ’ciaddr’ field is nonzero, then the server
unicasts
# DHCPOFFER messages to the address in ’ciaddr’.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr != 0x00000000} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02 AND destip != @pkt1.ciaddr }
MSG: OFFER message must send to ciaddr in DISCOVER message from the client
# Rule24:
# If the ’giaddr’ field is zero and the ’ciaddr’ field is nonzero, then the server
# unicasts DHCPACK messages to the address in ’ciaddr’.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr != 0x00000000} ;
pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05 AND destip != @pkt1.ciaddr }
MSG: DHCPACK message must send to ciaddr in DISCOVER message from the client
# Rule25:
# If ’giaddr’ is zero and ’ciaddr’ is zero, and the broadcast bit is set, then the server
# broadcasts DHCPOFFER messages to 0xffffffff.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr = 0x00000000
AND pkt1.flags.br = 0x80} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND destip != 0xffffffff }
MSG: DHCPOFFER message must send to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255
#Rule26:
# If ’giaddr’ is zero and ’ciaddr’ is zero, and the broadcast bit is set, then the server
# broadcasts DHCPACK messages to 0xffffffff.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr = 0x00000000
AND pkt1.flags.br = 0x80} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND destip != 0xffffffff }
MSG: DHCPACK message must send to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255
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# Rule27:
# If the broadcast bit is not set and ’giaddr’ is zero and ’ciaddr’ is zero, then the
# server unicasts DHCPOFFER messages to the client’s hardware address and ’yiaddr’
address.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr = 0x00000000
AND pkt1.flags.br != 0x80} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x02
AND destip = 0xffffffff }
MSG: DHCPOFFER message must not send to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255
# Rule28:
# If the broadcast bit is not set and ’giaddr’ is zero and ’ciaddr’ is zero, then the
# server unicasts DHCPOFFER messages to the client’s hardware address and ’yiaddr’
# address.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000 AND pkt1.ciaddr = 0x00000000
AND pkt1.flags.br != 0x80} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x05
AND destip = 0xffffffff }
MSG: DHCPACK message must not send to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255
# Rule29:
# In all cases, when ’giaddr’ is zero, the server broadcasts any DHCPNAK messages
# to 0xffffffff.
==
pkt1 {pkt1.opts.53 = 0x01 AND pkt1.giaddr = 0x00000000} ; pkt2 {pkt2.xid = @pkt1.xid
AND pkt2.opts.53 = 0x06 AND destip != 0xffffffff }
MSG: DHCPNAK message must send to the broadcast address 255.255.255.255
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